POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Edited for the Academy of Political Science by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University

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Volume LXX *March 1955* *Number 1*

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE ANTI-COLONIAL POLICIES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

AN important phase of the foreign policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt was a vigorous and persistent opposition to colonialism. He definitely believed in that section of the Atlantic Charter which affirmed the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government; in his opinion it was as applicable to the peoples of Asia as to those of Europe. His conception of a future world order to be developed through the international organization that took form and shape as the United Nations had as one of its basic provisions a final end to imperialism.

Throughout the entire period of the war, Roosevelt continued to maintain this point of view. He believed that the European Powers should follow the example the United States was prepared to set in the Philippines and provide for the immediate self-government and ultimate independence of their overseas possessions and colonies. He was convinced that there should be no restoration of foreign authority in those areas of Eastern Asia liberated from Japanese control, and that, wherever autonomy was impractical, the United Nations rather than any single country should exercise a mandatory power and serve as trustee for the peace-loving nations of the world. He envisaged a world-wide string of naval and air bases that, again under the control of the United Nations, would uphold international peace in a democratic world.

* * * *

Roosevelt had not always been anti-imperialist.[1] During

[1] In apparent contradiction to this statement—but obviously not of any real significance in studying Roosevelt's mature views—there might be cited evidence

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the years in which he served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the Wilson Administration, he exhibited a strongly paternalistic attitude toward existing American colonies, and at least in the Caribbean would have favored the acquisition of additional territory. In 1913, he endorsed a memorandum drawn up by Admiral Fiske proposing new American bases in Central America, and after the actual purchase of the Danish West Indies, he urged the taking over of all Dutch interests in the Caribbean. He further believed in the responsibility of the United States in upholding—if necessary through forceful intervention—the general stability of the Caribbean area, and was far less concerned than his chief, Josephus Daniels, over the implications of the action taken to restore order in Haiti with the landing of American marines.[2] There is the well-known story of his subsequent boasting that he had himself written Haiti's constitution—"and, if I do say it, I think it is a pretty good constitution."[3]

Roosevelt was prepared to support fully the Wilsonian program of world organization advanced after the First World War. He not only believed the United States should join the League of Nations, but as the vice-presidential candidate of his party in 1920 he campaigned vigorously on this issue. Still, his views of international coöperation did not preclude the maintenance by either the United States or other Powers of their colonial possessions. There was at this period in his life no evidence

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of a very early expression of the ideas to which he ultimately subscribed. On January 19, 1898—as a schoolboy at Groton—Roosevelt took the negative in a debate: "Resolved: That Hawaii be promptly annexed." His position was that "if we go in for foreign colonies we must stick to that policy and not only are foreign colonies expensive, but they are dangerous children and may bring political differences upon the mother country at any moment." Elliott Roosevelt, ed., *FDR—His Personal Letters* (New York, 1947), I, 160.

[2] Frank Freidel, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Apprenticeship* (Boston, 1952), pp. 271–74. Daniels has written that he advised withdrawing the marines and letting the Haitians govern themselves. Josephus Daniels, *The Wilson Era: Years of War and After, 1917–1923* (Chapel Hill, 1946), p. 254.

[3] Roosevelt's biographer has pointed out that there was no justification for this statement, for Roosevelt had little or no part in drawing up Haiti's constitution, but that in spite of later denials the statement as quoted was made on August 18, 1920, at Deer Lodge, Montana. Frank Freidel, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Ordeal* (Boston, 1954), p. 81. For full discussion of his actual part in intervention in Haiti, see Freidel, *The Apprenticeship*, pp. 283–84.

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of any feeling that those peoples held under foreign control should be encouraged to expect independence.

Two years after his unsuccessful vice-presidential campaign, he took occasion to endorse heartily the rigid program that his friend General Leonard Wood was trying to carry out in the Philippine Islands. On March 30, 1922, he wrote:

> It does seem to me a pity that both of our parties at home cannot get together and definitely state the American policy toward the Philippine Islands, Porto Rico, Haiti, and Santo Domingo. The vast majority of people in this country, I have always been certain, understand that complete independence for all these people is not to be thought of for many years to come.[4]

The attitude reflected in this statement, however, was soon to change. In the mid-1920's Roosevelt vigorously urged a more generous and coöperative policy in the Caribbean and toward Latin America generally, and strongly opposed intervention in Nicaragua. He took the position that the United States should carry out its pledges for ultimate withdrawal from the Philippines. As his biographer has stated, "he gradually came to see the error in his thinking on imperialism and strongly sponsored a different sort of program."[5]

This new point of view was revealed in an article Roosevelt wrote for *Foreign Affairs* in 1928. He now spoke of the important service that the anti-imperialists had performed in 1898 in helping to direct policy in the Philippine Islands toward educating the Filipinos for self-government. He was highly critical of past intervention in the Caribbean, although admitting that during the Wilson Administration he had "a slight part in these actions." The onetime imperialist had been awakened to a new conception of the world rôle of the United States:

> The time has come when we must accept not only certain facts but many new principles of a higher law, a new and better standard in international relations. We are exceedingly jealous of our own

[4] Freidel, *The Ordeal*, p. 136.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 137. A journalist especially close to him at the close of the 1920's has also noted that Roosevelt was "thoroughly anti-imperialist in thought and emotions." Ernest K. Lindley, *Half Way with Roosevelt* (New York, 1937), p. 317.

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sovereignty and it is only right that we should respect a similar feeling among other nations.[6]

As President, Franklin Roosevelt was prepared to uphold these new principles of a higher law. He repeatedly asked Congress to grant Puerto Rico the greatest possible measure of self-government, and emphatically supported the movement for granting full freedom to the Philippines.[7] In urging enactment of the legislation that finally took form as the Philippine Independence Act of 1934, Roosevelt declared, "Our nation covets no territory; it desires to hold no people against their will over whom it has gained sovereignty through war."[8]

The outbreak of European strife in 1939, and especially its repercussions in Asia as Japan allied herself with the Axis Powers, extended her sway over Indo-China, and threatened other areas in Southeastern Asia, soon aroused him to what he believed to be the necessity of assuring the peoples of Asia, as well as those of Europe, that the Allied cause was the cause of freedom. He realized that there was no other way of gaining their support. On March 15, 1941, in an address to the White House Correspondents Association, he asserted in unequivocal terms: "There has never been, there isn't now, and there never will be, any race of people on earth fit to serve as masters over their fellow men . . . . We believe that any nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent right to its own nationhood."[9]

Such ideas were very much in Roosevelt's mind when in August 1941 he was on his way to that famous meeting with Prime Minister Churchill which was to produce the Atlantic Charter. In his reminiscences of conversations with his father at this time, Elliott Roosevelt may not always be completely reliable. Yet there can be little question that what he has recorded

[6] *Foreign Affairs*, VI (July 1928), 573–86.

[7] For general statements on policy toward the Philippines and Puerto Rico, see Samuel I. Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York, 1938, 1941, 1950), IV, 494; XI, 475; XII, 117; XIII, 245. *Congressional Record*, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3580–81 (March 2, 1934); 78th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1686 (March 9, 1943); 78th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 7841–42 (September 28, 1943).

[8] March 2, 1934. Rosenman, *op. cit.*, III, 118.

[9] *Ibid.*, X, 69.

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reflects the spirit, if it does not always give the correct substance, of Franklin Roosevelt's insistent anti-imperialism.[10]

Elliott Roosevelt recalls his father stating that he felt it essential to make clear in his forthcoming talks with Churchill that the United States was not prepared to aid England "so that she will be able to continue to ride roughshod over colonial peoples." And this he apparently did, to something less than the complete satisfaction of the Prime Minister. Roosevelt's insistence that establishment of a stable peace involved the development of backward peoples, the removal of artificial barriers to world trade, and the end to "eighteenth-century" economic relationships between the East and West struck an unhappy note for the British statesman. Elliott Roosevelt wrote:

> India, Burma—these were reproaches. Father, having once mentioned them aloud, would keep reminding his British hearers of them, sticking his strong finger into sore consciences, prodding, needling. And it was not from perversity, either; it was from conviction. Churchill knew that; that was what worried him most. Smoothly he changed the course of conversation . . . to keep the subject away from Father and his mention of the colonial question. . . .[11]

When Elliott later suggested that his father and Churchill were going to be able to work together only so long as they stayed off the topic of India, Franklin Roosevelt purportedly replied that he thought there would have to be "some more talk about India before we are through." Then he added: "*And* Burma. *And* Java. *And* Indo-China. *And* Indonesia. *And* all the African colonies. *And* Egypt and Palestine. We'll

[10] Elliott Roosevelt, *As He Saw It* (New York, 1946). The contemporary reviews of this book almost universally questioned the accuracy of Elliott's direct quotations of his father, and cautioned the reader upon the reliability of the author's sources and notes. Yet as Jonathan Daniels wrote in the *Saturday Review of Literature:* "Politicians and historians may violently quarrel over it but neither politicians nor historians will ever be able to disregard it." *Saturday Review of Literature,* vol. 29, October 5, 1946. Chester Wilmot has written that, in spite of misrepresentation on some issues, evidence indicates "that Elliott was not an inaccurate reporter of the views his father held on the colonial questions." *The Struggle for Europe* (New York, 1952), p. 633n.

[11] Elliott Roosevelt, *As He Saw It,* pp. 25, 38.

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talk about all of them. . . ."[12] It was his apparent conviction that the overwhelming need of Churchill to assure British survival would enable the United States to exercise decisive pressure in favor of an entirely new approach to colonial problems everywhere.

As finally evolved, the statement in the Atlantic Charter that bore upon these issues was the declaration made by Roosevelt and Churchill that the two nations for which they were spokesmen "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live."[13] There at once became apparent, however, a sharp difference in the interpretation that the two men were prepared to place upon this declaration of policy. Roosevelt was to make it clear that he considered it of universal application; that is, extending to the peoples of Asia as well as to the peoples of Europe overrun by Germany.[14] Churchill expressed a directly opposite point of view. Addressing Parliament after his return from the meeting with Roosevelt, he declared that the Atlantic Charter in no way qualified existing British policy in India or Burma, and that what had been primarily under consideration was the restoration of the sovereignty of the European nations under the Nazi yoke—"quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples which owe allegiance to the British Crown."[15]

The most important issue underlying this divergence of opinion was the status of India. Both the Roosevelt Administration and the American people generally were greatly exercised over the failure of Great Britain to show more sympathy for the independence movement in that country, and Roosevelt was unwilling to drop the matter in spite of Churchill's obvious

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[13] State Department, *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–41* (Washington, 1943), pp. 717–20; Rosenman, *op. cit.*, X, 315.

[14] On his return after the conference Roosevelt refused to amplify the official announcement of the Atlantic Charter—the United States was an avowed neutral in the war. His most explicit statement on the Charter's scope was made over a year later, on October 27, 1942. *New York Times*, October 28, 1942.

[15] September 9, 1941. *Parliamentary Debates*, Fifth Series, vol. 374, cols. 68–69.

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resentment at what he considered unjustified American meddling in a solely British problem. At the meeting between the two statesmen in Washington after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the meeting that was to provide the basis for wartime coöperation and the grand coalition of the United Nations, India came up directly. Churchill has written that after Roosevelt had talked for a time "on the usual American line", he—Churchill—raised the most strenuous objections to any further discussion on India. "I reacted so strongly and at such length", added the British Prime Minister, "that he [President Roosevelt] never raised it again verbally."[16]

Nevertheless there was continuing correspondence that served to broaden rather than narrow the gap between such opposing viewpoints. In letters to Churchill on March 11, 1942 and to Harry Hopkins on April 12, 1942, the President again set forth his ideas and went into long disquisitions on how he thought Great Britain should promote self-government for India patterned on the experience of the United States under the Articles of Confederation. He told Hopkins, for transmission to Churchill, that the American public could not understand why, if the British government were willing to concede the right of India to independence after the war, it was unwilling to grant self-government during the war.[17]

Churchill's comment on these letters was acid. He wrote:

> I was thankful that events had already made such an act impossible. . . . The President's mind was back in the war of Independence. . . . Nor was the issue one upon which the satisfying of public opinion in the United States could be a determining factor. We could not desert the Indian peoples by abandoning our responsibility and leaving them to anarchy and subjugation.[18]

The next occasion when Roosevelt took up the general issue of colonialism was during his conversation with Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, in June 1942. He then proposed, on the evidence of Robert Sherwood, some form of international

[16] Winston Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate* (*The Second World War*, vol. IV, Boston, 1950), p. 209.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 213–19.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 219.

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trusteeship for the island holdings and other colonial possessions of the "weak nations".[19] Whatever he meant by this phrase, he referred specifically to Indo-China, Siam, the Malay States and the Dutch East Indies. And again according to Sherwood, Molotov replied that he had no doubt "that the President's trusteeship principle would be equally well received in Moscow."[20]

In the meantime, popular controversy remained centered on the Indian question. Returning from his world-wide tour in the autumn of 1942, Wendell Willkie, defeated Republican presidential candidate in the election two years earlier, reported to his countrymen on a nation-wide radio hook-up that people throughout the East were asking about India, and demanding the extension of the principles of the Atlantic Charter to Asia. The United States, Willkie insisted, should everywhere take a strong stand against imperialism.[21]

Roosevelt was asked at his press conference the next day—October 27—for his reaction to the Willkie address and his interpretation of the Atlantic Charter. "I have already made it perfectly clear", he answered decisively, "that we believed that the Atlantic Charter applied to all humanity. I think that is a matter of record."[22] There was no immediate response from Churchill.

A little more than a week later Willkie made a further speech in which he vigorously criticized what he termed a continuation of the "white man's burden philosophy" in the Anglo-American attitude toward the East. He praised Roosevelt's statement on the Atlantic Charter and pointed out that Churchill seemed to have given it a quite different interpretation.[23] This time the reaction of the British Prime Minister was sharp and emphatic. It was just four days later, in a speech at the Lord Mayor's dinner at Mansion House, that he made his most famous statement on colonial policy: "I have not become the

[19] Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York, 1948), p. 572.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 573.

[21] *New York Times*, October 27, 1942.

[22] *Ibid.*, October 28, 1942; Rosenman, *Papers and Addresses*, XI, 437.

[23] *New York Times*, November 7, 1942.

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King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire."[24]

Neither American interest in Indian independence nor American policy toward the general problem of colonialism was swayed by Churchill's vigorous statement. When shortly after this exchange Under Secretary of State Phillips was sent to India as the President's personal representative, his instructions gave further emphasis to Roosevelt's belief that not even India was exempt from the Atlantic Charter's provisions and that she should be given definite assurance of independence. On the briefing of Phillips on his mission on November 20, Secretary Hull reports:

> I said that the President and I and the entire Government earnestly favored freedom for all dependent peoples at the earliest practicable date. Our course in dealing with the Philippines offered, I thought, a perfect example of how a nation should treat a colony or dependency in coöperating with it to make all necessary preparations for freedom. We offered this as a strong example to all other countries and their dependencies.[25]

There was not on the part of either Roosevelt or Hull any idea of urging an immediate grant of independence to peoples not fully prepared for it. The Secretary of State particularly was to resent what he considered the too-exuberant enthusiasm of Wendell Willkie—and also of Vice President Wallace—in seeking precipitate action on colonial problems.[26] The position taken by the State Department was support for the gradual preparation of the British, French and Dutch colonies for the autonomy to which they were ultimately entitled. Anything short of this, however, was considered certain to weaken the Allied cause in Asia and create insoluble post-war problems.

The colonial issue arose in its most acute form, perhaps, when the future of the French colonies was discussed at the Casablanca conference in February 1943. Elliott Roosevelt reports his father as saying that he doubted whether the United States

[24] *Ibid.*, November 11, 1942.

[25] *Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), II, 1491.

[26] *Ibid.*, II, 1599, 1697.

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would be justified in returning to France the colonies that had been occupied by Japan and freed by American arms, without first obtaining from France some assurance as to their future administration in the interests of the colonial peoples themselves. When Elliott expostulated that after all the colonies belonged to France, the President asked by what right, and insisted that French colonial rule had been indefensible. In commenting on Indo-China, he declared that it had been "a cinch for the Japanese to conquer the land" because the Indo-Chinese had been so flagrantly down-trodden that they believed that anything was better than to continue to live under French rule. Elliott further reports his father as saying:

> When we've won the war, I will work with all my might and main to see to it that the United States is not wheedled into the position of accepting any plan that will further France's imperialistic ambitions, or that will aid or abet the British Empire in *its* imperial ambitions.[27]

Again Elliott Roosevelt may not have been an entirely accurate reporter, but there is mounting evidence from other sources that these were indeed Roosevelt's ideas on colonialism. When Foreign Secretary Eden visited Washington soon after the Casablanca conference, the President made it very clear that he did not favor any advance commitment on the return to the former controlling Power of any Far Eastern colonies liberated from Japan.[28] A few weeks later, he gave his express approval to a draft proposal for a policy statement on dependent peoples to be submitted for discussion at the forthcoming conferences with the British at Quebec.[29]

This draft proposal had two major facets. It suggested that peoples liberated from Japanese rule and unprepared for autonomy should be placed under some form of international trusteeship representing the United Nations, and that in the case of other colonial peoples, the nations charged with the responsi-

[27] Elliott Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, pp. 114–16.

[28] According to memorandum quoted in Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 718–19.

[29] See Harley Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945* (Washington, 1949), pp. 471–72; Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1234–35.

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bility of their government should follow such policies as would enable the colonies to become qualified for independent national status. To promote the latter part of this program, the colonial Powers were called upon to adopt certain specific procedures:

> They were to give their colonial peoples protection, moral support and material aid looking toward their continued political, economic, social and educational advancement.
>
> They were to make available qualified persons among the colonial peoples for governmental posts.
>
> They were to grant colonial peoples progressive measures of self-government.
>
> They were to fix at the earliest practical moment the dates at which such colonial peoples should be granted full independence.
>
> They were to pursue policies that would provide for the development of colonial peoples in the interests of the people concerned and of the whole world.[30]

These proposals were received with something less than enthusiasm by the British—Foreign Secretary Eden objected especially to the inclusion of the word "independence"[31]—but in spite of this setback, the President instructed Hull to bring the matter up again at the forthcoming conference of the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Russia and China at Moscow. At the briefing before the departure of the American delegation on October 6, 1943, the President fully outlined his position.[32]

He reaffirmed his support for the draft declaration of policy toward dependent peoples, and especially emphasized the idea of an international trusteeship in areas where autonomy was not practicable. In implementing the latter proposal, he suggested the intermediate status of trusteeship for Korea and Indo-China, and also proposed placing certain other areas under trustee control so as to provide an internationalized string of

[30] Notter, *op. cit.*, p. 471; Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1235.

[31] Notter, *op. cit.*, p. 254; Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1238.

[32] Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1305.

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strategic air and naval bases encircling the globe. He mentioned as such bases Hongkong, the Bonin Islands, the Kuriles, Truk, some place in the Solomon Islands, and, on the other side of the world, Ascension Island, Dakar and a point in Liberia.[33] Secretary Hull has stated that Roosevelt wished to apply the trusteeship idea "widely to all sorts of situations"; and Admiral Leahy, who was also present at the briefing on October 6, has written that this was "one of Roosevelt's pet ideas."[34]

No more progress was made toward the adoption of these proposals at Moscow than at Quebec. Hull has written succinctly: "We had definite ideas with respect to the future of the British colonial empire on which we differed with the British."[35] Yet the Secretary of State refused to admit that the United States did not have the right to make such proposals since failure to make provision for the ultimate self-government of the British possessions would provide the kernels for future conflict that could not help affecting the United States. And again he noted in his *Memoirs* that, in contradiction to Churchill's statement that the right of self-determination applied only to the occupied countries of Europe, both he and Roosevelt understood it to be applicable to peoples throughout the world.[36]

The President himself brought up the colonial issue in his conferences with Churchill and Stalin at Teheran, and with Chiang Kai-shek and Churchill at Cairo.[37] Meeting with Stalin prior to the formal opening of the Teheran conference, according to Sherwood, he stressed the importance of preparing the peoples of Indo-China, Burma, Malaya and the East Indies for self-government along the lines of what the United States had done in the Philippines, but cautioned Stalin against bringing up the question of India with Churchill.[38] He also talked more specifically with both Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek

[33] Hull's account of this briefing (*ibid.*, pp. 1305, 1596) is supplemented in William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (New York, 1950), p. 314.

[34] Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1305; Leahy, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

[35] Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1477–78.

[36] *Ibid.*, II, 1478.

[37] *Ibid.*, II, 1595, 1597; Rosenman, *op. cit.*, XIII, 562–63.

[38] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 777.

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about an international trusteeship for Indo-China and told Secretary Hull that they both agreed with his proposal. Roosevelt admitted Churchill's opposition to any such plan, explaining that this was due to the Prime Minister's fear of the effect that trusteeship for Indo-China, with the promise of ultimate independence, would have on the peoples of Britain's colonial possessions, but adding that he "saw no reason to play in with the British Foreign Office in this matter."[39]

Apparently Roosevelt also talked with Churchill about a further scheme for providing some system of inspection for existing colonies which would serve as a spur for the controlling government to improve conditions for the natives. Discussing these conversations at a press conference after his return from Teheran and Cairo on February 5, the President gave as a horrible example of colonial exploitation the British colony of Gambia in Africa. Admitting that its people were far from ready for self-government, he nevertheless declared that something had to be done to help them. It was his plan that a United Nations committee would visit such a colony with the purpose, as he said he had told Churchill, that "if you Britishers don't come up to scratch—toe the mark—then we will let all the world know." It is hardly surprising to find that Roosevelt then added: "Well, the Prime Minister doesn't like that idea."[40]

A month later the President discussed with Edward Stettinius the issue of trusteeship for Indo-China. He told him that both Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek had agreed with his trusteeship proposals and that, in the face of Churchill's objections, he had told the Prime Minister that he failed to realize a new period had opened in world history and was outvoted three to one. "But," the President added in his conversation with Stettinius, "we are still going to have a tough time with the British on this issue."[41]

This failure to win effective backing for either the "dependent peoples project" or a world-wide string of strategic air and

[39] Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1597.

[40] Rosenman, *op. cit.*, XIII, 69–70.

[41] Quoted from contemporary notes in Edward Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians* (New York, 1949), pp. 237–38.

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naval bases under international control prevented the United States from offering such plans when a general trusteeship system was taken up at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, held in August 1944 to set up the framework for the projected world organization that took ultimate shape as the United Nations. The American plan that was presented went no further than to advocate a system of international trusteeship for the administration "of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent agreement." Among the basic objectives of this system was the promotion of measures looking toward the political, social and economic advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories and their progressive development toward self-government, but there was no reference to ultimate independence. Moreover the trusteeship system was to apply only to territories presently held under mandate, territories detached from enemy states as a result of war, and those "territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration."[42]

This was in general terms the plan that was adopted for the trusteeship system of the United Nations, and American policy-makers were disappointed that they had been unable to win support for a more all-embracing program that would hold out the promise of self-government or ultimate independence for all colonies. In explaining this failure Secretary Hull set forth what was then—and would continue in post-war years to be—the greatest single obstacle to making Roosevelt's anti-colonial program effective:

> Our prime difficulty generally with regard to Asiatic colonial possessions, of course, was to induce the colonial powers—principally Britain, France and The Netherlands—to adopt our ideas with regard to dependent peoples . . . . But we could not press them too far with regard to the Southwest Pacific in view of the fact that we were seeking the closest possible cooperation with them in Europe. We could not alienate them in the Orient and expect to work with them in Europe.[43]

[42] *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization*, Vol. III: *Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Comments, and Proposed Amendments*, United Nations Organization (London and New York), pp. 607–608.

[43] Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1599.

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Yet the failure to incorporate some declaration of policy in support of the aspirations of the dependent peoples in the United Nations trusteeship system did not bring to an end American efforts along these lines. President Roosevelt strongly approved, in September 1944, a State Department memorandum suggesting the great value of an independent announcement by the colonial Powers of their commitment to ultimate independence for their possessions. And while nothing came of this specific proposal, Roosevelt at least went so far as officially to inform the British, French and Dutch governments that the "United States expected to be consulted on any arrangements as to the future of Southeast Asia."[44]

Secretary Hull has written:

> It might be thought that we were presumptuous in seeking to present our ideas to the British, French and Dutch Governments as to what they should do with their Pacific possessions. We had, however, two rights to take such action. One was the fact that the liberation of those possessions would not have been achieved—and possibly never could have been—except by the United States forces. The other was our interest in seeing that peace in the Pacific, restored by our forces, should continue. And we could not help believing that the indefinite continuance of the British, Dutch and French possessions in the Orient in a state of dependence provided a number of foci for future trouble and perhaps war. Permanent peace could not be assured unless those possessions were started on the road to independence. . . .[45]

Roosevelt's opposition to colonialism was to play its part in the negotiations at that most famous of wartime conferences among the Big Three—the Crimean Conference at Yalta. For, however strongly the President felt about the necessity of continued close coöperation with Great Britain, he was still highly critical of British imperialism. On this issue he appeared to believe that the interests of the United States and Soviet Russia were much more closely allied, and that particularly in Asia they should present a common front on the colonial issue. Chester Wilmot, indeed, has suggested that the President's

[44] *Ibid.*, II, 1600.

[45] *Ibid.*, II, 1601.

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ideas along these lines played an important part in his willingness —or anxiety—to assure Russia's entry into the Pacific war.[46]

There is no evidence that the President sought at Yalta to revive his program for assuring the dependent peoples of ultimate independence or establishing a world-wide string of bases under international control. Nevertheless the provisions for trusteeship territories in the proposed charter of the United Nations skirted rather close to the edge of such proposals. When the foreign ministers reported agreement on the principles underlying the machinery for the trusteeship system, Prime Minister Churchill suddenly exploded. The accounts of this episode by Stettinius, Admiral Leahy and Robert Sherwood agree entirely on Churchill's emotion and differ only slightly in recording his emphatic statement. Admiral Leahy has written:

> Roosevelt then brought up the system of trusteeship as proposed in the draft charter of the United Nations Organization. Churchill was on his feet immediately. The Prime Minister refused to consider permitting any agency to deal with any territory under the British flag. He said, "While there is life in my body no transfer of British sovereignty will be permissible."[47]

He was quieted, according to Leahy's report, only when it was explained to him that the trusteeship program—whatever the United States might have desired—did not contemplate any interference with existing colonies and applied only to the former Japanese mandated islands.

Although he was unable to implement his ideas for promising colonial people ultimate independence, placing Indo-China and

[46] Wilmot has written that in Roosevelt's eyes "Britain was an Imperial Power, bearing the 'colonial stigma'; Russia was not. That assessment of his allies was a decisive factor in Roosevelt's readiness to make concessions to the Soviet Union both in Europe and in Asia to ensure Stalin's entry into the Pacific War. . . ." *Op. cit.*, pp. 640, 642–43.

[47] Leahy, *op. cit.*, p. 313. Sherwood reports that Churchill said he "would never consent under any circumstances to the United Nations thrusting interfering fingers into the very life of the British Empire." Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 865. Stettinius wrote that the Prime Minister, interrupting his report, declared that "under no circumstances . . . would he ever consent to the fumbling fingers of forty or fifty nations prying into the life's existence of the British Empire. As long as he was Prime Minister . . . he would never yield one scrap of Britain's heritage." Stettinius, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

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other such liberated territories under a trusteeship, and creating a world-wide string of bases under United Nations control, Roosevelt was never persuaded that such a program did not represent the most promising way of dealing with the colonial problem as a whole. On his way home from Yalta he talked with the correspondents aboard the *U.S.S. Quincy* about such matters. Referring specifically to Indo-China, he once again insisted that it should be placed under an international trusteeship rather than returned to France. He recalled that in the discussions at Cairo and at Teheran both Chiang Kai-shek and Stalin had agreed with him.[48] When asked about Churchill's attitude, he talked very candidly about the basic difference between his and the British Prime Minister's thinking on the whole colonial issue:

> Q. Is that Churchill's idea on all the territory out there, he wants them all back just the way they were?
>
> The President—Yes, he is mid-Victorian on all things like that. . . .
>
> Q. He seems to undercut the Atlantic Charter. He made a statement the other day that it was not a rule, just a guide.
>
> The President—The Atlantic Charter is a beautiful idea. When it was drawn up, the situation was that England was about to lose the war. They needed hope, and it gave it to them. . . .
>
> Q. Do you remember the speech the Prime Minister made about the fact that he was not made Prime Minister of Great Britain to see the empire fall apart?
>
> The President—Dear old Winston will never learn on that point. He has made his speciality on that point. This is, of course, off the record.[49]

At his very last press conference—on April 5, 1945—Roosevelt explored the situation that would result from the defeat of Japan. Asked whether the controlling government in the Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific would be the United States, he answered: "I would say the United Nations. Or it might be called the world, which has been much abused and now will have the chance to prevent any more abuse. . . ."[50]

[48] Rosenman, *op. cit.*, XIII, 562.

[49] *Ibid.*, XIII, 563–64.

[50] *Ibid.*, XIII, 610.

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What Roosevelt's continuing policy would have been had he lived to meet the post-war issues of colonialism remains entirely problematic. He might well have given way along the lines foreshadowed by Secretary Hull—and later actually followed—considering it inexpedient to insist too vigorously on anti-colonialism because of the need for the colonial Powers' continued support for American policies in Europe. He might have tried to stand his ground and yet still have failed to exercise a finally decisive influence on those nations—most notably France—still reluctant to grant autonomy or independence to their colonies.

One of the ironies in the post-war situation as it did develop was that Great Britain—although not under the leadership of the obdurate Churchill—in dealing with her own possessions forwarded the policies that Roosevelt had so warmly espoused. It was France that proved to be the most stubbornly colonial-minded nation. Her insistence upon maintaining control over an Indo-China that she recovered only by the strength of American arms largely created the crisis in Indo-Chinese affairs of 1954.

Whatever Roosevelt might or might not have been able to do in influencing the post-war course of events in Eastern Asia, he had made his own position clear. He was convinced that imperialistic policies were no longer admissible on the part of any Power. He was certain that the colonial peoples could not be permanently denied their legitimate aspirations for self-government and ultimate independence. He believed wholeheartedly that the future peace of the world would never be assured until the Powers were prepared to recognize the rights of people everywhere—in Asia quite as much as in Europe—to take their place in the international community in freedom and self-respect.

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STRATEGIC FACTORS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH

A Social Science View

IN recent years no question in economics has more fully captivated the imagination of the public nor more completely attracted the research of specialists in the social sciences than the subject of economic growth. It is almost as much the theme of our time as was laisser faire after Adam Smith wrote the *Wealth of Nations*, as was population and the food supply when Malthus penned his dismal prophecies, or as capitalism was at the beginning of the twentieth century when Werner Sombart and a score of others attempted to describe the evolution of this important institution.

Reasons for contemporary concern with the problem of economic growth are not hard to find. In the first place, interest in the subject has been generated by the mere fact that the outstanding aspect of the economic life of the last century and a half has been the degree of increase in output measured either on a per capita or on a geopolitical unit basis. Indeed it is estimated that in Western culture the increase in goods and services available to each and every person since 1800 has been in the order of some five hundred per cent.

In the second place, the rate of growth in this century and a half has been so unequal in different parts of the world and has led to such enormous economic differences among various societies that people in both economically developed and underdeveloped areas want to know the secrets of success. Thirdly, the subject of economic growth has been pushed to the fore because of a growing realization that there is a direct correlation between economic potential and national military and diplomatic power. Members of the two hostile camps into which the world has become divided consider that their security or their positions of supremacy are dependent upon their ability to grow economically. Fourthly, the economic stagnation of the 1930s with its social and political implications drew attention to the

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need for a fuller understanding of growth and for the adoption of both public and private policies that would foster expansion. Lastly, economic growth has been the object of scholarly investigation because in our culture there is a generally accepted belief that material well-being is a desirable goal for mankind and further that high levels of income are essential for great accomplishments in the arts and sciences—for reaching high levels of what we in the West consider to be marks of civilization.

Much of the theoretical analysis of economic growth, particularly that having to do with economically underdeveloped lands, has been based on experience in relatively short periods of time and in but a few parts of the world. In fact, an almost congenital ignoring of the broad sweeps of history in many different environments in what is patently a long-range and universal problem has tended to invalidate much of the theory. Specialists should realize that analysis of the short run are by their very nature inadequate to explain secular trends and that theories based on experience in a few geographical areas can hardly be generalized to apply to all times and climes.

The obvious limitations of much of the traditional work in the field of economic growth has led to a much broader approach to the subject on the part of social scientists, especially on the part of economic historians, economists with an historical bent, anthropologists, and geographers.[1] Their contention has been

[1] Some evidence of such efforts may be indicated by citing Colin Clark, *Conditions of Economic Progress* (1951); the League of Nations' report entitled *Industrialization and Foreign Trade* (1945); Walter W. Rostow, *Process of Economic Growth* (1952); and Shepard B. Clough, *Rise and Fall of Civilization* (1951). Economic growth viewed in historical perspective has been the object of two closed conferences of scholars, whose findings have been heavily drawn upon for this article. The first of these was held in April 1954 under the auspices of the Committee on Economic Growth of the Social Science Research Council. Discussion centered here on four papers: on the structure and balance in the economic growth of Mexico since 1939, by Henry G. Aubrey; on economic progress in Canada since 1913, by A. W. Currie; on growth factors in the Italian economy from 1900 to the present, by Bruno Foa; and on factors operative in Western Europe from 1540 to 1640, by John U. Nef. The discussion of the several papers was led, respectively, by Nathan L. Whetten, Penelope Hartland Thunberg, Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan, and A. P. Usher. The second conference was held in conjunction with Columbia University's Bicentennial Celebration. The main paper, "Toward a Theory of Economic Growth", was presented by Simon Kuznets, and was discussed by Frederic C. Lane.

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that economic growth can be fully understood only if it is studied in the broad framework of social change.[2] In essence this means that changes conducive to growth should be sought in the ideologies, attitudes, techniques, population size and structure, leadership, and geography of a society, that is, of any socially organized group, and that analysis should not be limited as it once was primarily to the traditional factors of production. Thus the perspective in which economic growth is viewed has been greatly widened and, as we shall see, it has at the same time been greatly deepened.

Furthermore, the new approach to a study of economic growth has resulted in greater emphasis upon the obvious fact that here, as in all social change, alterations result from the convergence of several strategic factors in the right proportions and with a propitious timing. Facile, monocausal explanations of growth have been thrown overboard as meaningless either for theory or for the formation of public policy. Laws which would explain growth in every age and every environment have lost their lustre and have been replaced by suggestions of topics for scrutiny under various kinds of economic and social conditions.

In the investigation of economic growth, a formalized procedure may, however, be followed with profit. The first step may be a consideration of the society under study to determine to what extent it has rigidities which militate against change and to locate areas of flexibility which are conducive to accepting something new. It is clear that a society which believes that material betterment is sinful, or that the local manor is the ideal economic unit, or that technological change will adversely affect much-cherished social relations will be less subject to growth than one where material betterment is considered highly desirable, where mobility in the use of labor exists, and where new techniques are actively sought. Canada in the nineteenth century had, for example, a set of ideologies very similar to those of Great Britain, which was experiencing growth, had few built-in social inhibitions to material advance, and stood

[2] A brief statement of social change may be found in *History and the Social Sciences*, Bulletin 64 of the Social Science Research Council (1954).

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primarily in need of equipment to exploit its resources, of transportation to get its products to market, and of capital to acquire both equipment and means of transportation. On the other hand, Russia in the period between 1850 and 1900 had social and economic rigidities which were inimical to growth and needed a breakdown of the existing structure if economic expansion was to be realized. Here the center of flexibility seems to have been among intellectuals. It was in part their introduction of Marx's ideas which led the people to "attack their shrines" and to open up vistas of better days.

The second step of analysis may be to try to isolate those factors which set off a process of growth—to determine what elements in a given situation had a "trigger effect" in change. Inasmuch as factors of change, like technical inventions, usually come into being by the slow accretion of details until the composite makes something new and inasmuch as a new technique may start a chain reaction, it is necessary to learn how innovations come about and to be able to judge their potential power. In the first great technological revolution of which we have any knowledge, that which occurred in the two millenia which preceded 3000 B.C., the shift from food gathering to food raising in the valleys of the Nile, of the Tigris and Euphrates, and of the Indus Rivers was at the center of change. Working the soil and gathering grains required better tools than those made exclusively from wood and stone and thus created a potential demand for metals—for the copper, bronze and iron which appeared in relatively rapid succession. Furthermore, grain could not be cooked over an open fire like meats, but had to be placed in pots, a requirement which gave a fillip to the development of pottery and to the invention of the potter's wheel. The shortage of hides for clothing led to the making of textiles and to the invention of both the spinning stick and the loom. Production in excess of local consumption made possible an exchange of goods, and trade led to improvements in the ship and the use of an inorganic source of power—the wind—to the development of money, and to some division of labor.

In a similar way, the increased use of coal in England in the seventeenth century gave an important impetus to the pro-

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duction in volume of goods for the masses, like beer and light hardware, and laid a better foundation for large-scale industry than was to be found in any other Western European country. The invention and use of the steam engine in industry made possible a veritable revolution in the ratio of output to human input, for with it man was able to harness a new and mobile source of power generated by an inorganic and abundant substance. In general, the greater use of what nature had stored up over eons of time meant that man had greater supplies of goods for both building and energy than he had ever had in the days when he relied largely upon what was currently growing on the soil.

Under other circumstances "triggers" of economic growth have been acquired quite differently from those already mentioned. Instead of being developed indigenously, they have been obtained by some backward area from a more highly developed one. In fact, the diffusion of techniques and of all institutions and ideologies conducive to growth has played as great a rôle in economic development as has invention itself.

The process of diffusion usually takes place first in those areas which are culturally close to the advanced area and where an exchange of ideas and goods is already going on. In such a case the more backward areas borrow voluntarily and even eagerly from the more developed. Thus the industrial system, which has produced the greatest economic growth of all time, spread first from England to other culturally similar areas in Europe and to overseas lands settled by emigrants from industrial Europe's heartland, and only later to other cultures. Belgium and France early borrowed new techniques from England; Germany and Italy soon followed suit; and overseas the United States soon joined the procession, becoming in turn a center of diffusion in the Western Hemisphere. It was subsequently that the new economy took root in other cultures—in Japan, Russia, India and China. In this process of radiation, activity was speeded in some places by the extraordinary rôle of leaders, as in the case of Cavour in Northern Italy, in others by the presence of great natural resources, as in the case of abundant supplies of coal and iron in close proximity in the United States,

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and in still others by the falling off of supplies from foreign producers, as was experienced in Mexico during World War II.

The other major aspect of diffusion, that of forcing new economic ways upon backward areas, usually occurs between very highly developed societies and those which are extremely underdeveloped and is most frequently motivated by the simple desire of the former to increase their supplies of goods, especially raw materials. In ancient times a need for foodstuffs and metals led to Greek commercial expansion into the Black Sea area and to the colonization of the southern part of the Italian peninsular and stimulated Rome to exploit North Africa and Gaul. In the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century Western Europe pursued policies of colonial expansion as a part of mercantilism and forced many of its institutions on the New World and part of the Far East for the purpose of enriching itself. In more recent times the demand for such products as petroleum, copper and uranium have led to the forcing upon very backward areas of a great quantity of advanced techniques and business institutions, as in the case of the Near East and the Belgian Congo.

Frequently the exportation or borrowing of the techniques and institutions from advanced economies by underdeveloped ones has resulted in the new economies' surpassing the old. This was true of Rome vis-à-vis Greece, of Gaul as regards Rome, of the United States as regards Western Europe, and may be true of Russia as regards all of Western culture. In no case in history has any one society, any one socially organized group, ever attained and permanently retained a position of economic supremacy. One of the reasons that every society has at some time suffered a decline relative to others is that in the process of diffusion economic techniques and institutions have gone to areas where conditions were such that they could surpass former leaders both economically and militarily. Here is a lesson from economic history that may well be pondered by those who would blithely develop all parts of the world with no thought of ultimate consequences.

Whatever the "triggers" may be in setting off economic development, whether created indigenously or borrowed from others,

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economic growth will be sustained only if production is in excess of consumption per capita of the population and if the use or investment of that excess provides still greater production for greater consumption. This process may be fostered by new techniques which allow greater output per unit of input, by better organizing production, by command of larger supplies of natural resources, or by a greater concentration of resources in production rather than in such uneconomic activities as war. Consumption may be lowered by Spartan methods, by reduction of waste, or by a reduction in the size of the society's population. At all events, the ratio between production and consumption cannot be increased if the population, given its production potentials and its consumption pattern, grows so fast that there is no excess for investment. Time and again in the past populations have outstripped their abilities to increase production, and they may do so again. Sheer logic indicates that economic growth cannot go on to infinity—that all the world be as densely populated as New York City. This being the case, any theory of economic growth must take cognizance of the importance of limiting populations to maintain a desirable ratio between production—consumption—and investment.

Another observation which comes from historical study is that as material well-being is built up, purchasing power may become concentrated in a small group, be it a religious organization, a political entity, or a social class. The basic economic wants of a small segment of a society are satisfied early in the process of growth, whereas the wants of the masses are still great. An important aspect of sustaining growth is, therefore, enough economic equality to provide purchasing power for the people. When this is done enterprisers in turn will be motivated to risk their capital and to organize production for the turning out of more goods.

Even though some semblance of economic equality may be regarded as important in sustaining growth, recognition must be given to the historical fact that throughout the recorded past economic growth has not been in a straight line upward but has been characterized by advances, regressions, and periods of relative stagnation. Hence theorists should eschew easy

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optimism regarding economic growth; they should pay more attention than formerly to problems of sustaining growth once it has begun; and they should investigate causes of secular economic decline.

There are many factors in declines of this character, such as the depletion of the soil, of forests, and of other natural resources, and military defeats, but one of the most important is generally overlooked; it is that as a society attains a high level of material well-being, it strives to satisfy non-economic wants. The question begins to be asked what the purpose of economic growth is, and this query is answered by stating that wealth permits a fuller realizing of some of the esthetic or religious goals of the group. Consequently resources are diverted from economic activity in an effort to obtain what are considered to be marks of civilization. These, whether they be pyramids, cathedrals, tombs, opera houses, country clubs, musical scores, or paintings, by their very nature take away human energy from production in the economic sense. If a society allows this process to go too far, as was probably the case in ancient Egypt, it may become so economically, politically and militarily inferior to other societies that it can be conquered by some covetous rival. One of the eternal and one of the most perplexing problems of statesmanship is to formulate public policies which will provide a nice balance between economic activity to assure material well-being and security and creativity to furnish what are colloquially referred to as "the finer things of life."

Lastly, the broad social science approach to economic development has done much to clarify and improve methods for measuring growth. For most purposes growth should be considered, as has already been stated, as providing an increased amount of economic goods and services per capita of a society's population and not as a means for sustaining an ever larger number of persons. Consequently a society's total production, irrespective of population, is of value primarily for estimating military potential or for attempting to judge the effect of different production levels to resources.

The actual measurement of growth may be made through the use of national income data, but unfortunately the necessary

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statistical records exist for only very recent times. For somewhat earlier periods real wage data, obtained by the establishment of price-wage ratios weighted for changes in goods actually purchased in the market, are illuminating. For still more remote times no precise estimates are possible, yet general impressions may be had from a variety of written and archaeological records. For example, some notion of economic growth may be derived from very long-run increases in population on the ground that more people could not be fed, housed and clothed if there were not an increase in production and consumption. Some idea of development may also be had from the growth of cities on the theory that urban centers grow in size in some direct proportion to the increase in production. And a notion of economic progress may be obtained from improvements in the standard of living of populations as reflected in better clothes, better food or food supply, and better houses. One of the unfinished tasks of the economic historian is to establish more precisely than has been done to the present time the long-term trends of growth and regression and the turning points between the two phenomena.

In any case, the very broad social science view of economic growth which has been displayed in much of the recent work in this field augurs well for the obtaining of secure findings. The conclusions arrived at should be of the utmost importance to contemporary statesmen in the formation of public policy in these days of great decisions, for many of the issues considered under the rubric of economic growth are the great public questions of our day.

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SOME CONTROVERSIAL ASPECTS OF THE PUBLIC CORPORATION

SINCE the Labor government instituted its post-war program of nationalization in the United Kingdom, continuous controversy has centered on the problem of public control of the nationalized industries. Much of this discussion has involved the relations between the public corporations and their "parent" ministers, machinery to protect the interests of consumers, or the position of Parliament. The following article takes up these topics in the given order. In each case an attempt is made to indicate the nature of the underlying issues and to draw some conclusions of more than local importance. The point of view is economic in the sense that these institutional problems are always considered in terms of their implications for the economic performance of the nationalized industries. It is suggested that the proper scope of direct political control depends in part on the intended significance of the market as a guide in the affairs of the corporation; that if the corporation is to be guided primarily by market considerations, public control in pursuance of other objectives can and should be limited and external in character; that if the corporation's commercial objective is the satisfaction of consumer demand to the extent consistent with cost coverage any preëxisting need for rate and service regulation will persist regardless of the change in ownership; that the general problem of public control is complicated by the absence of the profit motive and by the ultimate identity of the regulator and the regulated; and that the influence of Parliament as taxpayers' (and therefore risk-bearers') representative will make itself felt, and probably in a conservative and protectionist direction.

It seems quite certain that nationalization has in some cases made possible important improvements in industrial organization by wiping out the unduly restrictive vested interests of former owners, both private and municipal. But apart from this negative result, nationalization itself solves no organizational

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problems[1]—not even that of the relation between the centers of political power and the operating unit or units. For this problem is not merely a matter of trying to adjust private and public rights and interests in some sort of compromise fashion. If it were, then obviously it would have been solved by eliminating the "private" protagonist. The important and persistent question is how best to allocate control over the affairs of the enterprise in the light of its objectives: from this point of view, the delineation of private rights is itself a variable instrument rather than a troublesome datum.

Moreover, the problem persists not only regardless of ownership but also regardless of whether the undertaking is or is not commercial. The typical government activity involves no strictly commercial task similar to that performed by private businesses. Yet even here there are recognized limitations on direct legislative intervention in departmental affairs as, for example, in the delegation of personnel management to the agencies themselves or to specialized bodies. This is done not because freedom for the executive branch of government is regarded as an end in itself, or because the departments are supposed to have "private" rights and aims independent of those prescribed by the legislature, but simply because such limitations are expedient in terms of these broader legislative aims themselves. They are, indeed, *self*-limitations, and therefore subject to withdrawal by political processes; but so ultimately are all restrictions on the sovereign power. Prudence may dictate that certain of these restrictions be given extraordinary (for example, constitutional) status; they are not thereby rendered immutable.

[1] Of the British nationalization program, Edward Goodman has written: "To bring about the advantages of economically right scale, to cut through the tangle of vested interests obstructing the achievements of right scale, was one of the chief objects of the post-1945 nationalization measures. It is hard to see what other speedy method lay to hand for reorganizing the public utilities than the breaking down of the old outgrown and obstructive pattern of ownership and management. The breaking-down, however, could only rightly be regarded as a preliminary; what the right scale, the right form, and the right internal and external relationships of the affected industries might be was a question not to be answered automatically by nationalization." *Forms of Public Control and Ownership* (London, 1951), p. 36.

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Nevertheless, for many years the preferred view in the United Kingdom has been that a much greater degree of freedom from political control should be accorded to a commercial body than to an ordinary department. The public corporation (the form of organization provided for in all the post-war nationalization statutes) owes its popularity to the widespread acceptance of this view.[2] On the reasons for this extraordinary freedom, and on the corollary definition of the proper scope of political control, opinion remains divided. Perhaps the wide appeal of the idea arises in part from a vague feeling—carried over from private enterprise—of the impropriety of government interference in "other people's business".[3]

The problem of defining political control is embodied concretely in the development of a working relationship between the "parent" minister and the governing boards of the public corporations. Since the minister is fully responsible to Parliament, the identical problem is also basic to the determination of what questions regarding the nationalized industries will be answered by their respective "parents". If, as Ernest Davies has charged,[4] the ministers have been exerting more influence informally over the corporations than they are prepared to admit and answer for, this practice would seem to involve an evasion of proper responsibility.

The indeterminate relationship between minister and board has been frequently singled out as the principal organizational weakness of the nationalized concerns.[5] The confusion and

[2] As indicative of the very widespread acceptance of this view by 1932, Marshall E. Dimock quotes a committee of the Trades Union Congress of that year as follows: "It is doubtful whether there is ever any advantage in conducting an industry or a commercial service by the method of direct State control, i.e., by a government department." *British Public Utilities and National Development* (London, 1933), p. 158. Mr. Goodman dates the acceptance of the public corporation idea by "the hard-headed school of British socialism" from 1929, when Herbert Morrison decided in its favor when drafting the London Passenger Transport Bill. *Op. cit.*, p. 44.

[3] See Dimock, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

[4] Ernest Davies, M.P., "Ministerial Control and Parliamentary Responsibility of Nationalized Industries" in W. A. Robson, ed., *Problems of Nationalized Industry* (London, 1952).

[5] See, for example, D. N. Chester, "Organisation of the Nationalised Industries", *Political Quarterly*, April-June 1950, p. 123.

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inconsistency that have characterized the practice of ministers attempting to play their indefinite rôles to the satisfaction of Parliament are by now well known. In some instances, the principle governing the minister in choosing questions which will be answered appears rather obvious but of dubious general validity: for example, in the matter of dirty coal, where the criterion seems to have been whether or not the public was making a considerable fuss about the subject at the time the question was asked.[6] In others, the formulation of a rationale for ministerial practice defies the lay imagination.[7] One may well wonder with A. H. Hanson what theory caused the Speaker (who reflects ministerial decisions) to allow a question about pit closures in Lanarkshire and reject a question regarding the policy of the Road Haulage Executive toward employing in one branch persons who had given notice in another.[8]

Under these circumstances, it is odd that there should continue to be a very general acceptance and use of the phrase customarily employed to designate the type of thing with which the minister should not concern himself—namely, "day-to-day" affairs, or matters of "day-to-day" operation. In view of its essential vagueness and failure to point the way to a satisfactory working relationship, the long tenure and extreme prominence of this phrase as a major political principle are very surprising. Although in fact the scope of political control over the pre-war public corporations was left to the discretion of the ministers,[9] the phrase "day-to-day administration" was early employed by the Postmaster-General to define the intended limits of his

[6] *Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries*, H. C. 332, October 29, 1952, p. vii.

[7] See, for example, instances discussed in A. H. Hanson, "Parliamentary Questions on the Nationalised Industries", *Public Administration* (Spring 1951). Robson suggests the possibility "that a uniform practice will not emerge and that different ministers will interpret and use their powers in different ways. It is already clear that there are large differences in the degree to which departments think it their duty to interfere in the policy and administration of nationalized industries." *Op. cit.*, p. 307.

[8] *Comment* on the Report of the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, *Public Administration* (Spring 1953), p. 59.

[9] Davies, in Robson, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 114.

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control over the B.B.C.[10] Twenty-six years later, a Select Committee of the House of Commons still professed to be guided in its recommendations regarding questions on the nationalized industries by the desirability of excluding matters of "detail" and of "day-to-day administration".[11] ("Detail"—the word and its derivatives—is also quite popular as a term describing matters properly left to boards.) The key statement indicating matters concerning the corporations on which information will be given to Parliament by ministers is still that made by Herbert Morrison as Lord President of the Council in 1947, which hinges on the familiar phrase;[12] and the same verbal treatment has been officially accorded to questions specifically based on the minister's power (and hence his responsibility) to give to the corporations directions of a general character on matters appearing to him to affect the national interest.[13] Since the provisions regarding these directions and regarding information form the only statutory basis for a general ministerial control over and responsibility for the affairs of the corporations (a possible exception being the minister's power of appointment of the board), the importance in principle of the "day-to-day" phrase is very great. This term, which is supposed to single out a particular class of decision reserved to the board itself, is of course not the same thing as that which would rule out "daily" questions or "continuous" control by Parliament or minister, although this sort of expression is sometimes used in the same context.[14]

[10] The Postmaster-General said: "The Committee recommended, generally speaking, that while the Postmaster-General must, of course, always remain with the ultimate responsibility, the conduct, the general control, the day-to-day administration of the service should be entrusted to a semi-public body, operating as trustees in the national interest." *H. C. Deb.*, Nov. 15, 1926, col. 1566.

[11] H. C. 332, 1952, pp. vii–ix.

[12] This statement is quoted in the *Report*, H. C. 332, p. vi.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. v. Noting that the duties of the minister include "giving to the Board directions of a general character as to the exercise and performance by the Board of their functions in relation to matters appearing to the Minister to affect the national interest," the Committee points out that questions related to this duty "are limited by the words of the statute. Directions must be 'of a general character,' and must be 'required by the national interest.' This has been interpreted as implying a major matter of policy, or action required by crisis conditions, as contrasted with day to day working."

[14] See, for example, R. H. Thornton, "Nationalisation: Administrative Problems Inherent in a State-owned Enterprise", *Public Administration*, Spring 1947, p. 13.

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Critics have not been lacking to point out the vague and unsuitable character of the term "day-to-day". For example, Professor P. Sargant Florence has noted that there exists no convenient given line between "general principles and directives and day-to-day particular orders"; "a command", he remarks, "can only be relatively more general or more particular than another."[15] As to the term's effectiveness in singling out matters of importance to the public, Mr. Hanson has written:

> As any administrator knows, the process of policy-formulation takes place at a number of different levels . . . it . . . becomes almost impossible to say where the "general" ends and the "day-to-day" begins. General principles of policy, moreover, are not always specifically formulated at the highest level, but may quite often arise from a host of small decisions of the day-to-day order, which collectively constitute something of genuine public importance.[16]

Marshall Dimock has demonstrated that "small matters" (that is, those affecting only a few people and negligible amounts of money) often involve principles that might well concern a democratic legislature.[17]

In fact, it is difficult to see how any useful division of ultimate responsibility could be based on the distinction between the general and the particular, the routine and the extraordinary, the large and the small, or any other meaning suggested by the "day-to-day" expression. Ultimate responsibility for the accomplishment of any given aim would almost always, it would seem, cut across these categories, although the lesser type of decision might well be *delegated*—not at all the same thing as cutting it off entirely from responsibility at the highest level. For it is the aim with whose accomplishment a person (or group) is charged which must determine both his (its) powers and the extent of his (its) answerability. Where there is a clear definition and division of the results expected of two persons, and the powers of each are proportioned to his duties, there will be no

[15] P. Sargant Florence, *The Logic of British and American Industry* (London, 1953), p. 241.

[16] Hanson, *loc. cit.*, pp. 52–53.

[17] Dimock, *op. cit.*, pp. 160–161.

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confusion as to the allocation of praise or blame, even though (as in some regulatory relationships) a very great deal of overlapping occurs between the "subject matters"—that is, persons and activities—controlled by each. Perhaps some have been misled by observing that higher officials spend a relatively large amount of time on large-scale or unusual problems. This certainly does not mean that they avoid responsibility for most of the organization's decisions since ordinarily they do not fall within these categories, but only that the time-consuming tasks are those that cannot be or have not yet been delegated.

Like the official statements of policy just discussed, the statutes themselves reflect a confused conception of the intended politico-commercial relationship. In recognition of this confusion, the *Economist* on November 23, 1946 expressed the hope that a workable arrangement would be evolved through "the typically British system of precedent."[18] According to one expert British observer, "in the Civil Service the view seems to have prevailed that the relationship between Minister, Parliament and Board was a 'developing' one which would eventually stabilise itself in a manner fairly satisfactory to everyone but constitutional logicians."[19] These hopes and predictions have not yet been fulfilled.

At least two mutually exclusive types of relationship are suggested in the statutes: one which limits political control to matters specified in the Act, residual authority being retained by the corporation; and another in which full control over the corporation's affairs runs in a direct line-of-command relationship from the board through the minister and ultimately to Parliament. Taking the Transport Act, 1947,[20] as an example, we find the first of these conceptions borne out by the enumeration of specific types of action by the British Transport Commission that require the prior approval of the minister (for example, long- or short-term borrowing, acquisition of certain kinds of companies by agreement, programs of reorganization or development involving substantial capital outlay, and programs of

[18] Quoted in Hanson, *loc. cit.*, p. 57.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] 10 and 11 George VI, Ch. 49.

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training, education and research). In addition, specific matters on which the minister may direct the B.T.C. to act are listed in the statute (for example, the preparation of "area schemes" for road passenger transport, similar general plans for harbors or groups of harbors, and matters covered by recommendations by certain consultative groups provided for in the Act). It is also provided that the minister may direct the B.T.C. to discontinue any of its undertakings or to dispose of portions thereof. (By the law of 1953, these powers were altered somewhat and a large number of additional specific powers were given to the minister in connection with the new programs of disposal and reorganization.)[21] These features of the Act belong in a scheme of limited control. Moreover, although the purposes which these enumerated powers are intended to serve are not made clear, they are not nearly as broad as would be necessary if the minister had general responsibility for the corporation's price-output policy, or for the profitable conduct of its affairs. In this respect, the implied position of the corporation is similar to that of the ordinary private company.

On the other hand, it is the minister who appoints the B.T.C. as well as the Executives formerly in charge of the several departments (Railways, London Passenger Transport, etc.) directly under the Commission itself. (The reorganization of 1953 abolished all these Executives with the exception of the London Passenger Transport Executive.) Furthermore, as has been noted above, the minister's power to direct the Commission is not confined to specific matters enumerated in the Act, but extends to any matter which in his opinion affects the national interest.

It is in fact widely believed that the power of the ministers to issue general directions has enabled them to exert a very great influence over the decisions of the boards, even though (as of mid-1954) this power has been actually used only once. It is hardly reassuring that the single explicit direction of this character, issued in April 1952, was for the purpose of modifying an unpopular rate policy adopted by the B.T.C. with the approval of the Transport Tribunal.[22] Again, the duty of the

[21] Transport Act, 1953, 1 and 2 Eliz. 2, Ch. 13.

[22] An interesting discussion of this affair is contained in the *Annual Report* of the British Transport Commission, 1952, pp. 54–55.

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minister to transmit "information" to Parliament is not limited in any way by the statute. The implied relationship is one of full power and full responsibility.

The latter provisions would seem to leave little or no room for any ultimate autonomy on the part of the corporation. At the same time, however, the enumerated powers do not embody and are not accompanied by any rationale for their implied limitation on political control. The resulting confusion is hardly to be wondered at. It is possible to explain the duality of the statutes, and also the very general acceptance of the "day-to-day" terminology, as the result of a fusion of two separate and conflicting views on the operation of the nationalized industries. Indeed, there is evidence that these points of view belong respectively to two sets of real persons, and that their fusion represented in some sense a compromise between them; this aspect of the matter, however, will not be insisted on here. The emphasis will be on the nature of the issues rather than the sources of the conflict.

Let us begin by asking what it might be that distinguishes the "commercial" from the general run of governmental activity, and thereby justifies extraordinary freedom. One might say that any sort of offering to buy or sell constitutes a commercial activity; however, this in itself does not seem to call for any special limitation on political control. Such a limitation *is* implied, however, if the success of the operation is made to depend to any extent on conformity to conditions given by the market—that is, to the preferences of individuals as revealed in their willingness to buy or sell. For example, if it is desired to sell a given number of annual reports of a government department at a price that will just clear the market, two things are immediately implied: (1) the price itself cannot be further influenced or determined by reference to nonmarket considerations, other aspects of public policy being ruled out; and (2) the organization most appropriately charged with setting the price is the operating rather than the controlling political agency. The latter conclusion follows directly from the former, as well as from the fact that the department is in a better position to estimate demand. It is in this sense that a commercial activity

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justifies and demands a greater degree of autonomy: an intended conformity to market conditions may be basic to the organizational peculiarities of the public corporation as it is certainly basic to the institutional problems of regulated private enterprise.

There are various senses in which conformity to market conditions may be intended. Moreover, this conformity may be placed high or low in the scale of public objectives. The above example of the annual reports may be contrasted with a situation in which it is intended that the entire price-output policy of a nationalized industry—say, rail transportation—shall be determined by the market demand for its products in relation to their costs. In the former case, the indicated commercial policy might readily be subordinated to a parliamentary or departmental decision to increase public knowledge of the department's work by setting a nominal price on the report or distributing it free of charge. On the other hand, to call attention to the fine job done by the railroads by running free trains daily to the seashore might well be thought inappropriate.

The fact that an activity is commercial—whether simply concerned with buying or selling or in some sense subject to direction by the market—does not imply that any particularly great importance is or should be attached to its "efficiency", in the sense of attainment of objectives with the greatest possible economy of means. This characteristic is certainly no less to be desired in the defense establishment than in the London passenger transport system. Thus all those arguments must fail which call for special treatment of commercial activities on grounds of efficiency in the narrow sense. Included here are many arguments which defend the special public corporation form for commercial operations because of the superior efficiency to be derived from freedom from civil service rules, instability due to changes in the top executive when governments are changed, and the like,[23] or from ability to retain and fully utilize top-notch executives who would be unnerved by political personages "breathing down their necks". If the railway manager is to be treated with greater consideration in this regard than the

[23] In this connection see Dimock's discussion of the typical criticisms of the Post Office. *Op. cit.*, p. 159.

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ordinary civil servant, it must be because of some characteristic of his job which requires a bolder exercise of independent judgment. Such a characteristic exists if he is expected to be responsive to changing market conditions.[24] Nor does it seem possible to establish any greater need for initiative or flexibility in commercial than in other governmental activities *except* in connection with market responsiveness.[25]

It has been urged that greater freedom *can* be given to market activities because the financial results of their trading provide an objective measure of efficiency and hence a substitute for parliamentary safeguards against waste. A trading organization required to make ends meet is, as long as this requirement is not subordinated to other aims, subject to at least a psychological limit on extravagance. But this without more constitutes in general only a loose check on obvious waste; it is certainly not enough in itself to warrant any great degree of freedom. Where public policy does not require a level of output larger than could be supported by receipts from sales, there is of course the possibility that financial risk can be shifted from the public treasury to private investors. The same possibility exists even with subsidization, provided a system of support can be worked out that does not involve a governmental financial guarantee. If the risk is so shifted, then that supervision which is aimed at avoidance of waste can be dispensed with. But all this is quite irrelevant to a government-owned enterprise.

In short, no good reason presents itself for granting greater independence to commercial activities other than the desire that they be operated in conformity to market conditions; moreover, even this consideration does not justify freedom from financial supervision where government funds are at stake.

[24] These conditions include technological developments that facilitate satisfaction of new demands. Changes that are merely cost-reducing stand in the same relation to both types of governmental organization.

[25] This was very probably what Lord Wolmer was getting at in his insistence that public utilities "be administered by the Commercial Mind, the mind that can diagnose the public's requirements, and provide the service rapidly and cheaply without bureaucratic interference"; this, and not "public relations technique" and "public service attitude" as expressed merely in promptness and good humor in dealings with customers. Dimock, *op. cit.*, pp. 321–324.

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A mere break-even requirement is not sufficient either to define the sense in which market conformity is intended or to indicate its importance in relation to other public purposes. All of the post-war nationalization statutes, for example, provide that the respective boards shall see that revenues are sufficient to cover costs, taking one year with another. Yet this obligation is in principle consistent with a variety of price-output policies; for example, in the case of the railways, (1) serving at a loss or without charge shippers in areas marked for expansion in a "national plan" decreed by the current government, and covering the resulting deficits by excess returns on other traffic, or (2) serving all shippers at rates determined by a general and impartial conformity to considerations of cost. In the first instance, the loss incurred for "development" purposes might be deliberately limited to what could certainly be reimbursed by returns from other traffic or, alternatively, the finances of the system as a whole might knowingly be jeopardized to achieve a given level of employment in the favored area. At any rate, in case (1) the main policy objective would be the execution of the national plan, and the market merely a convenient means of accomplishing this program and covering all or part of its cost. In case (2), a thoroughgoing adaptation to conditions given by the market—including both the factor markets and the product markets—would itself be the major policy objective. These market conditions would suffice in principle to define not only the desired level of output and technique of production in a very broad sense, but also the desired distribution of output among various classes of consumers and the price structure as well.

Unlike the determination of a "national plan", the working interpretation of market data does not call for a political process of compromise or voting. It requires rather the judgment of a specialized mind in close contact with the particular relevant conditions.[26] Therefore if the organization is viewed as pri-

[26] In a paper entitled "Conditions of Industrial Progress", read at the University of Pennsylvania on January 10, 1947, Sir Henry Clay remarked: "The issues of industrial management are not the kind of decisions which are suitable for political discussions: they are matters of technique or occasions for market judgment, not decisions which turn on the application of high political or moral principles. They

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marily concerned with the achievement of a market objective, there will be no need for political (that is, ministerial) power to direct its affairs as a whole; political power over it can and should be limited to specific, enumerated areas where it is thought necessary to substitute political for commercial judgment. It is this sort of view of commercial enterprise that is exemplified in what Professor Robbins has called "the classical case for economic freedom",[27] where the direction of resources in response to market incentives is defended as a "rough and ready" mechanism working for the general good; and it is this sort of view which may underlie what we may call the "liberal half" of the nationalization statutes. The general supervisory power of the minister—which is the main innovation of the post-war as compared with the pre-war public corporations—is more suitable for an organization viewed primarily as an instrument for carrying out a politically formulated program.[28]

So far at least, there has been little complaint of excessive governmental control over the nationalized industries. On the contrary, the principal criticisms have been in the opposite

need to be safeguarded in a separate and specialized organization; if they are brought within the compass of governmental action, it is difficult . . . to segregate them and ensure that they are settled by relevant considerations of cost and demand, not by irrelevant considerations of political expediency, even if camouflaged by plentiful use of the word 'reasonable'." Quoted in E. G. Plowman, "An Appraisal of Nationalized Transport in Great Britain—Part II", *American Economic Review*, May 1950, p. 250.

[27] Lionel Robbins, *The Theory of Economic Policy in English Classical Political Economy* (London, 1952), p. 16.

[28] For example, in explaining the general supervisory power of the minister in the Transport Bill, a government spokesman said: ". . . it is not our intention that there should be any interference at all in the ordinary day-to-day duties of management of these Executives. But, surely, it must be conceded that, in setting up an organization of this sort and importance, on which the prosperity of our industries and the welfare of our people depend, the public should have an opportunity to express its will through Parliament. Moreover, transport must always be an essential feature in any orderly planning of our national resources, and such planning is the firm policy of His Majesty's Government." As specific examples of possible uses of this power, the same spokesman indicated that preferential rates or more extensive facilities might be used to shore up a development area showing signs of relapse and that rates might be lowered to speed up capital expenditures in a general depression. *H. C. Deb.*, December 18, 1946, cols. 1980–1983.

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sense: (1) that the machinery for the protection of consumer interests is not strong enough, and (2) that the nationalized concerns are not sufficiently "accountable" to Parliament.

In a recent article, Herbert Morrison placed "Consumers' Councils and similar machinery" first on a list of four "arrangements for public accountability" in connection with "matters of day-to-day management"—for which, in this context, we may read "matters concerning the satisfaction of market demand".[29] This sort of arrangement, though certainly a part of the same general problem of public control, is distinguished from the political control discussed in the preceding section in two important respects: (1) its objective is not to deflect the corporation's activities from the direction indicated by response to market conditions, but to make this response more satisfactory;[30] (2) because this objective does not vary with such factors as general business conditions or the ideology of the party in power, its accomplishment can be conveniently delegated to bodies not immediately subject to parliamentary control.[31]

In general, the post-war Labor government refused to accept the view that the public corporations would need any external controls or enforcible legal safeguards to insure full protection of the interests of consumers. Though certain exhortations

[29] Herbert Morrison, "Public Control of the Socialised Industries", *Public Administration*, Spring 1950, p. 6. This article, like some other writings of the same author, suggests strongly that his own conception of the public corporation involves determining the limits of political control by recognizing a sphere of accepted dominance by market considerations, rather than by making a slippery distinction between the particular and the general.

[30] In the context of "the classical case for economic freedom", the direction of resources by the profit incentive is in general recommended; but, as Professor Robbins points out, the argument was "not so much that the system of markets was always tending to some refined equilibrium adjustment, but rather that it provided a rough pointer and a rough discipline whereby the tumultuous forces of self-interest were guided and held in check" in the general interest. *Op. cit.*, p. 16. The central problem of rate and service regulation is the correction of the results of this "rough discipline" to a more "refined . . . adjustment." The two disciplines are complementary rather than mutually exclusive.

[31] Both of these points together seem to make up the substance of the argument that conflicts between companies and their customers involve the protection and definition of "private rights" and for this reason should be handled by independent tribunals.

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to eschew undue preference and discrimination[32] and to preserve (to a limited extent) freedom of choice on the part of transport users[33] were included in the statutes, these do not grant enforcible rights. The retention of part of the former regulation of rail rates and services under the newly created Transport Tribunal is an exception easily explained (but not so easily justified) in terms of tradition and precedent, although on this subject prominent Laborite speeches can be found that directly contradict the orthodox view on regulation of the nationalized industries.[34] A limited exception to this orthodoxy is also found in the provision for consumers' representation on Councils which advise the managements of the various public corporations at the national and regional levels. As Frank Milligan has written, "the whole apparatus of consumers' representation suggests the view that the measures available to the corporations themselves are inadequate in one particular respect—that the determination of consumers' wishes and opinions requires supplementary, external machinery."[35]

This, however, is as far as the exception goes. These bodies are in general "representative" rather than legally expert in character; their main function is advisory; although they deal with complaints, they have no power to compel satisfaction from the board either directly or through the courts. Because

[32] See W. Arthur Lewis, "The Price Policy of Public Corporations", in Robson, ed., *Problems of Nationalized Industry*, esp. pp. 193–194.

[33] See Frank Milligan, "The Consumer's Interest", in *ibid.*, esp. pp. 145–146.

[34] For example, the following speech by the Minister of Transport, Mr. Barnes: "I cannot imagine a fairer way of settling this vexed problem of the adjustment of charges as against costs than by the functioning of the Transport Tribunal.

"At any time any of the services of the British Transport Commission wishes to adjust its charges the procedure which is followed represents a public inquiry, and it brings into play facilities for all the users of the services, both trade and industry and the travelling public, through the organisations that represent them, to bring to their service qualified and technical experts and people who understand the facts to interpret all the facts. The public inquiry becomes a technical and fair examination, first as to the wisdom of the proposal, the effect of the proposal on the public economy, and eventually whether it is essential to the British Transport Commission to have what they have applied for so as to enable them to meet the obligation which Parliament imposes upon them." *H. C. Deb.*, October 18, 1950, col. 2063.

[35] Milligan in Robson, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 147.

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of their part-time and inexpert nature, they are forced to resist the tendencies of complainants to employ counsel and present their cases in a formal and complete manner.[36] They are appointed by the minister, and only through his direction can their recommendations be enforced.[37]

Not only Conservatives and Liberals but also neutral and socialist observers have recently advocated protection of consumer interests by an independent agency of judicial character. A leading socialist authority on public administration, W. A. Robson, regards thoroughgoing price regulation as an essential step in "the conversion of nationalization to socialization."[38] Under "socialization," he writes, "there would be tribunals to which aggrieved consumers could bring their complaints by cheap and easy methods of procedure; and others before which the public corporations would be required to justify price increases."[39] Professor W. W. Haynes, an American observer whose thorough study of nationalized coal has led him to the conclusion that it has produced better results than a continuation of private ownership would have done, regards the advantages to be derived from a regulatory body "much like the American public utility commissions" as "overwhelming": "the public interest", he continues, "would be protected by an independent agency which can give weight to consumers' interests . . .; another check to the executive powers of the Government would be available."[40] Mr. Robson, expressing a view concurred in by Professor Florence[41] and Professor W. Arthur Lewis,[42] has persuasively and succinctly stated the view that the Consumers' Councils as they stand are unsuitable for dealing with consumer grievances:

[36] On this point, see the discussion of the Annual Report of the Central Transport Consultative Committee for 1953 in *Modern Transport*, March 13, 1954.

[37] Milligan in Robson, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 149. Even this provision for enforcement is regarded as having been a "concession to the doggedness of the Opposition."

[38] Robson, *op. cit.*, p. 346. [39] *Ibid.*, p. 347.

[40] W. W. Haynes, *Nationalization in Practice: The British Coal Industry* (Boston, 1953), p. 252.

[41] Florence, *The Logic of British and American Industry*, pp. 257–258.

[42] Lewis in Robson, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 193.

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> The main objection to the councils from this standpoint is that they are advisory or representative organs whose main purpose is related to the administrative operations of the national industries. The task of inquiring into individual complaints requires a tribunal of some kind to ensure a painstaking investigation of the facts, a concentration on the particular circumstances of the individual case, consideration of the situation in terms of the consumer's rights and the corporation's responsibilities towards him. The weakness of the machinery for safeguarding the interests of individual consumers is that it attempts to use advisory or executive organs for performing a function which requires the judicial process. This fact serves to emphasize the error of leaving a consumers' council which includes representatives of a public corporation among the members to investigate a charge or consider a criticism against that corporation by a person who will usually be one of their customers. There could scarcely be a more blatant example of an interested party participating in what should be an impartial inquiry.[43]

It is extremely important to note that this argument does not depend on the assumption that the corporation will be guided by any deliberate urge to extort or to discriminate. As Mr. Milligan has shown, even a general dedication to the interests of consumers is compatible with occasional lapses from duty and mistaken analyses of particular situations, and the proper way to deal with these will still be the judicial process.[44]

In Mr. Milligan's opinion, all fruitful discussion of consumer protection under nationalization should proceed on the "assumption that, in the main, the nationalized industries will not be tempted to exploit their position at the expense of the public"; since "Any controversy about this assumption is almost bound, sooner or later, to shift to the question of nationalization—with both sides compelled, for lack of evidence, to employ *a priori* arguments."[45] Nevertheless, it does not seem inappropriate to remark that, as a practical matter, there is in many cases a strong similarity between behavior motivated by long-run maximization of profits and that required to cover costs "taking one year with another." At any rate, in so far as the public corporation earnestly tries to accomplish this latter mandate,

[43] Robson in *ibid.*, p. 332.

[44] Milligan in *ibid.*, p. 169.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 166.

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its interests will certainly be in conflict with the interests of particular consumers narrowly conceived—as particular consumers are almost certain to conceive them. If, then, we conduct our *a priori* analysis in terms of "break-even man", we arrive at results resembling in important respects the works of our relatively familiar friend *homo economicus*.

Here it is well to recall that a very considerable part of traditional rate regulation has *not* consisted of the application of clear-cut cost criteria to curb the manifestly extortionate or discriminatory tendencies of the private monopolist. On the contrary, the regulation both of the general rate level and of individual rates and their relationships has been very largely a matter of arriving at an appropriate distribution of costs which are not the result solely of carrying the particular traffic to which the rates in question apply. In the case of the general rate level, the distribution in question is among periods of time rather than classes of traffic or routes; but the problem of determining a rate-level time-pattern which will over the years just cover the cost of the regulated service is hardly less complex than that of determining, say, the proper distribution of the "transportation burden" among various traffics at any given time. Both types of problem involve forecasting and estimation to an extent which does and must leave a wide margin for honest differences of opinion between groups of buyers as well as between buyer and seller, whether the latter be a private company or a public enterprise bent on making ends meet. Thus the representatives of such an enterprise must continue to defend its revenues, just as the representatives of consumer interests must continue to urge the case for lower rates and expanded service. Only in the expectation of a comfortable over-all profit margin could the nationalized concern afford to adopt a readily compliant attitude toward the demands of consumers. But the very existence of such an expectation would denote a failure by the management to adjust output to the maximum level in its view consistent with the coverage of costs. Furthermore, the margin would of course tend to disappear as the demands of buyer after buyer were satisfied.

It is therefore not surprising to find the Transport Tribunal

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occupying itself with such matters as the proportion of "Central Charges" (that is, costs not officially allocated among the various undertakings of the B.T.C.) to be borne by London passenger transport,[46] or to find the chairman of the B.T.C. attributing a large part of his financial ills to delays in the adjustment of the level of fares and charges in the face of rising costs.[47] Perhaps no one will be tempted to ascribe the relaxation of rail rate regulation by the Transport Act, 1953, to any new benevolence of railway management under nationalization. But perhaps again it is as well to note that this relaxation stems from the growth of road competition and probably would have been accomplished in 1939 had not World War II broken out.

If in our analysis we substitute political man (the vote-maximizer) or any of the variants of bureaucratic man (for example, the minimizer of criticism by politicians) or engineering man (the modernizer of technique at any price), the results are even less reassuring. Mr. Milligan is, of course, right; we do not know with what sort or sorts of creature we are dealing. But, still on the *a priori* level, there are some cogent arguments for approaching the optimum price-output policy (if it be defined as the maximum satisfaction of demand consistent with cost coverage) through the judicious employment of economic man. Moreover, this method recommends itself even more if it is conceded that using any of the available substitutes—even public-spirited man himself—is not likely to do away with the necessity for external controls on behalf of the consumer.

The maximum satisfaction of demand consistent with the coverage of necessary cost implies far more than the mere absence of "excess profits", in the sense of unnecessarily large returns over and above such payments to productive factors as happen to be contracted for in advance. It also implies the production of any given output at the lowest possible unit cost and experimentation with new products, new techniques, and new price policies. In the direction of these latter aims,

[46] See, for example, the *Preliminary Decision* of the Transport Tribunal on the London Area (Interim) Passenger Charges Scheme, July 13, 1950.

[47] *Modern Transport*, March 14, 1953.

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only limited results can be expected from external control agencies;[48] among the various internal incentives that may promote them, the profit motive recommends itself as the only one which guides experimentation in precisely the directions indicated by the consumers' own market valuations. Furthermore, the characteristic respects in which the works of economic man may differ from the optimum (that is, nonlegal restrictive practices and excess residual returns) are at least in principle *relatively* easy to correct by means of external controls, whereas the characteristic aberrations of other species may well be incorrigible.

This is not to say, of course, that many "private" markets do not exhibit defects that are *not* readily corrected by traditional regulatory controls. These include all excess returns except high residual incomes—that is, all those that are manifested as unduly high "costs"; for example, labor costs held up by feather-bedding or restrictive practices, or excessive overhead due to "umbrella" price policies. But these defects are neither inseparable from the profit system nor peculiar to private enterprise. Moreover, there is some evidence that public ownership may make it more rather than less difficult to deal with excessive wage costs.[49] As to inefficient organization of production, one must distinguish the immediate impact of nationalization and the long-run effects of public ownership. Against the above-mentioned salutary effects of the elimination of special interests must be set, first, the inflated capital burden that may in some instances be hung irrevocably upon future consumers or taxpayers,[50] and, second, the consideration that the same benefit (political complications aside) could have been obtained by a determined policy of anti-restrictionism. For the long run, it must be kept in mind that nationalization ordinar-

[48] Hence the proposals of P. S. Florence and Gilbert Walker for efficiency through regulation ("Efficiency under Nationalization and Its Measurement" in Robson, ed., *op. cit.*), as well as the similar expedients alluded to by Herbert Morrison in his above-cited article, would seem to have only limited prospects of success.

[49] See, for example, Florence, *op. cit.*, p. 243, and Haynes, *op. cit.*, pp. 221–222 and p. 252.

[50] For example, the British Railways. See Gilbert Walker and R. H. B. Condie, "Compensation in Nationalized Industries", in Robson, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 63–65.

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ily means the closing of the field to all potential new entrants: to this extent pressure for efficiency and progress and actual replacement of the relatively inefficient are done away with. There remains the possibility of the same sort of pressure from outside the legally defined field. Here it seems rather likely, especially on the basis of foreign experience, that the presence of the taxpayer in the rôle of risk-bearer would serve to encourage rather than to avoid protective restrictionism at least of the legal variety.[51] (This particular topic is discussed further in the last section.) The general downward pressure on costs exerted by the profit motive is also relevant here.[52]

Whatever may be the inherent tendencies of the public corporation, it seems evident that the external controls over its market behavior will be effective in direct ratio to their independence from the corporation (and from its "parent" ministry to the extent that it accepts responsibility for the profitable conduct of the enterprise). That regulation should be separated from management is a principle which has been too often ignored; though certainly not new,[53] it is to some extent enjoying a new emphasis.[54] This principle would seem to be equally applicable to all forms of public control, including those embodying nonmarket aims (for example, conservation of scarce materials, observation of standards of safety, and so on). Hence from this point of view the minister should not undertake responsibility for the commercial success of the enterprise if he

[51] M. R. Bonavia, *The Economics of Transport* (London, 1936), p. 159: "All interference with consumers' choice runs great risks. The estimation of the highest social returns is a matter of immense difficulty; and there is always the temptation, once a course of action has been chosen, to endeavour to make it a success through manipulation of demand. No doubt a state which was a monopolistic manufacturer of soap would hesitate to enact that each of its subjects should take two baths a day; but we know from experience that a state which owns the railway system of its territory is likely drastically to limit the scope of road services which compete with its own undertakings. The artificial stimulation of demand through the withdrawal of substitutes is an ominous possibility."

[52] This point is penetratingly discussed in Sir Arthur Salter's article, "The Crux of Nationalization" in Robson, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 231.

[53] See, for example, Yves Guyot, *Where and Why Public Ownership Has Failed* (New York, 1914), p. 269.

[54] For example, Goodman, *Forms of Public Control and Ownership*, p. 28.

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is to be charged also with "regulatory" functions. Since the ultimate holder of regulatory power is and must be Parliament, a more basic requirement for the desired separation would seem to be that the legislators also should not be responsible for commercial success: but here we run into the irreducible fact that under public ownership commercial "failure" involves a burden on the taxpayer, whose interests must be of legislative concern.

It will not do, in this connection, to draw a line between the "self-financing" corporations on the one hand and the "dependent" corporations on the other, and to regard parliamentary interest in the finances of the latter as legitimate while condemning the same interest in the affairs of the former. Wherever there is a chance that the taxpayer may be called upon to meet a deficit, there is a legitimate proprietary interest in the corporation's affairs. As Ernest Davies has remarked:

> Public corporations are indirectly public investments and Parliament is finally responsible for public money. To argue that as long as the boards are not in default the minister is not responsible is unconvincing, because it is in the national interest to ensure that default does not arise. It would appear that if a member of Parliament thought the board was pursuing a policy that would prevent compliance with the statutory requirement that the public corporation should operate on a financially successful basis over a period of years, he should have the right to raise the matter in Parliament.[55]

This proprietary interest, as well as concern with the complaints of voters who are also consumers of nationalized products, and a lingering survival of the old socialist view that thoroughgoing popular control is the main object of nationalization,[56] have contributed to a growing feeling of frustration on the part of Members of Parliament whose questions have frequently been refused answers by ministers on inconsistent and opaque

[55] Ernest Davies, in Robson, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 114–115.

[56] "The difference between the public monopoly and the private monopoly", Mr. Davies has said, "is very largely the question of public accountability. If this outlet in Parliament, of putting questions to Ministers, were not provided, much of that public accountability would be destroyed." House of Commons, Standing Committee B, *Official Report, Transport Bill*, February 25, 1947, col. 1503.

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grounds. As a result of this, a Select Committee was authorized in December 1951 with the following terms of reference: ". . . to consider the present methods by which the House of Commons is informed of the affairs of the Nationalised Industries and to report what changes, having regard to the provisions laid down by Parliament in the relevant statutes, may be desirable in these methods."[57]

The first report of the Committee dealt with parliamentary questions, which had been the main focus of dissatisfaction and which the Committee regarded as "the most immediate and convenient way open to Members to obtain information about public matters."[58] Noting that the public corporations had been established "as separate legal entities having full responsibility for day-to-day administration," and that this characteristic had been officially interpreted as excluding not only ministerial responsibility in this field but also the transmission of information to Parliament on these matters,[59] the Committee found that the limited scope accorded to the parliamentary question was entirely appropriate in the context of the nationalization statutes. The recommendations of the Committee were similarly in accord with the orthodox theory of the public corporation.[60]

This line of reasoning did not, of course, imply that all (or, indeed, that any) of the Committee believed that the statutes themselves could not be improved upon. Nor did it appear to the Committee that the same theory would rule out the establishment of other channels through which Parliament might obtain broader information on the affairs of the nationalized industries. In its second report, the Committee, which

[57] *Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries*, H. C. 332, October 29, 1952, p. ii.

[58] *Ibid.*, p. iii.

[59] *Ibid.*, pp. vi–vii.

[60] The Committee recommended: (1) that the minister himself, rather than the clerks at the table, be obliged to take public responsibility for refusing to answer questions that are "not obviously matters of repetition or matters of detailed administration"; and (2) that "the House should consider whether the number of Questions which Members are permitted to set down for oral reply should be reduced from three to two on each day on which Questions may be asked." *Ibid.*, p. ix.

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had been reappointed in November 1952, recommended the establishment of a committee of the House of Commons, whose object "should be that of informing Parliament about the aims, activities and problems of the Corporations and not of controlling their work."[61] The recommended scope of the investigations of the proposed committee is very broad indeed, encompassing not only the examination of accounts but also "future plans and programmes" and, in general, the entire field of corporation policy. The report even suggested that the committee might "encourage" the corporations to prepare advance estimates of revenue and expenditure, so that the committee might "satisfy itself that the corporation was genuinely trying to comply with its statutory requirements of breaking even, taking one year with another," and might have "a means of comparing what had been expected at the beginning with the actual outturn."[62]

In support of this recommendation, the Select Committee argued that the legitimate needs of Parliament for information (and—of secondary importance—of the corporations for a forum for their own defense) could be met in no other way:

> The basic argument for the establishment of a Committee to be a liaison between the nationalised industries and Parliament and elicit such information as is necessary on behalf of the House of Commons is that such a Committee is the only practical means of performing those functions. Last session we investigated the possibility of extending the sphere of the Parliamentary Question, and reported that it was inadvisable. Apart from this the number of ways by which the House of Commons can, on its own initiative, obtain information is limited. There is debate . . . which has not fully satisfied members and sometimes has not occurred sufficiently frequently or sufficiently soon after the issue of Reports: there is the procedure of moving for returns, which is not frequently used or altogether appropriate. There remains only the Committee, a body appointed by the House to obtain information for it.[63]

The published reports of the industries, the Committee declared, "do not completely meet the needs of Parliament or the public,

[61] *Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries*, H. C. 235, July 23, 1953, p. xii.

[62] *Ibid.*, pp. viii–ix.

[63] *Ibid.*, p. vii.

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partly owing to their sheer volume and complexity, and partly because information is not necessarily available on the matters on which it is required or when it is required."[64]

The question that immediately presents itself here is, of course, the use to which such information is to be put. For what purpose does Parliament require detailed financial and other information of a kind definitely denied to it through statutory channels? In this connection, the report quotes with approval Lord Hurcomb's statement that there is "a very real problem ultimately of accountability to Parliament" arising "from the vast amount of capital, and of income and expenditure involved in concerns which are under public ownership; the charges upon consumers and users of the necessities of civilized life which they provide; and the Treasury guarantee of the interest paid on the stock issued in respect of the various Nationalised Industries."[65] But it is virtually impossible to justify the support of a watchdog who can do nothing but watch. On the other hand, if it is intended that Parliament take action to safeguard its proprietary interest, then that body assumes a rôle quite different from that assigned it in the orthodox theory of the public corporation. If there is a real argument for a strict limitation on political control through ministerial channels, surely this argument should also apply to political control that by-passes the minister. (A similar view was in effect expressed by several witnesses who appeared before the Committee, including Herbert Morrison himself.) Precisely the same issue of the limits of parliamentary control was in fact raised when the Public Accounts Committee, in the session 1951–52, examined in detail the Annual Reports and Accounts of the B.T.C. and the Raw Cotton Commission. Pressed to produce a part of an internal auditors' report referred to in the report of the statutory auditors on the B.T.C. as a whole, Commission officials, though they did finally produce the desired information, suggested that the practice of inquiring into these subsidiary audits would be in violation of the "day-to-day" limitation on parliamentary control.[66] There is in fact no place

[64] *Ibid.*, p. iv. [65] *Ibid.*

[66] A discussion of this inquiry will be found in Gweneth Gutch, "Nationalised

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for any active proprietary—that is, risk-bearing—interest in the orthodox scheme of things. For obvious reasons, the committee seems an inappropriate device for supervision of "charges upon consumers and users" of the products of the public corporations.

While disavowing any intention of vesting control of the corporations in the committee, and emphasizing the friendly and even protective nature of its intended relation to them,[67] the report indicates that the committee should not confine itself to contemplation, but should "make representations about such matters as seem to require consideration by the Boards or debate in the House."[68] It is furthermore not merely unjustifiable but almost inconceivable that such a committee should exist and have no practical effect other than the satisfaction of idle curiosity. For one thing, criticism by Members of Parliament is itself a fairly powerful sanction, so that the very questioning of officials becomes to some extent a process of control acting in the direction of conservatism. It is no doubt possible to overwork and exaggerate this point—are there many civil servants who would regard a continuous parliamentary investigation as a "terrifying" prospect?[69]—but the testimony of Herbert Morrison and Sir Geoffrey Heyworth on this point has the ring of truth.[70] Another plausible guess is that the committee would serve as a sort of public relations group: a sympathetic retailer of the corporation's view to Parliament and public and an adviser to the corporation on how best to avoid criticism. This at any rate was the type of thing suggested by Lord Hurcomb, whose arguments were cited by the Select Committee in support of their proposal.[71] It not infrequently happens in this country that congressional committees function as uniquely privileged "lobbies" for the particular departments with whose affairs they are concerned, while at the same time

Industries and the Public Accounts Committee, 1951–52", *Public Administration* (Autumn 1953).

[67] H. C. 235, 1953, p. vii.

[68] *Ibid.*, p. viii.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 76, testimony of Lord Reith.

[70] *Ibid.*, pp. vi–vii.

[71] *Ibid.*, p. iv–v.

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exercising a more or less vigilant critical supervision over their administrative performance.

When the Committee's proposals came up for discussion in the House of Commons, misgivings were expressed as to the excessive degree of parliamentary control which might result from their adoption. A spokesman for the government indicated that it at that time favored a considerable scaling down of the proposed committee's functions.[72] Whether or not its recommendations are accepted, both the fact of the Select Committee's existence and the point of view expressed in its reports are evidence that the principal omission in the orthodox blueprint of the public corporation is not an insignificant one. This omission is, of course, the failure to take proper account of the legitimate interest of Parliament as representative of the taxpayers, who are now also the ultimate bearers of risk. How this undeniably real factor will make itself felt in terms of economic performance can only be conjectured. It seems probable that the phenomena discussed above—tendencies to managerial conservatism and parliamentary protectionism—will exist even without the standing committee. Whatever one may think of the probable importance of these tendencies, they are based ultimately on the fact that the taxpayer is not ideally cast in the rôle of risk-bearer. Consequently, practices that would be regarded as overcautious or restrictionist when associated with private ownership take on respectability when ownership is public. The notorious example here is that of government-owned railways.

The neglected parliamentary element may, of course, cause further changes not allowed for in the blueprint. We can perhaps dismiss the possibility of crude political exploitation such as might be expected in less civilized countries; nevertheless, experience with wage policy and talk of favoring certain areas and industries for reasons of state—as well as the ministerial direction to the B.T.C. on rate policy—suggest that the United Kingdom is not necessarily free from those tendencies toward sectional privilege which W. M. Acworth found to be one of the two besetting sins of public enterprise in democratic

[72] *H. C. Deb.*, Feb. 8, 1954, cols. 841–844.

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countries.[73] A thoroughgoing study (by The Acton Society Trust) of parliamentary questions on nationalized industries has revealed an understandable tendency to concentrate on local matters brought to members' attention by constituents.[74] It has been said that the public corporation is a "brittle form". It is particularly so when the statute authorizing it contains the machinery for its destruction.

All forms of organization are ultimately brittle. If the fate of the Hoch-Smith resolution reassures us that our system of regulated private enterprise is difficult to manipulate as an instrument of sectional pressure, the fact that the resolution was passed by Congress shows that such manipulation is not strongly enough opposed by public opinion. Again, the fact that the integrity of public control—as well as that of commercial management—*can* be better maintained when there is a separation of the regulatory and the commercial authorities does not mean that it *will* be so maintained; indeed, the benefit of this separation is lost to the extent that the regulator assumes responsibility for the financial success of the enterprise. It was in all probability this characteristic of railroad regulation

[73] W. M. Acworth, *Historical Sketch of Government Ownership of Railroads in Foreign Countries* (Presented to the Joint Committee of Congress on Interstate Commerce, Washington, D. C., May, 1917), pp. 62–63: "The essential lesson . . . may be said to be this: It is impossible to obtain satisfactory results on government railways in a democratic state unless the management in cut loose from direct political control. Neither Australia nor any other country with a democratic constitution—perhaps an exception ought to be made of Switzerland—has succeeded in maintaining a permanent severance. . . . Without imputing a double dose of orginal sin to politicians, it is easy to see why this happens. The railways belong to the people. Parliament is the authorized representative of the people. It seems therefore to the ordinary citizen only right and natural that Parliament should control the management of the people's railways. And yet facts are stubborn things; and the facts show that Parliamentary interference has meant running the railways, not for the benefit of the people at large, but to satisfy local or sectional or even personal interests. They show further that, under Parliamentary management, it is easier to get money for big schemes of new construction than for inconspicuous day-to-day betterments and improvements which probably would produce much greater public benefit."

[74] The Acton Society Trust, *Accountability to Parliament* (1950), pp. 7–8. This study is the first of a series of twelve published by this Trust on various problems of nationalized industry.

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in the United States that led Joseph Eastman to condemn it as productive of buck-passing and loss of managerial initiative.[75] The other major defect that he noted, lengthy litigation between shippers and railroads, is not necessarily a problem peculiar to private ownership. Nevertheless, in so far as its origin is in legislative vagueness, it is a symptom of that failure to conceive clearly the purposes of regulation which may yet undermine the regulatory system. Without such a clear conception, regulation can be and indeed has been in part perverted into a régime of restriction similar to those justified elsewhere as "protecting public investment". The result is to shelter inefficiency and backwardness; and inefficiency and backwardness allowed to grow under governmental protection gave rise to the most compelling arguments for nationalization in the United Kingdom.

What we can learn from the as yet limited British experience with nationalization is not only that all problems do not disappear with the euthanasia of the private stockholder, as so many have been discovering. The additional point is that, for an organization whose main function is the satisfaction of market demand, public ownership creates structural difficulties that do not exist where ownership is private. This knowledge should encourage us to try to correct our own defects, which seem and may yet prove to be remediable without scrapping the system itself.

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Washington, D. C.

[75] U. S. Office of Federal Coordinator of Transportation, *Regulation of Railroads*, S. Doc. 119, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1934, pp. 12–13.

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JUGOSLAV ELECTIONS: DEMOCRACY IN SMALL DOSES

I

THE leaders of Jugoslavia seem to be having difficulty deciding just where they are going. Their expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 has led to a disillusionment with Stalin-style communism, although they still belligerently insist that they are Communists. They have imitated certain principles and methods from the West, yet at the same time they deny that they will ever become a Western-type democracy.

Since 1948 they have gropingly sought a "middle way" which is supposed to embody the good points of the Soviet socialist economy without its bureaucratic distortions, as well as the positive achievements of liberal democracy without the faults of capitalism. That steering such a middle course involves difficulties was dramatically demonstrated last year when even someone as important as Milovan Djilas, formerly No. 3 man in the country, strayed too far in a democratic direction and had to be called to heel.[1]

In trying to build a new type of "socialist democracy", the Jugoslav leaders have since 1949 instituted a whole series of reforms. Four fifths of the collective farms have been dissolved, a kind of workers' management has been established in economic enterprises, governmental and economic administration has been considerably decentralized, Communists are instructed to lead the masses by persuasion and education instead of by commands and force, and elections are conducted under a liberalized system which even permits occasional non-Communist candidates to compete against Communists.

The elections of November-December 1953, which were held under a new law, provide an opportunity both for examining the extent to which political democracy has actually been introduced in Jugoslavia, and for illustrating the difficulties

[1] For details on the "heresy" and ousting of Djilas, see: Thomas Taylor Hammond, "The Djilas Affair and Jugoslav Communism", *Foreign Affairs*, January 1955.

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which Jugoslav Communists have in following the new policy of leading without commanding. The elections also tend to confirm the impression that in the Union of Communists (formerly Communist party) there is a struggle between those who still cling to the old Stalinist ways and others (of whom Djilas is an extreme example) who favor further steps in the direction of democracy.

The elections contained several features which had not previously existed in elections on the federal level: (a) nomination by open meetings of voters, instead of by the Socialist Alliance (formerly People's Front); (b) the use of printed paper ballots; (c) the absence of any large-scale marching of the voters to the polls in groups, and the diminution of the use of open pressure on individual citizens to vote; (d) the election of some candidates who ran in opposition to the "official" nominees.[1a]

II

The author, who was able to observe the whole election procedure firsthand, found that the chief problem of the government in running the elections under the new system was to make them as free and democratic as possible in form, while at the same time insuring that the "right" results were obtained. Local Communist leaders seem to have had considerable difficulty in finding the correct intermediate ground between the old Soviet-style elections and free Western-style elections. Vice-President Moša Pijade, who supervised the application of the new electoral law, found that many Communists wandered astray in one of three main directions: (a) abandoning the leadership of the masses, (b) commanding the masses, or (c) waiting for orders from above.

(a) The first group took the democratic provisions of the new law at face value, interpreting them to mean "the *abandonment of* any kind of *leadership* over the political activities of the working masses" by the SA (Socialist Alliance, the chief Communist "front" organization) and the UC (Union of Com-

[1a] For details of the law see: "The Law on the Rights and Duties, Election and Recall of Federal People's Deputies", *Službeni List Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije* (*Official Gazette of the Federal People's Republic of Jugoslavia*), No. 35, Sept. 10, 1953.

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munists). Some Communists concluded that nominations should "be left to the wild movement of events," and many speeches were required to make it clear that the part played by the SA would remain "decisive for the outcome of the elections."

Just how the SA would be "decisive" was spelled out in detail by Vice-President Edvard Kardelj:

> The organizations of the SA have the task of starting discussions with other social organizations about possible candidates and of *submitting proposals* at voters' meetings which have been *formulated at previous conferences.* The organizations of the SA must in the first place be active in preparing and carrying out the nominating meetings.[2]

Since government officials frankly admit that the UC is "the leading force" in the SA, this meant in effect that Communists would play the chief rôle in the nomination of candidates.

(b) Other local leaders of the UC and SA mistakenly assumed that the democratic provisions of the new law were mere window dressing, failed to act in the new spirit, and instead retained their "bureaucratic habits of *commanding from above.*" This sin was condemned by Pijade as follows:

> Some believe that the attitude proclaimed by the highest political organizations is only a nice theory but that the practice should in fact be different, and some even believe that this is the hidden wish of those at the top. Some people are apparently possessed by a completely unfounded and silly fear of democracy, which seems to them . . . dangerous.[3]

Certain district and republic leaders, afraid of what might happen if democracy were left untethered, recommended candidates from above "in such a way that the organizations of the SA were discouraged in advance in their electoral initiative."[4]

(c) If commanding from above occurred in some areas, it

[2] *Borba*, Sept. 19, 1953. Italics added. Most of the quotations in this article are from *Borba*, which at the time was the official newspaper of the UC, or from *Politika*, which was the chief organ of the SA. Both are published in Belgrade.

[3] *Politika*, Oct. 11, 1953.

[4] Edvard Kardelj, in *Borba*, Sept. 19, 1953.

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is not surprising that in other places was observed its counterpart, the third error—*waiting for directives from above.* People guilty of this mistake, said Pijade, showed a lack of independent initiative, assuming that higher authorities would "impose candidates by issuing directives" to the local leaders.[5]

One can hardly refrain from feeling sorry for the local Communist official who had to figure out whether he was supposed to wait for directives from above or make an independent decision regarding which candidate to push. Indeed, a certain amount of "commanding from above" must have been sanctioned by Kardelj and Pijade themselves, for otherwise how would a certain constituency know that it would have the honor of nominating Kardelj or Pijade? How else was competition for the privilege of nominating Marshall Tito avoided? There had to be some central office to arrange for the nomination of those top leaders who were on the "must" list for the Federal Assembly. Such commanding from above apparently was not to be the prerogative, however, of those lower in the hierarchy.

The government leaders announced that, contrary to previous custom in federal elections, more than one person might be nominated for a post, but they also made it clear that this did not mean "reactionaries" should be permitted to become candidates. Warnings were issued against "anti-socialist elements" who were "preparing to exploit the democratic nature of the electoral law for their own aims."[6] Kardelj, in explaining the liberalized electoral law, declared: "If we are struggling for as large and as consistent an application of democratic principles . . . as possible, this does not mean that we stand for freedom of counter-revolutionary activities."[7]

III

Some of the methods which Communists could use to hinder the election of "reactionaries" became evident when nominations took place. The nominating was by far the most important step in the whole election process, as can be seen from the fact

[5] *Politika*, Oct. 11, 1953.

[6] Dispatch from Zrenjanin in *Borba*, Aug. 13, 1953.

[7] *Borba*, Sept. 19, 1953.

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that, out of 484 seats in the Federal Assembly, only thirty-eight were contested. This means that, for the other 446 places, nomination was tantamount to election. On the republic, district and town levels there was considerably more competition, but even for the republic assemblies less than one fourth of the posts were contested.

The electoral law provided for nomination by two methods: by a Meeting of Voters, or by a petition signed by 200 voters. Since only eight candidates were nominated for the Federal Assembly by petition, the crux of the whole electoral procedure on the federal level was the Meeting of Voters, and it was here that the Communists performed their most important work.

The regulations for the conduct of the Meeting of Voters were written so as to give a decided advantage to those who had planned and organized in advance of the meetings (that is, the Communists). This is seen particularly in the case of the great powers of the Nominating Committee, which was elected by the Voters' Meeting. Suggestions for the composition of the Nominating Committee had to be *made by a group of at least ten people*, and they had to propose *a complete Committee* of seven to fifteen members. At a Voters' Meeting in Belgrade attended by the author, a man got up and tried to make a nomination for the Nominating Committee, but was informed by the chairman that only groups of ten could suggest names. After some conversation with people sitting near-by, the man rose again and stated that he now had a group of ten. When asked whom he wished to nominate, he suggested only one nominee, whereupon the chairman pointed out that he would have to suggest a complete Committee. The man, thoroughly confused by these legal technicalities, gave up and sat down, amid hisses from the audience.

Once the "conscious leaders of the masses" succeeded in electing their slate of names for the Nominating Committee, half the battle was won, for the Nominating Committee had extraordinary powers. Although any voter present could propose a candidate, it was up to the Nominating Committee to retire, decide in secret which of those suggested were the best, and submit its slate of candidates for approval by the Voters' Meeting.

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Another provision of the law also stacked the cards in favor of those voters who were organized. To be accepted by one Voters' Meeting did not make a man a candidate; he had to be proposed by meetings representing approximately one fourth of the electors in the constituency. The importance of this provision is shown by the fact that 2,341 persons were proposed for the Federal Assembly by various Voters' Meetings, but only 517 of these had the support of enough Voters' Meetings actually to become candidates.[8] No one could become a candidate through Voters' Meetings unless he had the support of an organization extending into at least one fourth of the meetings in the constituency. Since the only political organizations which can operate legally are the SA and the UC, this meant that it was almost impossible to become a candidate without their support.

But even if the will of the people was not properly expressed by the selections of the Voters' Meetings, there was still the other possibility of nomination by a petition of 200 voters. On the federal level this provision of the electoral law was of little importance, for only eight candidates were nominated in this fashion, although the number in the republic elections was much larger. One reason for the small number of candidates by petition to the Federal Assembly probably lies in the fact that the most prominent Communists in the country were nominated for these posts at Voters' Meetings, and few people were foolish enough to try to run against them. It is likely also that many voters would be afraid to sign their names to a petition for a known opponent of the régime, even if they agreed with his views. Citizens who signed the petition of a "reactionary" candidate for the Slovenian assembly were asked by a newspaper reporter how they happened to be supporting such a man.[9] In a country where so many people have been in jail for political

[8] These figures, as well as most of the statistics in this article, come from two reports published by the Federal Electoral Commission: *Izveštaj o izborima za savezno veće* (*Report on the Elections for the Federal Council*), and *Izveštaj o izborima za veće proizvodjača* (*Report on the Elections for the Council of Producers*) (Belgrade, 1953).

[9] Article by "F.D." in *Slovenski Poročevalec*, Nov. 14, 1953. The candidate was Franc Kerin, of the 33rd constituency of the Krsko Region.

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opposition, such questioning would probably frighten the timid, even if it were not done for this purpose. A more serious case was that in Skopje, Macedonia, where a Communist nominated in opposition to a party superior asserted that one of the signers on his petition was discharged from his job.[10]

Communists who permitted themselves to be nominated without the approval of the local UC and SA committees usually found themselves in hot water. Typical was the criticism of Vlado Vukatinović and Dzemail Miftar, two Communists who "decided to submit their candidacies behind the back of the Socialist Alliance," and who sought support among people who had "frequently acted against socialism." The press denounced this as a case where "principles and Communist morals" were forgotten, and where "arrogance, irresponsibility, political blindness, and morbid ambition" had suceeded in darkening "socialist consciousness".[11]

Indeed anyone running against the candidate supported by the local committee of the UC was asking for trouble. An example was Milan Dimov, a Communist in Stip, Macedonia, who complained to a newspaper reporter that his scholarship to a party school was canceled and his landlord was ordered to spy on him because he refused to withdraw his candidacy.[12] In Resen, Macedonia, a member of the district committee of the UC put himself forward as a candidate in opposition to the secretary of the committee. Attempts were made to persuade him to withdraw, but he maintained that it would be better to "let the people decide." When he was ejected from the committee for "careerism, non-Communist actions, lack of discipline," and so on, he finally saw the wisdom of withdrawing.[13]

IV

One of the strangest things about the elections was the official disapproval of any campaigning on a personal basis. The

[10] Article by "Al. P." in *Borba*, Nov. 7, 1953. The article does not indicate whether or not the charge was true.

[11] Article by M. Milojković in *Politika*, Nov. 5, 1953.

[12] *Borba*, Nov. 15, 1953.

[13] Article by Al. Petković in *Borba*, Nov. 11, 1953.

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leaders of the country seem to have been particularly averse to the idea of two members of the UC or activists in the SA criticizing one another in full public view. A real democratic-style campaign of personalities, with one Communist exposing the faults of another Communist, might have been much too entertaining to the "reactionaries" and too disruptive to party unity. It would not do to wash dirty linen before the less conscious citizenry. Pijade went as far as to say that when members of the SA were nominated for the same office, they should not criticize one another, but that "even *cooperation* must exist among the candidates."[14] Instead of engaging in mutual "slander", the candidates were expected to exhort their constituents about the problems of constructing socialism. "The work of the SA", said *Borba*, "will be aimed at *preventing* any attempt at *agitation for or against* any of the candidates."[15]

In asking the candidates not to campaign "on a personal basis", the top leaders were of course working against human nature. What could have been more natural than that those candidates who faced real opposition should have canvassed, by fair means if not foul, to win the necessary votes. But in so doing they ran the risk of being criticized in the press and even of being publicly denounced by the SA. By failing to follow the rules prescribed from above they inevitably fell into such sins as "slander", "cheap demagogy", "localism", "careerism", or "catering to reactionary elements."

The most general sin committed in the campaigning was *cheap demagogy*, which consisted of making "unfounded promises" to the voters in an "unprincipled struggle for votes." The promises which certain candidates believed would win them votes are rather revealing. Some promised the peasants that they would "annul all taxation, dissolve the cooperatives, and increase the prices of all agricultural products."[16] In Moslem areas it was common for candidates to promise that they would repeal the law banning the wearing of the veil. In some parts of Croatia the "cheap demagogy" got completely out of hand,

[14] *Borba*, Aug. 24, 1953. Italics added.

[15] Article by "D.J." in *Borba*, Nov. 3, 1953. Italics added.

[16] Article by "D.M." in *Politika*, Sept. 18, 1953.

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with candidates promising that they would "change the whole administration in the district, starting with the janitors"![17]

Another common sin in the campaigning was *localism*. This meant either emphasizing local issues or insisting upon electing a local candidate. At an SA meeting in Slovenia a speaker reported with disapproval that "in some municipalities and districts discussion has boiled down to some minor local problems. As a criterion for this or that candidate they take into account how active he was in some matter of purely local importance, for reduction of taxes and accumulation, etc."[18] If the voters were so narrow-minded as to ask a candidate to support some popular measure in return for their votes, this was criticized in the press as "blackmailing the candidate".[19]

A different variety of "localism" was the desire by voters to elect "people from their midst". Pijade denounced those Communists who in some localities joined the peasants in stating: "Let us elect somebody who is also a peasant because he is familiar with our troubles."[20] In other cases the desire to nominate someone "from their midst" may have been simply the natural reaction of voters against having a candidate imposed on them from above. The number of seats in the Federal Council allocated to the city of Belgrade, for example, was only eight—not nearly enough to take care of all of the top leaders from Belgrade—thus making it necessary to have some of these elected in other constituencies. In such cases the voters might have preferred to elect a local person whom they knew, rather than some "big shot" who lived far away in the capital.

The worst campaigning sin of all was *catering to reactionary elements*. Even activists in the SA were sometimes guilty of this sin, as was reported by *Borba:*

> The enemy has not succeeded in proposing his men as candidates. . . . But . . . in those districts where there were several candidates,

[17] *Borba*, Nov. 5, 1953.

[18] *Borba*, Sept. 22, 1953.

[19] *Borba*, Nov. 8, 1953.

[20] *Politika*, Nov. 1, 1953.

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> the enemy quickly oriented himself toward those men who are of poorer quality, toward those who are for him "a lesser evil." In most frequent cases these men are activists of the SA. The majority of them have taken a stand against this undesired and calculated support. However, there have been candidates who have welcomed any support, even support coming from the reactionaries. . . .
>
> These are mainly men who are running in the election out of careerist motives. . . . For them the essential thing is to win in the elections . . . and, as regards everything else, "it will be all right."[21]

Any member of the SA guilty of "slander", "demagogy", "localism", "careerism", or "catering to the enemy" was liable to be openly repudiated by the SA. In several districts of Macedonia, for example, the SA disassociated itself from certain candidates, and succeeded in having the voters withdraw their nominations. *Borba* stated that "from among eighteen candidates for deputy, this being the number in Macedonia not supported by the SA, eleven were struck out by decision of the voters from the list of candidates." *Borba* boasted further that "during this struggle . . . against unhealthy, ambitious, petty-bourgeois, inhuman and career-seeking men . . ., the most conscious members of the SA and of the UC have been in the forefront."[22] Surprisingly enough, four of those who were repudiated by the SA were nevertheless elected to the Macedonian People's Assembly. Although permitted to take their seats in the Assembly they were excluded from the deputies' club.[23]

V

The provisions of the new electoral law regarding voting procedure represented a considerable improvement over the old. In previous federal elections, before World War II as well as after, printed paper ballots were not used because many of the people could not read; instead a voter cast his ballot by dropping a rubber ball in the box of his choice. In the elections of 1945 and 1950 it was difficult to keep one's vote secret because, in the first place, the electoral committee could usually hear

[21] Article by "Al. P." in *Borba*, Nov. 17, 1953.

[22] *Borba*, Nov. 19, 1953.

[23] See *Politika*, Dec. 19, 1953, and *Borba*, Nov. 24, 1953.

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the rubber ball when it dropped in the box, and, secondly, "loyal" voters were encouraged to show an open palm after dropping their ball in the pro-government box. Those who insisted upon secrecy were automatically suspect. This time, however, there were printed paper ballots and only one ballot box. The law provided that each polling place should have at least one voting booth, voting committes were enjoined to see that secrecy in voting was assured, and officials were forbidden to ask a voter how he voted or why he did not vote.

The actual practice was not always in compliance with the law. In the city of Belgrade, which one would expect to be something of a show place, the author found that the usual voting "booth" was merely a cardboard screen about two feet high placed on a table. In some rural polling places there were no screens of any kind.

When certain foreign correspondents in Jugoslavia reported cases of noncompliance with the electoral law, they were denounced for their stupidity and spite by writers in *Borba*.[24] But a few days later Pijade, in an impressive show of honesty, defended the foreign correspondents, criticized their Jugoslav critics, and himself mentioned several instances where the elections had not been conducted properly. Some Jugoslav newspapers, he said, had published photographs of voters marking their ballots without any screen to provide secrecy. One Jugoslav reporter questioned people about how they had voted, and still another met with the electoral committee after the balloting to collect information on the persons who failed to vote. Citing this evidence, Pijade said, "I believe that the secrecy of voting was not insured at every polling place as required by law." And, like a teacher scolding his pupils, he added, "It is up to us to see to it that not even one case of a similar nature should happen at the next elections."[25]

Thus, in spite of the new law, an opponent of the régime, remembering the many past instances where political nonconformity was punished, often was not certain that he could cast a negative vote without being discovered. If there was

[24] *Borba*, Nov. 26 and Dec. 3, 1953.

[25] *Politika*, Dec. 6, 1953.

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only one cadidate, or only Communist candidates, he must have felt there was no point in taking the risk anyhow.

In the pre-election campaign almost as much stress was placed on the importance of voting as on voting right. Although there was no overt checking up on people to see whether or not they voted, it was made quite clear that anyone who failed to vote was guilty of either extreme negligence or outright opposition. The previous custom of competing to see which polling places could report 100 per cent participation was discontinued, but it was still considered desirable to have something close to 100 per cent.

In elections where most of the candidates were unopposed and the outcome was a foregone conclusion, many people naturally felt indifferent toward voting. In addition, anti-Communists who were unable to nominate candidates saw that one method of expressing their opposition was by refusing to vote. Such "reactionaries", reported the press, tried to encourage abstention from the polls by saying to their friends, "Why should we go to the polls when everything has been settled in advance from above?" Thus it was necessary for Communists to beat the drums for a heavy vote. A low percentage of participation would reveal to the world either that the people considered the elections a farce, or that they were refusing to vote as an act of protest.

The percentage of registered voters who actually cast their ballots this time was less than the "records" usually set in the Soviet Union, but considerably more than is customary in the United States. In the country as a whole only 10.6 per cent *failed to vote* for the Federal Council, in spite of the fact that less pressure to vote was exerted than previously. When we consider that many of the nonvoters may have been sick, out of town, improperly registered, and so on, it is clear that the percentage of citizens who deliberately abstained was quite small.

The number who *voted against* the candidates is more difficult to determine, because the electoral law provided that votes against the candidates as well as ballots incorrectly marked should both be classified "invalid". This provision may have

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been designed to make it possible for government officials to claim (as they sometimes did) that most of the votes classed as "invalid" did not represent anti-Communist votes.

In any event the number of votes listed as "invalid" was small, being only 4.3 per cent in the nation as a whole. The percentage was highest in Slovenia (5.9) and lowest in Montenegro (0.8), while on the district level Djakovo (Croatia) had the high figure of 16.9 per cent and Titograd (Montenegro), where Milovan Djilas was the candidate, had the almost unbelievably low figure of 0.1 per cent invalid.

If for the sake of comparison all abstentions and all "invalid" votes are lumped together, we arrive at the following "opposition" figures:

	Per cent	
Nation as a whole	14.9	
Highest republic	16.4	(Serbia)
Lowest republic	9.7	(Montenegro)
Highest district	43.3	(Djakovo, Croatia)
Lowest district	3.3	(Mlavski, Serbia)

These figures deserve comment. First of all, Serbia has the highest percentage of "opposition" votes primarily because of the unusually high percentage (21.7 per cent) in the province of Vojvodina, a prosperous area containing large numbers of national minorities, particularly Hungarians, Roumanians, and Slovaks. Secondly, the fact that a Communist régime would publish figures indicating that one district had an "opposition" vote of 43.3 per cent (Djakovo) is itself something of a sensation.

Are the election returns falsified? Probably no one, not even Tito, can give a confident answer to that question for every polling place, but the author is inclined to believe that there was no significant falsification for the country as a whole, partly because falsification was not necessary. This does not mean, however, that the returns give an accurate indication of the support which the régime has among the population. In the majority of cases in the federal elections there was only one candidate, a Communist, or, if there were other candidates, they were Communists too. Thus the anti-Communist usually

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could voice his opposition only by staying away from the polls or by casting an "invalid" ballot, in either of which cases he would accomplish nothing except to risk getting a black mark against his record.

Several statements were made by leaders of the country to the effect that everyone was free to vote as he wished or not to vote, and that no punishment of any kind would be meted out to those who failed to vote for the government. But even if we assume that those statements were sincere (and it is possible that some of them were), many of the voters did not believe them. The voters knew of the thousands of people who had been in jail for nothing more serious than being anti-Communist, and they knew that in past elections careful records were kept of those who failed to vote as they were supposed to. Regardless of what the intentions of the top leaders may have been, large numbers of citizens were afraid publicly to identify themselves as "anti". Or they felt that it was foolish to expose themselves by such a futile gesture. While they probably did not expect to be put in jail for voting wrong, they did fear that they and their families might be discriminated against in such matters as jobs, housing, pensions, university admission, and countless other favors which the government can grant or withhold.

The number of those who refused to vote or voted against the government, therefore, does not represent the total of those who oppose the régime, but rather those few who are not afraid to perform this act of mild opposition, or who were so bitter against the government that they did not care. The figures for the "opposition" vote, while unreliable for measuring the amount of actual opposition, probably can properly be used for comparing one republic or one district with another, since obvious similarities exist in the returns for the three post-war national elections. In 1945 and 1950 as well as in 1953, for example, Serbia had the highest "opposition" vote, while Montenegro just as consistently had the lowest.

VI

If the leaders of Jugoslavia have no intention of making the elections fully democratic and taking the chance of losing, why do they want to elections to be slightly democratic?

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One of the reasons probably has to do with the Cominform struggle. If, as the Jugoslavs now say, the elections in Cominform countries are a farce, then Jugoslav elections have to be different. The new electoral law is part of a general program of "democratization" which is intended to differentiate the Jugoslav system from the Soviet system. More democratic elections are support for the claim that Jugoslavia has become "the most democratic country in the world", a claim intended for both foreign and domestic consumption.

Although many Jugoslavs doubtless resent being denied the right to vote in truly democratic elections, there are others who have no understanding of such things. When one peasant was asked by an American whether the elections had been free, he replied in all seriousness: "Yes, completely free. In the past it was against the law to sell alcoholic drinks on election day, but this time you could buy all you wanted."

Another reason for more democratic elections is probably the confidence of the government that the opposition parties have been so completely destroyed that no real danger exists. There were apparently few cases where anti-Communists succeeded in being nominated (none at all in the federal elections, as far as this author can determine), and where there were contests it was usually between Communists.

But what is the reason for having contests between two Communists, especially if both must stand for identical programs? Such plural candidacies may have arisen, first of all, in constituencies where the party organization had difficulty in choosing between two or more possible candidates, and decided to let the voters make the choice. It is also possible that plural candidacies are being used as a method of picking local Communist leaders who are not only good Communists in every other respect, but who are also more popular (or less *un*popular) with the electorate. A local dictator who lords it over his constituents in an arrogant, arbitrary, "Soviet" manner can now be threatened with the possibility of letting the people vote against him in favor of some other Communist.

How this might happen was shown in the last elections in the constituency of Poreč-Buzet in Istria. The candidate

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nominated by Voters' Meetings was a prominent Croatian Communist who had made himself disliked by many of the local people, including some of the Communists. A young Communist official decided to run against him, succeeded in getting nominated by petition, and obtained 45.3 per cent of the votes. Not satisfied that he had been beaten fairly, the daring young man then protested to the credentials commission of the Federal Assembly that the election results were fraudulent, and caused them to conduct an investigation. He did not succeed in ousting his opponent, but he did provide dramatic evidence of the way in which the job security of local Communist bosses has been challenged by the new electoral procedure.[26]

Trial by the fire of voters' ballots does not seem to be the order of the day for the party high command, however, Plural candidacies have been rather common in the town and district elections, less common on the republic level, and relatively rare in the federal elections. So far, most of those Communists who are important enough to rate nomination for the Federal Assembly are also immune from competition. Because of this there has arisen a conflict of interest between the leaders at the top and the party bosses on the local levels. It is easy enough for a member of the top twenty or thirty to speak about the need for greater democracy in the elections, since he is in no danger of losing his seat. But the lesser Communist no longer enjoys such security. He knows that the more democratic the elections become, the greater are the risks that he will be voted out of office. Hence there is a natural temptation for him to use his influence with the local Communist organization, Socialist Alliance, press, police, and so on, to prevent anyone from being nominated against him, and if that cannot be avoided, to use whatever means are necessary to ensure victory. Further democratization in the elections will therefore be difficult to accomplish as long as local party bosses continue to enjoy great power. As one writer expressed it, "certain bureaucratic

[26] The loser's protest is discussed in *Borba*, January 31, 1954. The editor of *Naprijed*, a Zagreb weekly, was later criticized at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Croatian Party for having supported him. See *Christian Science Monitor*, March 19, 1954, p. 4.

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elements are afraid of losing their positions, and therefore they resist the development of democracy."[27]

What of future elections? Since the use of force, intimidation, and checking up on the voters was much less this time than in previous elections, it may be that in the future the populace will show more boldness in making nominations, canvassing for their candidates, and in voting against the government. If the voters who worked against the government candidates in these elections are left unpunished, others may join them next time. In other words, the same law, applied in the same manner, might produce a heavier opposition vote.

If this opposition should reach dangerous proportions, the government would probably find other methods of attaining the desired election results—by changing the law, by falsifying the returns, or by using its ultimate weapon, the police. In any case the government is not going to permit itself to be voted out of power and the people know it. The opposition is afraid to act aggressively, and it is for this very reason that the government is willing to make the electoral law more democratic.

The Jugoslav leaders seem to entertain mutually contradictory attitudes toward the idea of democratic elections. On the one hand, they are sincerely concerned about the problem of bureaucracy and they would like to have freer elections, but, on the other hand, they are reluctant to accept the risks involved. They tell themselves that the majority of the people are behind them (and cite the elections as evidence), but at the same time they know that the majority are not.[28] When Pijade was asked confidentially whether he thought the régime would win in completely free elections, he replied, "Of course we would win." If that was the case, his questioner continued, then why not have free elections? "Well," said Pijade, "maybe we would lose."

The Jugoslav Communists would of course ideally like to have elections in which the people would freely and voluntarily

[27] Živan Dimitrijević in *Naša Stvarnost*, No. 10, 1953.

[28] Djilas was in effect criticized for asserting that the majority of the people were behind the government. See especially Kardelj's speech in *Borba*, Jan. 18, 1954.

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choose communism by a sweeping majority. But, since they know this is at present impossible, they are liberalizing the election procedure only in ways which will not materially affect the results. They argue that Communist one-party elections are better for the country than a return to the bitter factional fights which characterized pre-war politics. As time passes (continues the argument) the majority of the people will become convinced of the wisdom of Communist policies, and then elections can be completely free.

In one of his campaign speeches President Tito commented that to introduce multi-party elections in Jugoslavia would be like hitching a horse in front of a well-running limousine. Adopting his metaphor, we may say that the Jugoslav election limousine has a new body, styled somewhat after Western models, but the engine is still the one-cylinder Communist variety, manufactured in Moscow. The democratic upholstery and paint improve the limousine's appearance, but they do not affect the way it runs, and as long as it operates on only one Communist cylinder, the passengers will never arrive at a democratic destination.

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PEASANT POLITICS IN THE THIRD FRENCH REPUBLIC

THE theory that France is a peasant nation can hardly be called a novelty. For generations now, both Frenchmen and foreigners have been taking it for granted: sometimes with pride, sometimes with regret. Recently the thesis has been forcefully restated by the eminent British scholar Alfred Cobban.

> In the last resort, and at bottom, France is a Peasants' Republic. That, I believe, is the key to understanding the fundamental facts of French politics. The strength and the weakness of France arise from this. . . . Though ultimately the peasants ruled [pre-war] France, their rule was passive and negative. . . . The continuing influence of the peasantry is the chief reason why the so-called Fourth Republic cannot escape from the Third, and remains petrified in the past.[1]

If the peasants have really ruled France, it would seem that historians of the Third Republic have been ignoring the facts of life; for the farmers have certainly gotten little attention in most history books. Still, perhaps the historians ought to be more pitied than censured for avoiding such an amorphous, complex and undramatic subject. Everything about the peasants is controversial, and any attempt to generalize falls short of the complete truth. Some observers describe the peasantry as the chief bulwark of democracy; others, as a reactionary element which clings blindly to old abuses and thus becomes (in Mr. Cobban's words) "the ideal agent for exploitation by the most sinister forces." We are told that they are the unchallenged masters of French political life, or, on the other hand, that they have long been the helpless victims of cynical city politicians. Hostile critics show them crouching jealously over their privileges with no concern for the nation's broader interests; apologists reply that the peasant's sole privilege has been the

[1] Alfred Cobban, "France—a Peasants' Republic", *The Listener*, XLI (March 17, 1949), pp. 429–30.

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right to live out a miserable and frustrated existence. And, indeed, there is reason to believe that all of these contradictory dogmas contain some truth.

The purpose of this brief essay is to sketch in broad outline the rôle of the peasantry in the political life of the Third Republic, with special stress on the years from 1930 to 1940. That decade, it seems in retrospect, introduced a new phase in the agrarian history of France: a phase of change, flux, ferment which is still in process today, and which is in contrast to the almost glacial evolution of the nineteenth century. Some of the signs of this ferment in the 1930's were the emergence of vocal organized minorities among the peasantry; the intensified activity of political groups in the countryside; and the growth of conflicting doctrines as to the peasants' proper place in society, the national economy, and the state. Before 1940, these developments affected only a small élite; but they foreshadowed a basic change in the peasants' political rôle—a change from silent, unorganized, "passive and negative" behavior to an increasingly active, aggressive, self-conscious participation in the nation's affairs. Not since the era of the Great Revolution had a change of such potential importance taken place in the countryside.

To some extent, this new peasant attitude grows out of the chronic upheaval and crisis of our times. But it is also the product of the Third Republic's golden age—of the socio-economic structure which had developed in those quiet, stable years from 1890 to 1930. That period was, in the main, a fairly prosperous time for agriculture; yet the peasants were not contented. On most farms, routine was the prevailing law, and hard, unrewarding labor the rule of life. A growing number of peasants gave up the struggle and left for the cities. From 1892 to 1929, the number of farms in France declined by 30 per cent. The peasants might be denounced by urban critics as profiteers and tax-dodgers; they continued nevertheless to abandon this happy life in droves.

Much of the discontent, of course, can be traced to the backwardness and stagnancy of a large segment of French agriculture. The agricultural survey of 1929 revealed some interesting facts

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to those few who studied it: for example, that half the land was tilled by only 10 per cent of the farmers, and that about one third of the farm population owned no land at all.[2] But it failed to show the most fundamental fact of all: the contrast between a minority of modernized capitalist farmers, producing for the market, and a mass of subsistence-type "precapitalist" peasants, living on a marginal standard and producing mainly for themselves. Obviously both types may be found in any Western nation. What was unique in France was the survival of so large a precapitalist element within the framework of a relatively modern and evolved society. Here, as in so many ways, France tended to straddle the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Here too was a source of increasing social stress, for it is probably true that the gap in living standards between the two farm categories and between the country and the city masses tended, over the decades, to grow wider rather than narrower.[3]

France's curious agrarian structure is often traced to the Méline tariff of 1892, which allegedly petrified French farming in a nineteenth-century mold and checked a natural evolution toward modernization. This argument is valid only in part; much of the responsibility must be shared by the politicians of the period after Méline. The tariff did not condemn French agriculture to inevitable stagnation; it only made it easy for both peasants and politicians to fall into lazy, routine habits. Some peasants resisted the temptation, and turned to modern methods on their own. The politicians resisted less well. They preferred to tell themselves that agriculture had already been properly cared for in 1892, and had no serious problems any longer. It may be, of course, that even if the politicians had been more far-sighted, the passive, tight-fisted mass of peasant voters would have blocked any proposal for a costly long-range

[2] E. Weill-Raynal, "La répartition des terres en France—légende et réalité", *Études et conjoncture*, III (1948), Nos. 9–12, p. 65.

[3] On this controversial issue, see J. Dessirier in *La conjoncture économique et financière*, IX (October 1937), p. v; P. Fromont, "La production agricole", in *Revue d'économie politique*, LIII (1939), pp. 1174–76; and Anon., "Le revenu de l'agriculture française avant la guerre et aujourd'hui", *Etudes et conjoncture*, I (November 1946), pp. 17–106.

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program of the sort that France needed most—a program of agricultural education and experimentation under the guidance of an adequate network of "county agents", with a view to modernizing young farmers' minds. Certainly the peasants could have blocked it, for the rural areas controlled the Senate, and a majority of the electoral districts for the Chamber were at least semirural in character. However, they were given no chance to block it, for it was never offered to them as a real choice. At intervals, cabinets did draw up plans which looked timidly in the right direction; but they were always rejected by parliament for financial reasons, and the peasants heard little about them pro or con. Down to 1930, the government's agricultural policy (if one can dignify it by that name) amounted to little more than a tariff law plus electric lights in several thousand villages.

If the peasants really dominated politics, why did they get so little out of the politicians? Several answers have been given, but the best one seems to be that they got little because they wanted little. The reflexes of most peasants in that era were defensive and negative; they sought to protect themselves against the foreign competitor, against the middleman, and against acts of God like hail, floods, and tax collectors. Such protection, to a considerable degree at least, the politicians gave them. Almost all of them were exempt from the income tax (and one can argue that most of them deserved to be exempt, since their living standard was so low). As for protection against the quirks of nature, parliament was usually generous to a fault. Senator Hennessy later recalled the palmy days of the 1920's when a farmer wrote to his deputy saying, "I've been wiped out by hail, it's cost me a million francs, try to get me a hundred thousand." "In those days," added the senator, "he probably got the million and then wanted two hundred thousand more."[4]

Leadership toward something more positive and constructive was not likely to emerge spontaneously from the mass of subsistence-type peasants. One would think that it might have come either from the more vigorous peasants who were modernizing by choice, or from a few effective political leaders with

[4] *Journal officiel* (*Débats, Sénat*), December 26, 1939, p. 745.

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vision. Why neither group responded to the challenge is a problem in itself, far too complex to tackle here. Besides, we must admit again that even if such leadership had materialized, it might have been resisted and sabotaged by the unenlightened peasantry, always suspicious and fearful of change. Yet there is no compelling reason to take so cynical a view. The only sure conclusion is that the peasants had no chance to make a choice. If it is true that the peasantry dragged the Third Republic down by its passive and negative influence (especially in matters of foreign policy and social reform), then French political leadership was more at fault than the peasants themselves. Most politicians confined themselves to ritualistic praise of the little peasant, like Dixie congressmen leaping to the defense of Southern womanhood. A cartoonist of the day pictured Minister of Agriculture Henri Chéron declaiming to a group of rural notables: "Agriculture, gentlemen, is the lifeblood of the country; and besides, let's not forget that the peasants can vote."[5] No politician seems to have reflected on the need for a gradual transformation of the peasantry, both for its own good and for the good of the nation. A program designed to stimulate such a transformation, if properly presented by an astute political leader and lubricated by funds from the state, might even have aroused enthusiasm rather than hostility in the countryside. At the very least, it would have had a cumulative educational effect of great significance.

Even before the depression hit France, there were signs of restlessness and ferment in the rural districts. One such sign was the creation, during the 1920's, of the first really effective farm pressure groups France had ever known—the so-called specialized associations, founded by the commercial growers of such products as wheat, wine, and sugar beets. Their aim, unfortunately, seldom went beyond keeping the price of each commodity as high as possible. Such an aim was simple and direct enough to win the support of many subsistence-type peasants—even those who had little to sell and actually stood to lose by a policy which meant expensive bread, sugar, or wine. The effect, of course, was to keep the marginal producers in business at the same old subsistence level.

[5] *Le progrès civique*, July 8, 1922.

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Another sign of the times was the active effort of various political factions to extend their organizational base into the countryside. Heretofore, politics in the organized sense had been a virtual monopoly of the towns and cities; the peasant merely listened to stump speeches and cast his vote. In 1927 a little group of utopian dreamers and ambitious schemers founded an Agrarian party, and called on all farmers both large and small to band together in self-protection against the growing cities. In 1929 the Communists took over a struggling little syndicate called the General Confederation of Toiling Peasants as a device for penetrating the mass of subsistence farmers. In 1930 the Christian democrats added a Catholic youth movement, the *Jeunesse Agricole Chrétienne;* and in the same year the Socialist party, which had not debated farm problems since its 1911 congress, suddenly put agriculture high on its agenda and drafted a streamlined new program designed to win the smallowners. It was also in 1930 that a talented young demagogue named Henri Dorgères rounded up some thirty disciples in rural Normandy to form the first of his Committees of Peasant Defense.

Meanwhile, a few Frenchmen—not peasants or politicians at first but agronomists and intellectuals—were beginning to show an interest in the whole broad problem of France's agrarian structure. One school of thought (the "neo-physiocrats", Louis Chevalier calls them) proposed to utilize a strictly economic yardstick. Its representatives argued that French agriculture ought to be reconstructed on industrial lines, with high productivity at low cost the only measure of success. Some of them relied on natural evolution and laissez faire to do the job; others held that the state must intervene to hasten the process. As one extremist put it: "If the small farmer chooses to vegetate at home, that's his own business; if the whole country suffers the consequence, that's something else again. . . . We don't need peasants to have sound agriculture—on the contrary. . . ." And he quoted with approval Guesde's brutal remark: "The only way to make the peasants fecund is rape."[6]

[6] J. Teilhac, "Les paysans ont-ils leur place dans la société moderne?", *La révolution prolétarienne* (June 25, 1935), pp. 210–11.

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A second group of thinkers insisted that the peasant problem was fundamentally social rather than economic. Their favorite phrase was borrowed from the novelist Ramuz: "Being a peasant is not a trade but a state of existence." They saw the flight of peasants to the cities as a tragic betrayal of France's true heritage, and held that the central aim of a real agrarian policy should be to root the smallowner on the land. All those who worked the soil were linked together by a kind of mystic bond, and any rifts in this rural unity were artificially created by the politicians. About 1930, this group discovered or rediscovered corporative theory, and began to preach the doctrine that an organized, unified peasantry should be delegated broad powers to shape its own destiny within the state.

Somewhere between these two extremes, a few Frenchmen were beginning to look to the Danish and Dutch examples as possible models. Like the corporatists, they wanted to keep a large population of smallowners on the soil. But like the neo-physiocrats, they argued that to preserve a mass of marginal subsistence peasants would only produce increasing social conflict and national weakness. Their aim was a policy of government aid, education, and coöperation which would gradually transform as many peasants as possible into small specialized farmers producing by modern methods for a wide market. Such a program obviously required both time and money in order to succeed.

These varied doctrines had barely begun to stir the surface of French thinking when the depression struck. The crisis disrupted efforts at rational long-range study of agrarian problems. The politicians turned instead to emergency measures, and the peasants turned to demagoguery. Parliament's debates on agriculture in the early 1930's make depressing reading. Only two consistent ideas ran through all the discussions: the need to keep out foreign imports, and the importance of defending the little peasant. Every farm bill to regulate marketing or to control production contained special loopholes for the small farmer. None of these privileges was adequate to help the peasant improve his status, but only to keep him from sliding off the bottom of the ladder. As most politicians saw it, the

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crisis only proved the soundness of France's agrarian structure, for subsistence farming served as a kind of "mattress" against disaster. That this sound and stable structure was based on mediocrity did not seem disturbing in a time when everyone was suffering.

While the politicians fumbled with the crisis, agitators were busy profiting from the spread of rural discontent. For the first time in modern French history, angry peasant mobs converged on Paris to demonstrate on the Champs-Elysées. Local elections brought sharp Communist gains in many villages of the Center and South. In the North and West, it was Dorgères who rose to sudden prominence. His Committees of Peasant Defense and his green-shirted youth group claimed a membership of over 300,000 by 1937. His gangs broke up sheriff's sales and manhandled deputies rash enough to appear at their meetings. Their barnyard appeal was increased by such exploits as locking a deputy in a pig-cart, and spraying the cart with disinfectant after the police freed their victim. Dorgères became such a celebrity that he was asked to appear on the most exclusive lecture series in Paris; fashionable ladies applauded as he glorified the peasantry, "the only sound force in the nation, undefiled by orgies, cocktails, and night-club balls."[7]

The Agrarian party, meanwhile, was enjoying a small boom of its own. It elected only one deputy in 1932, but by 1935 there were rumors that it planned to run 300 candidates in the coming elections. So bright were its prospects that it began to attract new members and cash subsidies of somewhat dubious character—to the dismay of some of its more idealistic small-peasant supporters.

Alongside the Agrarians and the Dorgèrists, a third Right-wing movement was spreading more rapidly still. This was the *Union Nationale des Syndicats Agricoles*, an old-line farmers' syndicate which was rejuvenated in 1934 and converted to the corporative doctrine. By 1937 it claimed 1,200,000 members, which made it far and away the largest peasants' organization France had ever known. Its leaders were soon to furnish Pétain with both the ideas and the personnel for his Peasant Corporation.

[7] H. Pitaud, *La terre au paysan* (Paris, 1936), p. 173.

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For a time, a serious effort was made to pool the strength of all these Right-wing movements in the so-called Peasant Front. But the Front (organized in 1934) was jerry-built and riven by internal jealousies; it began to disintegrate even before the 1936 elections. The Agrarian party was the first to fall apart; its Left-wing members walked out in protest against the growing influence of well-heeled city politicians and lawyers who "had never cultivated anything but chicanery." Soon after, Dorgères and the other members of the Front began to trade public insults. By the end of the decade, only the corporatist *Union Nationale des Syndicats Agricoles* seemed to have a guaranteed future as a stable and growing organism.

While these Rightist whirlwinds swept erratically through the countryside, Left-wing organizers were finding the farmers much harder to convert. The Communists' Confederation of Toiling Peasants failed to spread beyond a dozen departments in the Southwest; and its leader, Renaud Jean, later recalled its history in the curt phrase: "*C'était un échec.*" The Socialists did no better. Their National Peasant Confederation, founded in 1931, vegetated in total obscurity, even after the Socialists came to power in 1936. The Radical party's old stronghold, the Federation of Mutual Aid Societies and Cooperatives, held its own but failed to gain after 1930. The only exception to this rule of organizational failure on the Left was the Christian democratic youth group, the *Jeunesse Agricole Chrétienne*, which was only partially Leftist and only a partial success. Its growth was slow, but it did attract and hold a vigorous and eager young group of peasants who, for the first time, began to show a healthy interest in the basic character and problems of French agriculture. This kind of grass-roots élite, with an outlook broader than a single village, gave promise of serving eventually as a leaven in the peasant mass.

The organizational successes of the Right and the failures of the Left might seem to indicate that the peasantry was becoming the stronghold of conservatism in politics, and that the Popular Front victory of 1936 represented a disastrous defeat for the peasantry. Rightists tried to describe it as such; but, in truth, the peasants did their full share to bring the Popular Front to power. Peasant voting habits seem to have changed little during

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the crisis decade—probably even less than those of the cities. Peasants of Leftist tradition may have refused to let themselves be organized, but they continued to vote for Leftist candidates. A fair minority of Popular Front deputies (especially Radicals and Socialists) owed their margins of victory to peasant voters. One Agrarian party deputy achieved brief fame a few months later when he cried in parliament: "They say that every society needs slaves. . .; the Popular Front too has chosen its slaves—the peasants!"[8] His phrase contained more oratorical license than truth. For a year or two after 1936, the urban workers did make greater relative gains than the farmers, and the flight of peasants from farm to city did speed up once more. Some farm discontent was reflected by the senatorial elections of 1938, when several rural districts repudiated their Popular Front Senators. On the whole, however, agriculture got fair treatment from Blum and his successors. Most farmers were soon reconciled to the Wheat Office (though they wanted its machinery overhauled); and they were pleased by the gradual extension of social security benefits to the countryside. Those of corporatist leanings (notably the *Union Nationale des Syndicats Agricoles*) were appeased by the so-called "Family Code" adopted in 1939; its aim was to protect the small family farmer, and to keep him on the soil.

But if the peasants got fair treatment from the Popular Front and its successors, they failed to get very imaginative or statesmanlike treatment. No cabinet, no party took a fresh new look at the whole agrarian structure of France, or gave thought to a long-range program which might benefit both the farmers and the state. At most, the Popular Front encouraged the growth of farm coöperatives and took steps to improve marketing facilities. Georges Monnet, Blum's Minister of Agriculture, took the standard ritualistic line on the beauties of rural life and the virtues of the small peasant. His Wheat Office may have been most useful to the big producers, but it contained the usual special provisions designed to keep the small, uneconomic wheatgrower in business in the old way. The government continued and even expanded the old alcohol policy, distilling excess sugar beets, wine and cider at heavy cost, as a convenient

[8] J. Cadic, *Journal officiel* (*Débats, Chambre*), February 19, 1937, p. 643.

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device to appease the growers and to insulate them against the need for change. All in all, the Popular Front's agrarian policy seemed to have the same undeclared purpose as the policies of all earlier governments: to ensure the survival of as many subsistence peasants as possible, at about the traditional level of mediocrity.

In the closing years of the Third Republic, there were clear signs that traditional mediocrity would not satisfy the peasants much longer. For decades, the flight to the cities had been a kind of passive protest; but far more significant were the new signs of active protest after 1930. The general restlessness in the countryside showed that the peasants were looking for something new, even though they were not quite sure what they wanted or how they should go about getting it. The traditional weapon of the ballot had begun to seem negative and inadequate; in search of positive action, they groped toward some sort of leadership or organization which would promise a brighter future. Many were attracted to demagogues and to antirepublican doctrines, for the Republic's leaders offered them little but the old ritualistic phrases. Yet the bulk of them remained faithful to the republican parties and the republican idea, if only through force of habit.

As one looks back on the Third Republic, it does seem undeniable that the mass of unenlightened peasant voters helped to blight the régime; that they checked the development of a dynamic economy, a progressive social program, and a vigorous foreign policy. But it is also true that they did not do it alone. Large segments of the urban population were just as regressive and narrow in spirit; and France's political leadership certainly offered little guidance or inspiration. Perhaps, as Mr. Cobban suggests, the peasants are now on the way to blighting the Fourth Republic; for they are still with us, and they still have the vote. Besides, their dwindling numbers may conceal a growing influence; for the post-war spread of communism and Gaullism in the cities has been pushing the republican center parties back onto a narrowing rural base. The one encouraging factor is this: that the peasantry is no longer just what it used to be, and is not likely to play exactly the same rôle in this new

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edition of the Republic. The process of flux and ferment in the countryside, already noted in the 1930's, has speeded up since 1945; there is a new, aggressive self-consciousness among the farmers, just as there is a broader and deeper interest in basic agrarian problems both in the cities and within the growing rural élite. How the peasants will use their new self-consciousness and power is still not fully clear—not even to the peasants themselves. One can only be sure that the "negative and passive" era of the Third Republic is over.

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THE GENERAL IDEOLOGY OF AMERICAN SMALL BUSINESS

I

WITH the possible exception of the American farmer, it is doubtful if the virtues and values of any individual have been so consistently and unanimously proclaimed as those of the small businessman. Almost any Congressional committee report on small business makes it clear that every community is traditionally stamped for good or for ill by its small businessmen—in fact, the town is said to take its character from their enterprise and civic-mindedness. When a man makes his way into small business ownership, his perseverance is hailed as a "practical application of our highly prized ideal of equal opportunity under the American flag." As a Senate report says, his struggle "has been a great motive force among our people. It stimulates expression of the fundamental virtues of thrift, industry, intelligence, schooling, home ties, and family pride—in short, those fireside virtues which have counted for so much in developing our strength and character."[1] The preservation of small business, therefore, is urgent and vital in furthering the American ideal, "a goal which transcends economic and political forms and processes as such, and remains fundamentally concerned with the character of the men and women who comprise the nation."[2]

The small businessman has so often been taken for granted as being an essential pillar of our democratic society that it frequently comes as a discovery to realize that in actuality we know very little about his ideas, beliefs or values. In many respects we know more about small *business* than we do about

[1] *U. S. Senate Small Business Committee—Its Record and Outlook,* Progress Report of the Special Committee to Study Problems of American Small Business, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 47, February 12, 1945, pp. 2–3.

[2] Rudolph L. Weisman, *Small Business and Venture Capital* (New York, 1945), p. 164.

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small *businessmen.* The old independent entrepreneur, whose roots were planted in the liberal capitalism of small property holdings, has seen the economic ground shift to a system of corporate capitalism until today, in the words of C. Wright Mills, he lives "on a small island in a big new world."[3] Nonetheless the small businessman has endured with considerable tenacity as an important force in present-day society. His survival, furthermore, while significant as an economic reality, is even more noteworthy as an ideological phenomenon. In the past half century American society has witnessed the growth and spread of industrialism on the largest scale imaginable. At the same time the ideology that was once suited to a society of small capitalists has persisted almost as if it was the economic law of the land. It is as if the small-propertied world of the small independent businessman was still a going concern; and the ideology which enforces this picture is so little changed, comments Professor Mills, "that in the minds of many it seems the very latest model of reality."[4] It will be the contention here not only that small business has an ideology, but that when it is seen against the backdrop of our modern industrial society the popular image of the small businessman needs revision.

Professor Mills has pointed out that in the nineteenth-century world of the small entrepreneur, power was so much more decentralized and anonymous that it did not require "ideological cement". Conversely, he claims that it is in the new managed society that it has been necessary to formulate new ideological justifications for the power of the modern corporation. The new managers or so-called "vested interests", he maintains, need an "ideology" in the sense of wanting a comfortable set of self-interested rationalizations under cover of which they can conduct their business and perpetuate their power, while at the same time justifying their practices and policies to the public

[3] C. Wright Mills, *White Collar* (New York, 1951).

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 34. The small businessman, Professor Mills writes, "has become the man through whom the ideology of utopian capitalism is still attractively presented to many of our contemporaries." I wish to acknowledge here my indebtedness to Professor Mills's study. His section on the "old Middle Classes" is an excellent portrait of the small entrepreneur and his world of "middle-class capitalism".

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and, perhaps, to themselves as well.[5] For our purposes, however, the ideology of small business will be examined in terms of some of its ideas and values. At the same time we shall attempt to view them within the larger framework of a major tradition in American political history that has not lost its force in our modern industrial society. The ideology of small business, it will be argued, partakes of a good deal that was prevalent in the United States prior to the rise of industry, and has much in common with those values which are usually associated with a pre-industrial society. By placing the ideology of the small businessman in the context of what will be called the "agrarian spirit" it is hoped it will be possible to set forth an ideological framework within which one can see not only those things in which the small businessman believes, but also what kind of a person the small businessman is.[6]

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 154. "The whole growth of ideological work", writes Professor Mills, "is based on the need for the vested interests lodged in the new power centers to be softened, whitened, blurred, misinterpreted to those who serve the interests of the bureaucracies inside, and to those in its sphere outside." It should be stated that any difference of interpretation with Professor Mills is not one of disagreement with regard to the manipulatory potentialities of big business. At the same time, however, Professor Mills is not entirely clear as to the question of *intent* on the part of the "vested interests"—that is to say, is their demand for ideological justification "self-delusion", or is it "design" or "conspiracy"?

[6] It perhaps should be made clear what is *not* implied by associating the small businessman with the agrarian spirit. There is no implication that he wishes to return to the Jeffersonian era, or that he is himself a farmer at heart. No claim is being made that in literal terms there is a *total* commitment on the part of small businessmen to a pre-industrial society or that *all* small businessmen would prefer to live in such a society. The ideology of pre-industrialism in America is viewed here as an "ideal type", in the belief that it is profitable to discuss the ideology of small business within the context of those values usually identified with a pre-industrial way of life. Moreover, our concern is not so much with the economic factors which lead the small businessman to hold the particular views he does but rather in explicating his views and attitudes and *locating* them on some political spectrum.

One further point should be made. It is not to be inferred that the agrarian spirit represents an ideology peculiar *only* to small businessmen. Perhaps it fits other social or occupational strata equally well, but a project seeking data along these lines would be beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore, inasmuch as there is a dearth of public-opinion material dealing specifically with the political attitudes and assumptions of small businessmen, it is felt that an ideological approach may be suggestive and useful as a guide for further studies which may seek to correlate similarities and differences between small businessmen and other groups in society.

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In the South the early advocacy of agrarianism as the foundation of a democratic society was conceived as a weapon in the struggle against the forces of industrialism rising in the North.[7] It was an anti-industrial position whose central argument was that industrialization was the moral and physical corrupter of the owner of property as well as the working man. The conflict, symbolized in part in the struggle between Jefferson and Hamilton, has deep roots in the political and economic development of America. As fortunate as this country has been in not experiencing a succession of embittered political battles such as have marked the history of many European nations, there nevertheless have been in American political history two antagonistic traditions which have caused bitter conflict.[8] Sometimes this conflict has been called, depending on the particular circumstances, a North-South split. At other times it has been characterized as a struggle between labor and capital. Still on other occasions it has been viewed as an agricultural-industrial conflict. No doubt each of these descriptions contains more than a little truth, especially when it is related to an immediate political or economic problem. However, none of these explanations entirely succeeds in accounting for all of the elements present in the continuing antagonism. For this reason there is an advantage in regarding this traditional antagonism as a conflict between the heritage of the pre-industrial age and that of the industrial, between the agrarian spirit on the one hand and the cosmopolitan spirit on the other. The former represents the broad tradition of Jefferson, Calhoun, Henry George and Robert LaFollette; the latter embodies the tradition that links such men as Hamilton, Webster and the two Roosevelts. Much of the bitterness and emotional fervor that does exist in American politics arises from the fact that some people are committed, albeit implicitly, to one tradition and some to the other. It is true that up to now this agrarian-cosmopolitan conflict has not

[7] The ideologies of anti-industrialism, only touched upon here, are more fully and capably explored in the forthcoming study of managerial ideologies by Reinhard Bendix.

[8] Many of the observations on the importance of America's political traditions have come from extended conversations with Norman Jacobson.

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severely disrupted our political system. The reason, of course, is that neither of the two major parties has a complete monopoly on any one tradition. The Democratic party embraces both Southern agrarians *and* Northern and Western urban groups, while in the Republican party Midwestern businessmen and farmers represent one school of thought in opposition to Eastern and Western industrialists. Our purpose here is to show that the small businessman of today is a contemporary spokesman of the agrarian spirit and shares many of the values and ideas which are usually identified with it.

II

One hundred years ago George Fitzhugh expressed his views on the evils of industrialism, and so bitter was his condemnation of the relationship between employer and employee in the industrial North that he could exalt the institution of slavery as a happy alternative.[9] Not only was the basic hostility to industrialism made clear, but in contrast many of the rural values and folkways of the South were affirmed as the epitome of the good life. Where there were mobs, labor difficulties and lawlessness in the industrial North, serenity, peace and harmony prevailed in the agricultural South. This rural sentiment embodies many of the elements which are at the core of what is meant by the agrarian spirit.

It is not an overstatement to say that the tradition and thought of pre-revolutionary America have persisted in the rural sections of the country rather than in the urban. It has often been pointed out that rural America tends to be Protestant and even Fundamentalist, and that it is distrustful of the large metropolitan areas where innovation and experimentation are the rule rather than the exception. The fact that ruralism has never been sympathetic to the work of the melting pot in America goes a long way toward explaining its general hostility both to minority groups and to alien philosophies and ideologies. In this connection one can detect more than a little similarity between a deep-seated agrarian mistrust of the mingling of ideas and cultures in the large metropolitan areas on the one

[9] George Fitzhugh, *Sociology for the South* (Richmond, 1854).

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hand, and Jefferson's dislike of the city, Calhoun's fear of industry, and LaFollette's antipathy to Wall Street on the other.

In a series of articles on "soap operas" James Thurber described with extraordinary skill some of the rural feelings and attitudes which constitute to a large degree an important part of the agrarian spirit.[10] The daytime serials, he reported, perpetuate the ancient American myth of the small town, idealized in novels, comedies and melodramas at the turn of the century and before. The heavy predominance of "small towns in Soapland is a continued and often-emphasized victory for good, clean little communities over cold, cruel metropolitan centers." The differences between "small town people" and "big city people" coincide easily with the traditional concepts of good and evil, distinctions between the two being made in the "old-fashioned terms of the moral town and the immoral city." As Mr. Thurber so neatly puts it:

> Almost all the villains in the small-town daytime serials are emigres from the cities—gangsters, white-collar criminals, designing women, unnatural mothers, cold wives, and selfish, ruthless and just plain cussed rich men. They always come up against a shrewdness that outwits them or destroys them, or a kindliness that wins them over to the good way of life.

Neither Jefferson nor Calhoun in his own day would have quarreled with such a characterization.

In Soapland the agrarian spirit provides the setting and background for a world comfortably at rest. Mr. Thurber writes: "One serial writer tells me that the word 'republic' has been slyly suggested as preferable to 'democracy', apparently because 'democracy' has become a provocative flaming torch of a word in our time." Soapland, if nothing else, is a peaceful world, "a political and economic Utopia, free of international unrest, the menace of fission, the threat of inflation, depression, general unemployment, the infiltration of Communists, and the problem of racism."

[10] James Thurber, "Soapland", Part II, *The New Yorker*, May 29, 1948. Mr. Thurber's articles comprise a series of four delightful accounts of the soap opera in America which the *New Yorker* featured under the title, "Onward and Upward with the Arts".

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If the agrarian spirit nourishes many deep-seated suspicions of this sort, the cosmopolitan spirit does not. It is more tolerant of ideas emanating from foreign shores, and the mingling of many cultures and races in such cities as New York and San Francisco is a vital and important part of the life there. Tensions and conflicts are inherent in the very nature of the urban community, and the "high mobility" of urban groups "makes the situation of multiple contacts part and parcel of the daily life of city people."[11] The anti-urban feelings reflect a moralism based on a rural model of the good life. Urban disorganization is disparaged, while an over-admiration for "roots" and "ties" is displayed with approval. As David Riesman has pointed out, it is a moralism that views the city "through the eyes of a folkish ideology of consensus, hard workmanship, and a simplistic view of the integrated, well-adjusted homey individual."[12]

Many of the values of ruralism which have thus far been associated with the agrarian spirit can be seen as those with which the small businessman is generally quite familiar. He has long appreciated the value of owning not only his own home but the "tools" with which he has worked. If he was concerned with politics, he liked the idea that he had some direct control over the local problems at hand. There was real comfort in knowing that if a man set out to do something, nothing but his own self could prevent him from realizing his goal. And the independence he had prized as a businessman was what he also had valued for himself as a family man and as a member of the community: he had controlled his own fate and had been captain of his own ship. It is something he cannot claim for himself today.

[11] Jitsuichi Masuoka, "The City and Racial Adjustment", *Social Forces*, October 1948, p. 38.

[12] Professor Riesman is moved to observe, however, that those who share such feelings have failed to recognize that what they have "admired about rural or small-town life has been less its pleasures than its pieties—pieties often only possible because of the 'export' of adventure to the cities, pieties often exaggerated by the nostalgias in the mind of an observer unfamiliar with the forms rural deviance takes." David Riesman, "The Study of the City", *City Lights*, quarterly magazine published in San Francisco. Mr. Riesman's article was developed from a paper presented at a conference on "The Urban Person: A Program for Research" at the Fourth Annual Symposium of the Committee on Human Development, University of Chicago, January 31, 1953.

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The growing powerlessness of the small businessman has not been a development he has watched with dispassion. His hostility to much of what he has seen grow up around him has manifested itself in a number of ways. He has had to make grudging adjustments to the modern secular society of impersonality and anonymity. Not only has he seen his business prospects become entangled in a mass of bureaucratic confusion over which he himself has had little to say, but even his rôle and function as a parent have so changed that his own children learn more about life outside of the home, from people he does not know and has never seen, than they do from him. Perhaps the most important change upsetting his traditional equilibrium is the unmistakable trend toward centralization of power and control. Nor is the small businessman accustomed to a way of life where common interests are few and in which "the differential sharing" and participation in social life have become so great that, as Paul Meadows says, "the human being in industrialism is pushed first one way and then another on a gridiron of claims and counter-claims." As it is, his life is qualified and conditioned by a network of formal institutions at the same time that it is dominated by pecuniary valuations and advantages. "The continuity of existence with the historic past and the unquestioning dependability of a personalized society belong to other days, happy in retrospect."[13]

As can readily be seen, the agrarian spirit tends toward a provincialism and an isolationism that are in marked contrast to the internationalism of the cosmopolitan spirit. Those who are committed to the values and outlook of the former generally have a narrower range of interests than the cosmospolitan type. As frequent observers have noted, their orientation to the community close at hand involves such a parochial preoccupation

[13] Paul Meadows, *The Culture of Industrial Man* (Lincoln, 1950), p. 24. It should be stated that the danger of drawing an exaggerated picture of the "historic past" of the small businessman is a real one. In attempting to accentuate some important differences between a pre-industrial society and modern industrialism, the temptation is great to talk simply in terms of black or white, overlooking entirely any shadings of gray. Actually one could ask if the society the small businessman looks back upon really did exist. Some of the people who write about this period seem totally unaware of this; in fact, they often sound like romantics dreaming of the Middle Ages or afraid of the perils of modern living.

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that it virtually excludes any real concern for international and sometimes even national affairs. On the other hand, as Robert K. Merton has shown, the cosmopolitan individual is oriented significantly to the outside world and regards himself as an integral part of the Great Society. He seldom cares about his own city, preferring instead to discuss and think about national and international problems.[14] As Mr. Thurber has already indicated, people living in the small town look upon those who reside in the urban centers as alien to everything they themselves treasure in the rural folklore of American history. They associate the city and the people who live there with all of the difficulties and anxieties of the modern industrial world. Arnold Rose has shown that feelings of anti-Semitism, for example, are often an expression of hatred against the economic success or perhaps the political radicalism historically connected with life in the city.[15]

The persistence of the agrarian spirit, as typified by the feelings of the small businessman, can also be seen in the controversy over what should be the proper rôle and function of government. To the small businessman the best government is the one that has the least to do and say, reflecting again his attachment to the political and economic way of life that flourished before the rise of industry and the effects of urbanization. Apprehensive of the complexities of modern living, the small

[14] In an important sense this helps to explain the power and control of the political machine in the city and the general problem of apathy in city politics. For a discussion of the "cosmopolitan influentials", see Robert K. Merton, "Patterns of Influence: A Study of Interpersonal Influences and of Communication Behavior in a Local Community", in *Communications Research*, edited by Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Frank N. Stanton (New York, 1949).

[15] "In much of America, 'New York' and 'Jew' are almost interchangeable epithets. It is not simply that the Jew adapts to city life and makes a success of it. The Jew is willing to submit to the repression of the 'free instincts' which is required by the city." The Jew, in addition, is also thought of as "rootless, as unattached to the 'community' with its meaningful values. The Jew is mysterious; he might be the manipulator of all those forces which seem to control the life of the little man in the big city." Arnold Rose, "Anti-Semitism's Root in City Hatred", *Commentary*, October 1948, p. 376. In this connection it is interesting to recall that the great nationalists in American history were rarely rooted in local communities, but came from *outside* the country: Tom Paine, Hamilton, James Wilson—they, unlike Jefferson or Adams, had no *local* attachments. Consider also the great "unifiers": Napoleon, Hitler, Stalin.

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businessman is concerned with preserving what he feels are the true ideals and guarantees which the Constitution, drawn in a pre-industrial setting, made the basis of our free-enterprise system.[16]

The Conference of American Small Business Organizations, founded in 1941 and for over a decade an active national small-business organization, continually warned in its literature that the small businessman today must fight to save himself from starvation "brought on by ever-increasing competition conducted by government under the rules of socialism." The job of offsetting this dangerous development is a big one, the Conference pointed out, made all the more difficult because "a substantial majority of the American electorate has lost its one-time veneration for the principles of economic freedom", and is willing to accept government paternalism and "socialism" instead, at least whenever it sees a selfish advantage in such action.[17]

The National Federation of Independent Business, Inc. has expressed a similar attitude toward the disturbing trends in our present society. Its language in the statement that follows is typical of many testimonials to the fact that America has the highest standard of living in the world and that we should therefore refrain from urging any "change in our form of government."

> Let us all Think American. Let us all Talk American. Let us all Do Business the American Way.
>
> No nation on earth, regardless of its form of government, ever gave to human beings so much liberty and material prosperity as our own Constitutional form of Freedom. We started out as thirteen little States, ridden by poverty and threatened by savages. We were, however, blessed by God. We now represent the utmost in individual freedom and individual prosperity. Compare our United

[16] See Philip M. Hauser, "Some Political Influences of Urbanization", reprinted in part in Paul E. Hatt and Albert J. Reiss, *Reader in Urban Sociology* (Glencoe, 1951).

[17] The Conference of American Small Business Organizations thought so much of an editorial from the *Railway Age*, dated January 29, 1949, in which these and similar statements were made, that it had copies reproduced and sent to all of its members.

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> States with any other land on earth. The workingman here is a king compared to the workingman in any other country. Nearly all of us have modern homes—electric lights and power—gas cooking—telephones—automobiles—automatic refrigeration—electric washers and irons—radios—insurance policies. Most of us own bonds and have money in the bank, plus a thousand and one other conveniences and luxuries.
>
> Are we ready to exchange all this for the crazy promises of some foreign crackpot? Isn't it time for us to thank God for America and our many blessings? Isn't it about time that we wake up and do a real job, selling American principles?[18]

To the small businessman the "assassination of Adam Smith", along with the "insidious effort to undermine American traditions" by instilling in the minds of Americans "a contempt for the principles of individual independence and achievement, pride of family and country"—it is all symbolic of the destruction of ideals, qualities and propensities "which some members of an aging generation still fondly regard as characteristic of a great American people."[19]

One of the most important ingredients in the agrarian spirit is a straightforward and at times excessive individualism. It is an individualism marked by a strong dislike of both large-scale organizations and the increasing concentration of political and economic power in society.[20] In contrast, the cosmopolitan

[18] National Federation of Independent Business, Inc., undated circular, entitled "Before Urging Change in Our Form of Government First Make a Few Comparisons".

[19] From the *Return of Adam Smith*, by George S. Montgomery, Jr. (Caldwell, Idaho, 1953), distributed by the Conference of American Small Business Organizations.

[20] Because of the economic conspiracies and cut-throat competition of the large corporations, the protection of small business has automatically become the rallying cry of many well-meaning individuals. Trust-busting "continues to be an altar of sacrifice on which an occasional corporate goat is laid to appease a wrathful public." Meadows, *op. cit.*, p. 27. This opposition to bigness usually favors breaking up the large corporations into their component parts in the belief that it is neither efficient nor in the public interest to have a single corporation, in the words of Charles Noyes, "producing a variety of goods from kitchen utensils to washing machines and generators, or from nylon to munitions and commercial solvents." It represents a position that is entirely consistent with the nineteenth-century philosophy of pre-industrial capitalism, which held that a genuine free-

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spirit is far more hospitable and sympathetic to the needs and demands of bigness in organization in an age of limitless technology. But to the small businessman bigness and organization have often been seen as a threat to everything he cherishes and believes in.[21] He sees all around him a proliferation of organizations, and to him their presence is a form of coercion that prohibits him from exercising his individual choice. Part of the price one pays in joining any organization today is the sacrifice of decision-making at the individual, personal level, and the small businessman is often unwilling to pay that price. It is an attitude that is frequently reflected in the small businessman's estimate of labor unions and the damage they purportedly cause to the individual union member who, in his opinion, suffers a cruel loss of individuality and freedom in submitting to union discipline. The small businessman has not altogether accepted the fact that the individual lives a more specialized life in a modern industrial society and is more and more incompetent to understand and control—by himself—all the disturbing complexities which make up his daily life. He has still to learn that the ability of the individual to live off his own resources was easier in the nineteenth century, and that the advance of industrialism and mechanization has made the individual person, as a lone force in society, increasingly ineffective.

To the small businessman it seems perfectly obvious that democracy cannot survive when society is dominated by what he feels are anonymous economic units. John Crowe Ransom put it simply in his defense of the little man of Main Street against the industrial financier of Wall Street:

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enterprise system with unbridled competition would inevitably bring about the greatest prosperity and the greatest good for the greatest number. As Professor Noyes points out, one can find the same view clearly outlined in the economic pronouncements of Friedrich A. Hayek, who favors not only drastic curbs on monopoly but a return to uninhibited free competition. See Charles E. Noyes, "Is Big Business Bad Business?", *The Nation*, August 6, 1949.

[21] The hostility to bigness in America is endemic in a culture that has traditionally favored the "little man". But as Robert S. Lynd has emphasized, bigness and the concentration of power can be a valuable and useful servant of modern man. The utility of coördinated bigness is an acknowledged mainstay of technological abundance, and "laments of liberals such as Mr. Justice Brandeis against 'the curse of bigness' reflect but a wistful nostalgia for an era that can never return." *Knowledge for What?* (Princeton, 1946), p. 210.

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> Who, then, runs the Big Businesses? The executives, the officers, the directors, a small company of men, all in the position of trustees for the invisible and putatively brainless owners. Assume that they are honest trustees, as they probably are. What is honesty in a trustee? The virtue of a business executive is like that of a statesman, it consists in getting all he can for his wards.

Then, in keeping with the agrarian spirit's distrust of international dealings, Mr. Ransom expresses with striking frankness a sentiment with which the small businessman is in full accord:

> The standard of international morality is lower than the standard of personal morality, and the code of Big Business is lower than that of little business. The most charming statesmen are prepared to tell lies and break treaties and wage unjust wars in the name of their country, and amiable gentlemen on becoming business executives proceed to cut the throats of their small competitors and hire labor for the company on terms that sacrifice the dignity and elemental needs of the laborers. We have been informed that the "economic man", who used to be cited by economic theorists as the man who acts strictly in the pursuit of gain and is immune to moral and personal considerations, was an abstraction that never existed. He does not exist in the small businesses, or at least he is hard to find there, but he is the regular thing in Big Business.[22]

The small businessman looks upon the concentration of wealth in the hands of big business today as the modern outcome of the Hamiltonian conception of property. The entrepreneurial outlook of pre-industrialism, however, following the principles of Jeffersonianism, considers the right to own property as the greatest instrument by which it is possible to secure life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. But in Jeffersonian terms property was not trusts or banks or monopolies; it was land and personal enterprises held or obtainable by any self-respecting individual. Today the small businessman feels it is time to turn away from the "frenzy of Big Business", as Mr. Ransom calls it, "towards something older, more American, and more profitable."[23] This devotion to the principle of proprietorship in the American

[22] John Crowe Ransom, "What Does the South Want?", in *Who Owns America?*, edited by Herbert Agar and Allen Tate (Boston, 1936), pp. 183–184.

[23] *Ibid.*

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economy might well be called the common denominator of small business.

The cleavage between large and small business over the issue of proprietorship, or the "area of discretion of management", is sometimes profound. From the point of view of the small businessman the weakness of big business is not only that it is big, but that it is a drift away from proprietorship. Managers of big businesses, he feels, tend to be hirelings, intent primarily on achieving an equilibrium among the conflicting forces of labor, the government and the consumer. These men simply respond, over and over again, to the strongest combination of pulls, following the path of least resistance. The small businessman believes that a purely professional management can "go along" with almost anybody, and that it usually does. R. Harland Shaw, for many years assistant to the Chairman of the Conference of American Small Business Organizations, has given a good deal of personal thought and attention to this problem. In his view the management of big business "goes along with big labor, with big government, with fascist and corporative tendencies in the government—with NRA first and then with OPA and OPM and WPB industry committees—anything for harmony and convenience and *job safety for management*, regardless of what happens either to the country or to the other fellow."[24] Mr. Shaw's words echo the sentiments of a large number of small businessmen in their concern over the movement away from proprietorship in modern industrial society. When a few "independents" among big business leaders have themselves hewed to the proprietary line they have been damned by their associates. As far as the small businessman is concerned, the same is true when "an energetic labor thinker", as Mr. Shaw would call him, appeals to management to stand against industry-wide bargaining and "maintain local integrity": he is met with indifference and even hostility.

[24] R. Harland Shaw, "Small Business in Relation to the American Government and the American Way of Life", April 3, 1953, an unpublished statement outlining the basic position of the Conference of American Small Business Organizations (italics in the original). I was privileged to discuss a number of small-business problems with Mr. Shaw during the course of an extensive correspondence, and I am in his debt for many penetrating observations.

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The "unholy alliance" of big labor, big government and big business is, to the small businessman, one of the most pernicious and corrupting tendencies in industrial society today. To the managers of big business industry-wide bargaining may seem to provide an easier opportunity to handle labor with less trouble *to themselves*. The independent entrepreneur, however, looks upon it as an instrument to throttle, both directly and indirectly, a lot of small businesses. He sees it also as a tendency to standardize as well as to stratify society. "It reduces flexibility and increases rigidity in the economy as a whole", comments Mr. Shaw. "Big Business management frequently is strictly hired and lacks the incentive to individuality which results from a large proprietary interest." Therefore, as a very condition of its own survival, "small business is defending a principal of society which, in the opinion of many economists, is valuable to the whole society including some managements who don't like it."[25]

III

In spite of the major changes in America which have been wrought by the triumph of industrialism, the agrarian spirit persists, remaining very much alive in the minds of those who still are tied to the past, uncertain of the present, and distrustful of the future. The thinking and temper of the small businessman indicate a profound ideological attachment to the values of a pre-industrial order—indeed he has become a contemporary advocate of the spirit and virtues of agrarianism. He is deeply suspicious of anything that is alien to his preferred pattern of living, whether it be the intrusion of foreign ideologies onto the American scene or the upsetting of stability and tradition as a result of the spread of new ideas and the mingling of different cultures and peoples. Cosmopolitanism, representing an urbanity and sophistication toward which the small businessman feels distinctly aloof if not hostile, embodies the spirit of experimentation and change which has caused considerable grief to the independent entrepreneur. Tending toward an agrarian provincialism that is both narrow and rigid, he is especially antagonistic to all of the forces in the world which

[25] Shaw, letter to author, dated May 8, 1953.

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have led us into the complicating involvements of internationalism. His isolationism, in a word, is as strong as his individualism.

The small businessman, lastly, represents the proprietor "who—and who alone—made America." We have fought for the "little fellow", says Mr. Shaw,

> because he is little and needs help, but far more because America Needs Him. Our loyalty is not a selfish loyalty to the little businessman—it is rather a loyalty to the America that he, and millions who preceded him, built. It is a loyalty to an America that big labor most of the time, big business part of the time, and big government all of the time (whether consciously or not), are willing to sell down the river.

Any move that undermines the position of the proprietor or weakens the principle of private competition "is a move away from a republic and in the direction of empire, of cartelism, of all the things which have twice led to the fall of Rome."[26]

John H. Bunzel

San Francisco State College

[26] Shaw, letter to author, dated July 7, 1953.

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A NOTE ON COMMUNISTS AND STRIKES IN AUSTRALIA

IN a perceptive article in this QUARTERLY[1] Mr. Herbert Weiner suggested that the bitter industrial strife in post-war Australia has been fostered, in large part, by the Communist union leaders who used the unions and workers to promote Communist political action. The Communists, he observed, exploited the inattention of the non-Communist unionists and took over the unions by default. An important consequence of the return to power of the non-Communists, then, should be a decrease in industrial unrest and strike activity as the unions return to their members' day-to-day practical problems and immediate demands.

Mr. Weiner, who is an acute observer of the Australian labor scene, first suggested to the writer that a basic weakness of Australian unions is their lack of organization and services at the shop level. He believed that from the weakness of the internal union flowed many debilitating consequences. A detailed analysis of union structure and policies has confirmed his opinions and sheds further light upon the rise to power of Communists in Australian unions.

A comparative and detailed examination of strike data indicates that Communist leadership has probably not had a significant influence upon the incidence or pattern of strikes in Australia. The loss of man-days in that country during 1946–1950 was about double that of 1941–1944, but this increase is modest when compared to that in the United States where Communist leadership was not nearly as prominent. In the United States the man-days lost in the period 1946–1950 was nearly 4.5 times that of 1941–1944. In the peak strike year of 1946 the loss in man-days was 13 times as high as the loss

[1] Herbert E. Weiner, "The Reduction of Communist Power in the Australian Trade Unions: A Case Study", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. LXIX, No. 3 (September 1954), pp. 390–412.

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in 1944,[2] and in Australia the post-war peak losses were only 2½ times as large as in 1944.

While it is true that the Communist-led unions in Australia accounted for the overwhelming share of strike losses since the war, one must bear in mind that the same unions even under non-Communist leaders have accounted for two thirds to over four fifths of all man-days lost ever since Australia first began recording labor statistics in 1913.[3]

The use of man-days lost is not well suited to measure strike incidence. The figures give little or no indication of strike duration or worker participation. Moreover, the gross figure of days lost in one period is hardly comparable with days lost in another period, if the size of the work force and its industrial distribution change significantly, as they did during the war. A comparable measure of strike incidence is the ratio of strikers involved to all nonagricultural employees. Such a measure, if broken down by duration of strikes, reveals for Australia an increasingly larger share of all workers participating in short strikes—one day and less—while an increasingly smaller share have been taking part in long strikes—a week or more.[4] The trend toward a greater incidence of short strikes antedates Communist leadership in the unions, which suggests that it is a result of other causes.

If the cause of Australia's increasingly acute labor unrest, expressed in an increasing incidence of short strikes, is not simply a result of Communist domination, the remedy will not be a straightforward attack upon the Communists in the unions. The problems of industrial relations are more complex and intractable. The rise to power of the Communist union leaders and the growing industrial disorder in Australia are symptoms of a basic defect in union organization and management procedures at the job level. Unions are extremely weak among the workers in the shop and are unable to help the mem-

[2] Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Handbook of Labor Statistics*, 1950 edition, Table E-4, pp. 146–147.

[3] See the (Australian) Department of Labor, *Labor Bulletins*.

[4] See an article of mine, "Grievance Machinery and Strikes in Australia", *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, vol. 8, No. 2 (January 1955).

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bers meet their local problems. With neither authority among the workers in the shops nor concern for the workers' job problems, the unions, in effect, invited the Communists to take control, as Mr. Weiner indicated. The untended worker grievances and dissatisfactions were left to be exploited by the Communists for their own ends.

Only four unions in Australia, three of them in the important metal trades, provide for shop stewards whose duty it is to handle members' local grievances, but even these unions have not made the stewards important union officials. The unions secured employer recognition of their stewards in the larger firms only after 1944 and 1945. Apparently the union leaders had failed to realize any need for stewards' services at the job level earlier, for in the thirties the Arbitration Court had granted full employer recognition to stewards, but the unions did not avail themselves of the Court's provision. In practice one finds that the performance of the stewards even in the metal trades unions falls far short of the work of American stewards in comparable industries.

During the war the Amalgamated Engineering Union (the second largest union in Australia) indicated that shop problems were not union concerns when it petitioned the Labor government to initiate and develop a set of comprehensive grievance procedures for all shops and factories. A few months later the Arbitration Court did present a detailed grievance procedure for the metal trades unions,[5] but since the unions did not assume the responsibility of putting it into effect, the plan was not used.

At the present time union members are all too frequently left to themselves or the Communist shop leaders when shop problems arise. The workers may walk out, impose a slowdown, or hold a stop-work meeting to call attention to their festering grievances. There are few other regular methods available by which the workers can express their dissatisfaction or relieve their tensions. Once the workers have taken overt action, the unions and management hurry to the scene and improvise a settlement that often does not treat the basic cause of friction.

[5] Aircraft Award, 53 C.A.R. 439. The procedures were not introduced in other awards or agreements then or later.

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To a degree not found among industrial unions in the United States, the Australian unions do not consider their members' local work action to be matters of concern. Union members may join with other workers in special noncontract bargains with the employers which may be at odds with formal union policy, or the members may join management-sponsored work councils without union guidance or leadership.[6]

The non-Communists are succeeding in their fight to remove Communist union leaders, but unfortunately the Labor unionists are relying heavily upon political action and party initiative in the struggle. The unions may rid themselves of Communist domination at the top, but until they are strengthened in the shop and meet the needs of the workers there, we can expect continued, embittered industrial unrest. Further, the Communists will continue to have fertile ground in which to work.

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[6] For example, see "Joint Consultation, Case Study No. 3", *Bulletin of Industrial Psychology and Personnel Practice*, vol. VIII, No. 1 (March 1952), pp. 3–13.

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REVIEWS

A Study of History. Vols. VII, VIII, IX, X. By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1954, under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.—xxxi, 772; ix, 732; viii, 759; vii, 422 pp. $35.00.

Lord Melbourne remarked, of William Wordsworth's *Excursion:* "it is amazing when you leave a book on the table, how much you know what is in it without reading it." There will be many who, until Mr. Somervell comes along, will be practicing this comfortable doctrine about Professor Toynbee's *Study*. "Toynbeeism is in the air", especially in America where, oddly, he is better known than in Britain. From the press one learns that "British historian Arnold J. Toynbee predicted to-day that there would be no third world war"; and, in recent press lists of the World's Immortals from Confucius to Darwin, for which Marx, Mohammed and Voltaire do not quite make the grade, Dr. Toynbee is found to be a runner-up.

Professor Toynbee began to write in the climate of the times when H. G. Wells was putting together his encyclopaedic, straightforward (if secularistically biased) *Outline of History*—"greater than Ranke", as Sir Ernest Barker said, in that he "knew prehistory", but ending in the despairing gospel of "mind at the end of its tether"—and eminent men were being impressed by the book of revelations of the immensely erudite and very readable Oswald Spengler. Toynbee, jotting down, as penciled outline in a train in 1927, the sketch for his work to which he subsequently adhered, sought to produce a survey of history which not only would, with Dionysius of Halicarnassus, be "philosophy learned from examples", but would, with Spengler, yield a pattern. From this, studying the Past's lessons, we could peer into the Future's probabilities—but this in a more rational, empiric and liberal fashion than characterized Spengler. Toynbee is indeed not very kind to Spengler. The avoirdupois of his own product, exceeding even Will Durant's, is not in question. Everything is included, from Hammurabi to "my Aunt Grace". It is full of fascinating items of information. What impresses, however, is the erudition (although, as with Spengler, each specialist will have his own criticisms); and what attracts is the prophecy. Not only is Dr. Toynbee

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a very likable human being, a mystic and a poet when such are needed, but no one can fail to admire so determined an act of faith (comparable to that of Toynbee's model, Gibbon) that he would have a vision of the promised land of "conclusions"—although it must be no small comfort to have, supporting his arms, the Joshua and Aaron of Chatham House and of the Rockefeller Foundation. Many of us would find it would increase our own faith. Dr. Toynbee, however, is too honest and clear-sighted a man to wish us to do other than judge his fascinating work, not by the trust of the world's citizenry in *his* faith or by the massiveness of the mountains he has moved, but by the validity of the results which they have labored so long to produce.

This daedal product of labor is of peculiar interest to this reviewer who, in 1926, produced the first volume of a tetrology, still incomplete, which book was concerned to inquire what could be learned from history, which would have certainties as touching the limitations and control of future human conduct. His guides were Machiavelli, Hobbes, and, in lesser measure, Bryce and Alfred Adler. His concern was with method. And there still seems to be a strong case for basing the systematic study of politics (which is Dr. Toynbee's real concern, with his preoccupation with war, peace and social survival), precisely with Machiavelli, upon the constants in the nature of what Toynbee calls *homo terricola*. Recent British writers indeed are extraordinarily weak in their attention to fundamental method in the social sciences, in the very existence of which —there is no chair of sociology and until recently none of psychology in Oxford—most of them disbelieve anyhow. Toynbee's own references to the *Discourses* are almost nil, although there is evidence, in volume III and elsewhere, of careful digestion. As touching method it is Schopenhauer who asserts that, from the very nature of the case, history as such cannot yield a science or "laws"—although sociology and political science can, of which, as Max Weber said, the critical unit lies in "the act". History indeed gives a gigantic framework of experience, mostly irrelevant. In criticism of Dr. Toynbee's labor of Hercules it is prudent, in order not to be carried away by the undertow of tendency in this vast field of erudition, to criticize from the basis of one's own professional studies.

If, we may say, the method is wrong, then, like the gentleman who recently got drowned while swimming the English channel by night, while the attempt is noble, meriting and receiving a cathedral obituary service, the result is one vast monument of expended human effort or, at best, a historical panorama like that of Wells. It offers no basis upon which to advise the distressed and questing masses of humanity; and could be very hurtful indeed if so regarded. If this work is to be read a century hence (and Toynbee has the charming quirk of so writing as if

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his reader were in A.D. 2052), this issue of method is quite basic. This warning uttered, it becomes disturbing to discover that, in his indexes to over a million words, Professor Toynbee makes no references at all to Schopenhauer, Vico, Herder or Weber. In the four last volumes there are only two references to Marx (who, however, gets indirectly a section as does, specifically, the self-defeating Crocean thesis of the unsatisfactory Collingwood), and a single reference to Comte, itself in a quotation from Collingwood. (The index is not unified: there are earlier references to Comte, but not methodological.) I would rather be sure about method than about the early Shang *mores*. On Toynbee's own admission, in the early twenties, he made a false start by beginning with a commentary on—among rather unexpected but prophetic things—the *Antigone* of Sophocles. Then he seems to have plunged in, his outline sketch made, bald-headed, only clear—and here utterly right—that the atomistic and antinomian orthodox historians were often sterile. His warfare against the pre-Linnaean beetle-collectors, the occupants of lofty chairs, is to be applauded. In this dive he was first guided by Professor F. J. Teggart, of the University of California; and he was later boosted on by Jung. It is a scandalous ingratitude that this rich University permits Teggart's *Theory* to remain (as I know by inquiries in Berkeley) out of print and unobtainable. But it is not ungrateful to say that Teggart's central preoccupation, like that of Polybius (with whose work Toynbee compares his own), with differences of cultures—a word most difficult to define in applied studies—may not be the highway to great scientific advancements in the field. Nor is the speculative Jung perhaps the most fortunate choice, for the discovery of Newtonian or Einsteinian formulae, among the psychologists.

I find myself in entire agreement with Dr. Toynbee that social forms, be there just twenty-two "civilizations", all told, or not, depend upon human wills. But, without being excessively voluntaristic and Pelagian, this argument would seem to make mincemeat of the approach, with its deterministic implication, primarily by way of gross "cultures"—with the old organic mythos, so attractive to the public, of growth, senescence, loves and hates, thrown in for good measure. I would leave cyclic theories to the Stoics and Spengler, and even forget about Vico and Comte. Men actually grow old and governments actually fall: I doubt whether cultures, even like the Welsh or Breton or Tennessee hillbilly, are entities of this precise order. The comment, on this matter of method, of the London *Times* reviewer, W. H. Walsh, of Merton College, Oxford, is worth quoting: "The question is whether any amount of historical knowledge can serve as an adequate ground of such deductions about the meaning of history as is here drawn. It is hard to acquit Mr. Toynbee of

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philosophical naivety on this point." Toynbee legitimately offers probabilities about human conduct. Here there are ordered patterns. But I am deeply skeptical about their connection with any neatly measured cultural time cycles. We must look elsewhere, I suggest, for the psychological clues. So far Mr. Walsh is right.

However, as touching Professor Toynbee's conclusions, in the tradition of Bossuet, it so happens that the present reviewer (here probably in a small minority) chances to be in a broad agreement with them. But I do not think they have to follow from Toynbee's elaborate premises. In detail, this reviewer is sufficient of an anarchist or proto-Marxist to agree that voluntary communities, such as churches, are *societates perfectiores* compared with the over-worshipped coercive states. Again, in so far as Toynbee inclines to what is technically called "indifferentism" (an especially Hindu view which, at its worst, means taking the lowest common denominator) in religion, he is liable to prove a more dangerous enemy to organized Christianity than Gibbon. But, in general, emphasis on the positive common values in the great historical religions will surely come, in the future. America suffers here from a mental schizophrenia between John Adams and Jefferson with Paine, which issues in secular schools and in such a mixture between economic conservatism and a "modernist", rationalist, engineering, secularist and (for Toynbee) "arid" mental outlook as to deprive her, it can be said, of leadership in Europe, where her true religion of Deweyite pragmatic democracy is (probably wrongheadedly) regarded with cynicism, not least on the basis of American sociology. Toynbee here administers good medicine. This schizophrenia permits, as joyous paradox, Baptist divines, in the name of the sacrosanctly foolish division of Church and State (Gandhi said an impossible division), to tell the American Executive that America shall not be diplomatically represented in Vatican City. So "presbyter is priest writ large." Jung, Cassirer and Toynbee, in his religious emphasis upon the importance of Divine Dramas and Cults, are probably true prophets and at least are corrective, in the field of values, of the heady secularism of the tradition of Paine and Ingersoll. The decisive field indeed in human affairs is that of a people's fundamental ideas, more determinant in revolution even than weapons of war. Howbeit such ideas must be not only of religion and cult, as Toynbee indicates, but also about population and soil-conservation and the like great realities of earth-politics, if terrifying race-war is to be avoided. The technical and the valuational ideas *both* matter; and must be wedded.

On the other hand, Toynbee's immediate prescriptions awake doubts, which this is no place to discuss. The reviewer can only demand another five years to digest a judgment. Here Toynbee yet seems to plummet

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from the world-historical empyrean into the courtyard of Chatham House, in wartime a collaborator of the British Foreign Office. It is odd that his vast studies seem to conclude in remarks which appear curiously to display the hallmark of the immediate *Zeitgeist*, especially in its Westminster epiphany. The great public has taken to its heart, like some formula by Herbert Spencer, the phrase "Challenge and Response". One would have supposed that widespread human funk about the hydrogen bomb (following a gross miscalculation by politicians about power balances) could be a Toynbean sign of decadence, only to be met by some "better idea" that could win the assent alike of common men in every country—such as a revulsion from tyranny and outdated Marxism to coöperation and sociological science or to religious pursuit of human fraternity. Or that the reply of Patrick Henry would be a sign of vital Response to Challenge. To the challenge of Islam followed the response of a revitalized Eastern Empire and the Crusaders and Lepanto; to the Reformation, to save the older system, came the Counter-Reformation. But it seems that Response is not so. The Crusades were an error. Admitting the malign policy of Venice, one wonders whether yet Charles Martel and Lepanto were errors. Gandhi was not patient; and Gandhi was a great resister. However, we learn that "Response" spells patience, coexistence and a missionary effort (which will be "dull") against that dynamic new Islam of which Lenin was the armed Prophet. Missionary about what? As Greece was to Rome? Mr. Attlee has been known to be more downright. Marxism, Dr. Toynbee and Bevanite Mr. Driberg M.P. can both urge, is "a Christian heresy" (*vide Time*). Why not "Judaic" *à l'*Amos or even Saducee-Judaic? It says apocalyptically: "Brothers, unite: let us liquidate the running-dogs of non-Russian imperialism." (Marx himself included also the Russian variant.) Basically, one might suggest, the deepest psychology of Marxism is *not* Christian, but more nearly "capitalist", allied to the ultra-social-competitiveness and *Kampf* of now *démodé* Manchester secular capitalism and neo-Darwinism. However, against Dr. Toynbee's ten legions of volumes, we be but voices in the un-Rockefeller-watered wilderness; and discussions of these trifles of 1954–84 are merely quibbles *de minimis*. I can only protest the extreme importance, if we want practical results, of "Pure Politics" as of Pure Physics. Meanwhile, we must confess that the history of the world does indeed indicate the highly superior survival value of autocracies, such as the Egyptian and Chinese (although the wicked Venetian oligarchy did not do badly); and that the *pax Romana* was based on domination, desolation and conquest. The most probable prophecy would seem to be that the world will soon be ruled by a Kremlin-dynamized Peking, already ruling six hundred million folk. The ap-

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propriate philosophy will doubtless follow on owl-wings; and the kaleidoscopic pattern of the facts be expounded by some newer Toynbee. But that indeed human history could be *ad majorem Dei gloriam* I do not doubt.

George Catlin

London, England

The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918. By A. J. P. Taylor. Vol. II of *Oxford History of Modern Europe.* Oxford, at the Clarendon Press; New York, Oxford University Press, 1954.—xxxvi, 638 pp. 30*s.*; $7.00.

There is something Shavian about A. J. P. Taylor and his place among academic historians; he is brilliant, erudite, witty, dogmatic, heretical, irritating, insufferable, and withal inescapable. He sometimes insults and always instructs his fellow-historians, and never more so than in his present effort to reinterpret the diplomatic history of Europe from 1848 to the end of the First World War. In this work, his most ambitious to date, he seems to have been guided by a deceptively simple formula: to doubt all received interpretations, including those formerly held by himself, and, whenever possible, to turn them on their head. This method does not spring from the principled perversity his critics have often charged him with; rather it reflects his lively and exceptional intelligence playing anew upon the wealth of documentary material which he has read and mastered. And his intelligence has detached itself from the older preoccupation with "the causes of the war". Mr. Taylor's concern is with the last great age of the European balance of power, and while that system prevailed, no particular grouping or policy was frozen or rigid ("No war is inevitable until it breaks out", p. 518), and pre-war Europe is here re-created in all its multiplicity of choice and ignorance of the ultimate catastrophe which destroyed it in 1914.

Mr. Taylor's theme is "The European Balance of Power . . . and the book ends when the theme is dwarfed" (p. xxi). That balance, however, depended upon adroit adjustment by the visible hands of diplomatists, whose acts and motives Mr. Taylor describes. On the whole, they sought "to preserve the peace of Europe without endangering the interests or security of their country" (p. xxiii).

After a brilliant introduction, in which he defines the balance of power and assesses the relative and changing strength of the Great Powers, Mr. Taylor presents a chronological survey, beginning with the diplomacy of revolution (1848) and ending with the diplomacy of war, 1914–1918. The Metternichean system collapsed in 1848 and the Holy Alliance

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during the Crimean war; for the next twenty years no particular system prevailed, and Bismarck seized the opportunity to reconstitute Central Europe. Between 1871 and 1914, the European balance was preserved despite the Eastern question and the piecemeal collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the colonial embroilments and the clashing imperialist designs (actually Mr. Taylor holds that "the peace of the Continent is usually more secure when European restlessness can be discharged, in Guizot's phrase, 'against the barbarians' . . ." (p. 126), and was shattered only when Europe destroyed itself in the great war, and Lenin and Wilson, for different reasons, resolved not to restore the old balance of power.

Mr. Taylor writes on two levels. He narrates the history of European diplomacy and compresses it admirably into a single volume. Imposed upon the narrative is his effort to probe the historical meaning of given actions and conditions. Here his intelligence leads him along Hegelian paths, with the tacit assumption that the historical progress is rational, that each act or motive has reason, however absurdly ignorant the historical agent may be. In this manner Mr. Taylor is driven to reinterpretations which often appear to be rationalist reductions of highly complex historical situations. As he reinterprets the material, which on the whole is well known, his most provocative reversals derive from his implicit assumption that the European balance of power involved fluidity and choice as well as increasing rigidity and fixity of position. He has a peculiar sense of inevitability, growing out of what he regards the logic of a given development, as well as a delicate feeling for live options and alternatives.

Mr. Taylor suggests that fear, not aggression, was the dominant impulse of pre-war diplomacy. As the various Powers were afraid of one another in this Hobbesian condition, they sought allies, always banking on the fact that they would retain their freedom, that the very essence of their sovereignty lay in their ability to choose. Thus Mr. Taylor attacks the view that the pre-war alliances were unalterable commitments, redefines the supposed aim of most of them, and implies that each alliance could have been turned into its opposite. The Anglo-Japanese alliance "did not mark the end of British isolation; rather it confirmed it" (p. 400). "The Far East, and the Far East alone, caused the Anglo-French entente . . ." (p. 417). "The Anglo-Russian entente had thus little to do with Germany" (p. 442). Although the Luxembourg crisis in 1867 shattered "the dream of Franco-German amity . . . for ever" (p. 183), Mr. Taylor dwells on the several opportunities for a far-reaching Franco-German reconciliation, until in 1914 "The coalition of the three advanced western Powers against the Russian colossus seemed just round the corner" (p. 514). It is a little disheartening to see Mr. Taylor cheerfully abandon

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all past interpretations, which he does more easily by slighting the importance of the fear of Germany. Still to seize upon the evidence of political fluidity, to stress with a keen though sternly disciplined sense of drama the purely accidental factors, is undoubtedly a healthy corrective to those historians who have read back into the period after German unification the inevitability of war, or who from a Marxist position saw the war as the necessary outcome of monopoly capitalism, or who, like Mr. Taylor himself used to, felt that the war came because Bismarck's imposed compromise of 1871 "had to be carried to its logical conclusion" (*The Course of German History*, p. 165).

In determining causality Mr. Taylor seeks to escape the hedgings of conventional historians. This is praiseworthy, but his virtue often appears as virtuosity: "The Crimean war was fought to remake the European system" (p. 61). ". . . The immediate cause [of the first war] was a good deal simpler than on other occasions. . . . Austria-Hungary was growing weaker; Germany believed herself at the height of her strength. They decided on war from opposite motives; and the two decisions together caused a general European war" (pp. 526–27). Mr. Taylor's assurance concerning causality, made more challenging by his superbly self-confident style, traps him into contradictions. He says the Germans' "real object, not formulated even in their own minds, was to establish peacefully their predominance over the Continent, and thus be free to challenge the British empire overseas" (p. 427), but he denies that Germany was capable of pursuing a consistent, rational policy. As far as Germany is concerned, Mr. Taylor's harsh views of former years have been reduced to the plea that we stop seeing European history "through German eyes", and he sets the regrettable example of rendering Schleswig, Olmütz, and Buchlau as Sleswick, Olomouc, and Buchlov.

Mr. Taylor can emphasize political fluidity more easily because of his self-imposed exclusion of all developments which are not narrowly diplomatic. He does not tangle with the infinitely complex relations of external to internal affairs and creates the impression of diplomatists playing an autonomous game. At times he acknowledges the limitation: "Foreign policy . . . is often the outcome of a conflict of interests at home, which sometimes balance and sometimes provoke each other" (p. 483). At other points he slights the importance of internal developments, suggesting that European society was singularly stable before 1914. This line of argument is unconvincing, and Elie Halévy's *The World Crisis of 1914–1918* suggests a more rewarding approach.

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Mr. Taylor's self-denial in this respect is all the more remarkable when one remembers his admirable grasp of internal developments, especially in the decisive case of Germany. It is futile to wish that he had shared William L. Langer's plan "to take due account of economic developments, of changing military considerations, and of strong tides of national sentiment, as well as of individual leadership" (*European Alliances and Alignments*, p. viii). Mr. Taylor has written an excellent book, and its very excellence defines the limitations of diplomatic history. One may hope, however, that the projected *Oxford History of Modern Europe*, of which this is the first volume to appear, will not in every case prescribe a divorce of foreign from domestic politics.

FRITZ STERN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

German History: Some New German Views. Edited by HANS KOHN. Boston, The Beacon Press, 1954.—224 pp. $4.00.

This volume presents writings of eight German historians in search for a re-evaluation of Germany's history. They are flanked by a Swiss scholar now teaching in Berlin, and Hajo Holborn of Yale University, formerly of Berlin.

The book opens with a penetrating 30-odd-page survey by Kohn of the emerging post-Hitler *Geschichtsbild*, analyzed against the background of German historiography and its profound influence on German politics. Some of the growing trends he considers "danger signals". According to one such trend, Hitlerism was bad, but its bad features were really imports from the West. According to another, Hitlerism was not so bad; in fact, it was "the bulwark of Christendom and the West against Communism", but the Allies (and the anti-Hitler plot of July 1944) stabbed the savior of civilization in the back. These two schools are not only utterly untenable, they are mutually exclusive. Yet, instead of canceling each other out, they both flow into a third, namely, the advice to get rid of Western influences and to build Germany, and Europe, in the image of allegedly true German precepts. "A new war against the West is being launched in some circles and this, as it was often under Hitler, in the name of a new Europe, of the true Europe, which only German leadership, at the moment at least spiritual leadership, can create. . . ."

The challenging task of a new German historiography is to show that Germany has formed, and must form, "an integral and important part of the West." Such effort can provide the urgently needed "critical insight and a measured outlook. Some German historians are doing it

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and are rendering thereby Germany and Europe a great service." The German writers here presented belong, in general, in this class. Their pieces are excellently chosen and of very high caliber. Each is illuminatingly prefaced. This is an important book.

Karl Buchheim (Munich) deals with "The Via Dolorosa of the Civilian Spirit in Germany". His main thesis is that, "because the Army and democracy became antithetical forces in Germany, the whole problem of German democracy can be understood only by a critical analysis of Prussian militarism." "Since the military was the controlling social class," neither parliaments nor cabinets were ever "able to match the real power of the Prussian army." In 1932, logically, "the first blow [against the Republic] was struck by the *Reichswehr* . . . [whereby] once more, the old military caste of Prussia took over leadership." Hans Herzfeld (Berlin) gives analogous views in his "Militarism in Modern History". National socialism repeated "with redoubled energy and redoubled blindness the experiment of the First World War" to militarize the whole nation. After the "last and grotesquely exaggerated consequence of the idea of militarism"—total war—mankind will destroy itself unless it abolishes militarism, that is, the domination of politics by military considerations.

Franz Schnabel (Munich) maintains that Bismarck used the old methods of European statecraft, seeking primarily *power*. He thus drove "German history along the road to disaster"; yet, the blame lies largely with the weakness of his opponents. Alfred von Martin (Munich) expounds on the theme of the anachronistic nature of Bismarck's Reich. But why did the German people "give first Bismarck and then Hitler their opportunities? . . . Because they have tended to worship force, because they consider every kind of inconsiderateness, especially in the military field and in domestic and foreign policy, to be proof of increased strength. . . ."

Ludwig Dehio (Marburg) presents his deep-searching theory on wars for hegemony ("Germany and the Epoch of World Wars"). Germany fought for hegemony in both world wars; this was, in itself, nothing uniquely German, when compared with earlier wars for hegemony. But Dehio urges "ruthless recognition of the frightful role which we have played, as the last and therefore the most demoniacal hegemonic power of old Europe in decline." Especially the second effort, led by "a satanic genius", caused such material and spiritual destruction that it was the last war for hegemonic unification of Europe: global history has ceased to be made there. Dehio postulates as a law of history that all wars for hegemony *must* end in disaster for the nation which engages in it.

From the pen of Friedrich Meinecke, the collection offers a paper

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of 1948, comparing "Ranke and Burckhardt" in favor of the latter. Meinecke admonishes the Germans "to accept entirely new perspectives." But the shift from Ranke to Burckhardt as the political guide for the nation appears small. In fact, Meinecke himself stresses Burckhardt's desire to go back beyond 1789, and calls him "this morose enemy of democracy" to whom the ideas of the French Revolution and everything that followed were "unpleasant and, indeed, hateful, things." Hajo Holborn's essay, "Misfortune and Moral Decisions in German History", contains interesting criticisms of some of Meinecke's central positions. The young Swiss author, Walther Hofer, perceives in German idealist historiography a "continuing disintegration of originally idealist conceptions . . . from national feeling to race delusion, from cosmopolitanism to the dream of world rule, from a war for freedom to world conquest, from the national state to the organization of space, from humanism and Christianity to exclusive or tribal religion and ethics." Johann A. von Rantzau (Hamburg) finds "The Glorification of the State in German Historical Writing" all too much alive; hence, the danger of continued provincialism and separation from Western viewpoints. Above all, he claims, this leads to a cultural relativism which by its own premises excludes historical criticism since all political acts are but expressions of the respective culture or national *Eigenart*.

Ellinor von Puttkamer (Bonn), discussing the chances of German-Polish *rapprochement*, believes that it will take "decades and probably generations" until "the feelings of hatred and revenge are to be overcome and agreement based on mutual respect is to be possible" between Germany and her Slav neighbor.

All of the pieces are so closely reasoned that, as this reviewer is aware, summaries cannot do them justice.

JOHN H. E. FRIED

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Kronprinz Wilhelm: Seine Rolle in der deutschen Politik. By PAUL HERRE. Munich, C. H. Beck, 1954.—ix, 280 pp. DM 15.—.

The well-known German historian Paul Herre in his study of the political rôle of the last German Crown Prince puts himself to a very unenviable and unrewarding task. He undertakes to trace the often erratic and generally peripheral political activities of the heir apparent to the Hohenzollern throne and to evaluate these activities on the basis of "quiet scholarliness" and by the "principle of truth" (p. viii). Thus resolved and fortified the author ushers his readers into the innermost recesses, mainly very dark, of the political mind and machinations of the late

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Crown Prince. As Professor Herre investigates these step by step it becomes increasingly clear that the brighter his torch of truth shines on the winding, downhill path of the political life of Crown Prince Wilhelm, the more obscure appear the attainments of the latter.

The career of the man destined for the headship of the second German empire—and prevented by a seemingly not altogether blind fate from assuming it—can best be understood if one visualizes the Crown Prince in his "Death-Head Hussar" uniform. Throughout most of his life he behaved in matters of high and often vital policy-making as if he were still colonel of that hussar regiment. Crown Prince Wilhelm must have thought of political events and opponents as of so many hurdles in the riding ring and he indiscriminately tackled them with the dashing recklessness of the hussar. Unfortunately, he proved somewhat less brave in times of grave crisis and challenge, as, for instance, in November 1918 when he fled Germany and in 1944 when he held back from the *putsch* against the *Führer*.

In political decisions in which he was less directly involved he frequently showed much bravado and drive. His hussar sallies in the second Moroccan crisis and in the Zabern affair are cases in point. It was over the Moroccan crisis that his imperial father first publicly censured him, as he did again on the eve of the First World War and on later occasions. The oftentimes strained relations between Wilhelm the father and Wilhelm the son form an interesting part of Professor Herre's study. But it is the last German emperor rather than the heir apparent who gains in stature from a review of this relationship.

One of the most important conflicts between Wilhelm II and the Crown Prince centered on the controversy over Bethmann Hollweg. This chancellor, who also gains in stature when compared with the Crown Prince, was the whipping boy of the latter who concentrated most of his wartime political activities on bringing about the chancellor's downfall. As for the rôle of Crown Prince Wilhelm in foreign affairs during the First World War, Professor Herre credits him with an early understanding for the need of a compromise peace. Yet the author has to record the abrupt *Umfall* of the heir apparent under pressure from the Supreme Command bent on a "victory peace".

In this as well as other instances Herre does not fail to criticize the Crown Prince for being too much under the influence of other persons, too rash in his judgment, too flighty in his thinking, and too wavering in his attitude. Yet one feels that the author in his strenuous and strained attempt at an objective evaluation of the political rôle of the Crown Prince glosses over basic weaknessess and major *faux pas*. This seems especially true of the Crown Prince's rôle after 1930 when the Hohenzollern

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pretender temporarily sided with the Nazis and disowned Hindenburg. In this as in other decisions he was governed by reckless opportunism and not, as the author assumes, by long-range plans for the good of the German nation.

If Professor Herre's book falls somewhat short of the original aim of a balanced account of assets and liabilities in the political activities of Crown Prince Wilhelm, it is primarily because there is so little that will balance the scales of history in favor of the last heir apparent of the Hohenzollern dynasty.

F. GUNTHER EYCK

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

Geschichte des Alldeutschen Verbandes 1890–1939. BY ALFRED KRUCK. Volume Three of Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte, Mainz, edited by Joseph Lortz and Martin Göhring. Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1954. —vi, 258 pp.

This is an excellent concise account of the ideas, deeds and machinations of the Pan-German League that will always fill some of the blackest pages in the dark history of German nationalism. From its founding in 1890, for over forty years, the League labored incessantly to turn Germany into a hyper-nationalist, militarist, racist state. It sought the unification in one mammoth Central European Reich of all *Volksdeutsche* (except the Swiss-Germans) living in that area. It aimed at making Germany the greatest of all naval and colonial Powers. It poisoned the political atmosphere within Germany and abroad; and in the writings of Heinrich Class, the League's president from 1908 to 1939, and some of its other leading members, are to be found most of the ideas, schemes and programs of the Nazi régime.

Though it professed to see in Bismarck the greatest of all modern German statesmen, in practice the League rejected as incomplete his formation of a *kleindeutsch* Germany: the *Anschluss* of the thirteen million Germans living in the Dual Monarchy remained ever one of its objectives. Where Bismarck had been careful not to antagonize British feelings too much, the League, especially before the First World War, was bitterly anti-British. And where Bismarck, once he had established a unified Germany by violence, sought to safeguard it by comparative moderation in foreign policy, the League's proposals in this field were of an utter recklessness. Indeed, on at least three occasions before 1914 the League believed the time had come for Germany to strike first: in 1905, 1911, and 1912.

Especially before the First World War—and this doubtless made the

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League seem even more important and dangerous abroad—it never lacked for famous scholars, prominent business men and public figures among its members. Ernst Haeckel and Friedrich Ratzel were among its founders, and later were joined by such men as Georg von Below, Otto Hoetzsch, Karl Lamprecht, Dietrich Schäfer, and Max Weber. Stresemann belonged to it as a young man.

After the outbreak of war the League soon began to advocate unrestricted submarine warfare and mass Zeppelin attacks on large enemy cities. Its most extreme wartime propaganda was somewhat curbed by censorship, but it never ceased publicizing its wildly annexationist war aims while the Bethmann Hollweg government and its successors, lacking a definite policy of their own, had no way of preventing the League from gaining the tactical initiative. At the end of the war, in October 1918, while even Ludendorff was demanding immediate peace, Class and the leaders of the Pan-German League sought to start a national rising on the French model of 1871. But the plan failed miserably: the Germans would not fight in the streets for their country any more than they would for their political rights in 1848 or 1863.

For a short period after the founding of the Weimar Republic, until May 1919, the League coöperated with the Ebert government in its anti-Left activities; after that the League became the Republic's implacable enemy. Already in 1912, Class, in his famous book *Wenn ich der Kaiser wär'* (published under the pseudonym Daniel Frymann), had proposed a dictatorship for Germany, to be installed by a coup d'état if necessary, and as the years went on he revived his plan with increasing stridency. None of the democratic governments' successes and achievements served to placate Class and the League; the Rapallo agreement with Soviet Russia in 1922 they denounced as "criminal".

At the end of the 1920's—the League having also become outspokenly and bitterly anti-Semitic after the war—Class and his associates began to coöperate with the Nazi movement. (Hitler first had met Class in Berlin in 1920 and told him of his enthusiastic reaction to his *Kaiser* book.) As late as the presidential runoff election, in April 1932, Class still supported Hitler over Hindenburg. By October 1932, however, the League had become frightened at Hitler's success and ordered its local chapters to withdraw all support from the National Socialists, denouncing them for "having gone over to the side of parliamentary government" and for their increasing adoption of "Marxist doctrines". Once the Nazis were established in power the League's past work did not go unrecognized: it became the only even remotely political organization to be at all tolerated in Germany—until on March 1, 1939 it too was suddenly suppressed by the Secret Police. But by then the *Grossdeutsch-*

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land the League had championed for over forty years was well on its way to realization.

The Pan-German League's importance and influence long have been disputed. German politicians and scholars have denied the significance attributed to it outside Germany; and Dr. Mildred Wertheimer, in her study of the League to 1914 published in 1924, tended also to underestimate its effectiveness. This remains a question of considerable complexity; but Dr. Kruck, from his careful and detailed researches (he had access to all of Class's papers and some of Alfred Hugenberg's), is able to show considerable connection between it and the German government before 1918; and while the League's point of view was hardly ever accepted, one imperial cabinet after another sought a form of accommodation with the League that would save it from its virulent attacks. Tirpitz, Ludendorff and Hindenburg, to be sure, at one time or another during the war, all rejected coöperation with the League, and Class's revolutionary scheming with General von Seeckt, the head of the German Army, in 1923, likewise came to nothing. Yet, especially before 1918, numerous German generals and admirals were members of the League, and others still very close to it. As to the intellectual and ideological influence of the League on the general political atmosphere in Germany, before and after the war, and especially on the Hitler movement, there is much pertinent material in Kruck's study.

There are a few questionable details: the characterization of Lloyd George and Clemenceau as "demagogues", the approval of Rapallo, the various strong comments on the effects of the Versailles Treaty on Germany and the possibilities of its wide revision. And in time it may be possible to tell more about the Pan-German League's big-business support and financing before and after 1918, and some other matters about which Kruck evidently felt it necessary to be reticent.

In all, this is an excellent study of an important subject, one of the most impressive and valuable books on the modern history of Germany to come from there since 1945.

FRANCIS L. LOEWENHEIM

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Ambassadors and Secret Agents: The Diplomacy of the First Earl of Malmesbury at the Hague. By ALFRED COBBAN. London, Jonathan Cape, 1954.—255 pp. 21*s.* net.

This is an essay in diplomatic history (p. 9). However, Alfred Cobban, a Professor of French history at the University of London, is by instinct a political theorist. In consequence, he has provided us with some of

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the elements of an inquiry into the nature and essence of international politics. He asks how diplomacy was conducted at the end of the eighteenth century in the struggle between Great Britain, France and Prussia for influence in the United Provinces of the northern Netherlands. He traces the impact of the *dramatis personae*, and especially Sir James Harris, on political events from 1785 to 1788. He demonstrates that a diplomat of necessity blacks "his fingers when he . . . [has] to sweep chimneys" (p. 9). In effect, he lays bare the permanence of rivalries and the struggle for power among nations, the narrow but decisive area in which skillful leaders shape events, and the inescapable moral ambiguity of international politics. While these more general findings result from avowed objectives of the study, Professor Cobban for the most part is reluctant as a professional historian to do more than describe a sequence of events. Indeed the first half of the book is so burdened with minor historical details that the reader yearns for the return of the theorist even at the expense of a few canons of historiography.

What most concerns the author, however, is the historical narrative of England's quest for influence in the United Provinces. Their historic alignment had been upset by the American Revolution in which the Dutch and French were allied against England. The first task of English diplomacy was the restoration of the Anglo-Dutch understanding through strengthening ties with the House of Orange and the Stadtholder and weakening French influence on Dutch policy. France's ill-fated dependence on the anti-Orangist "Patriots", bent on destroying the power of the Stadtholder, spelled doom for her policies. It not only arrayed France against England's national interests but conflicted with Prussia's family connections with the House of Orange. The fateful movement of events reached its climax with the Prussian invasion of the Netherlands in 1787. Prussia both for lineal and political reasons intervened to redress the prestige of the House of Orange, the Princess having been arrested by the Patriots, and to reëstablish Prussian power on the Continent. Great Britain under Pitt, with promptings from Harris, who for his skill was to gain both an ambassadorship and peerage as Earl of Malmesbury, mobilized her navy and stood ready to enter the war on Prussia's side against France. The Patriots, deceived by France's failure to give direct assistance, capitulated at the approach of Frederick William II's troops and the authority of the Prince of Orange was restored. The unpopularity of the occupying forces and the loss of influence by the Princess of Orange, symbol of Prussia's influence, to the Prince whom she had earlier overshadowed led to the triumph of English power. The importance of secret service money in the diplomatic struggle was probably less decisive than Harris' acumen and tactical skill. Moreover,

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Professor Cobban puts to rest the twin illusion that up to £2,000,000 were spent in France as "Pitt's bribes" to provoke the French Revolution or that the "Dutch money" was spent on bribes and gifts instead of the Gelderland subsidy or temporary loans.

Throughout the book Cobban throws a fearless light on the turbulent whirlpool of international politics. He never obscures the painful gropings of diplomacy. He makes plain what modern social science so often conceals, that the political actor can never be sure of the consequences of his measures. In contrast to our high priests of progress, he points to those areas in which we moderns may have witnessed a decline (for example, "international morality did not then so easily accept the idea of the extinction of an independent state", p. 13). He catalogues the virtues of the diplomat so admirably fulfilled in Sir James Harris, now lavishing flattery and rhetoric on the Principal Secretary of his Foreign Department, again writing to Pitt in the vigorous language of foreign policy and then appealing to the Princess of Orange in a spirit of amiable and unscrupulous intrigue. What were his guides and standards? He wrote: "I know no guide to Politicks but *events* or rather circumstances, no principles but the interests of my Court" (p. 30). Professor Cobban in reflecting on the period observes: "perhaps the ways and means of international affairs have not changed quite so much since then as used to be supposed" (p. 9). It is unfortunate he has left to our imagination the full import of this reflection. Having written with great fervor and effect on "The Decline of Political Theory", he ought to take up his own challenge and write a sequel to this volume in the general area of the theory of international politics.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON

NEW YORK CITY

The Commons in the Parliament of 1422: English Society and Parliamentary Representation under the Lancastrians. By J. S. ROSKELL. Studies presented to the International Commission for the History of Parliamentary and Representative Institutions, XIV. Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1954. Distributed in New York by Barnes & Noble, Inc.—xi, 266 pp. 30*s.*; $6.50.

This monograph is the first volume to be puslished under the terms of the James Tait Bequest to the Manchester University Press for the publication of works of scholarship. While other historians have studied the parliamentary representation of a shire or group of shires, cities and boroughs, over a period of years, Professor Roskell thinks that "to use

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the 'horizontal' as distinct from the 'vertical' method, to take the county and borough returns across at one point, and analyse the composition of the Commons in a single parliament, perhaps produces results of greater interest . . ." (p. vii). He has chosen the Parliament of 1422 as one for which all the names of the elected representatives are known except for one borough. A secondary interest lies in the importance of the problems which faced this, the first parliament of the infant King Henry VI, and their solution. While 1422 is the center of interest, it is set in a wider framework by three introductory chapters and the conclusion—"The Changing Character of Borough Representation in the Fifteenth Century".

There is emphasis on the unity of the Commons as a political estate and their "capacity for some measure of independent collective action," and on inter-class ties between knights and burgesses. The change in the character of borough representation (non-residence), usually attributed to mid-century political strife, is shown to be already under way. Recognition, without overemphasis, is given to the interesting variety of connections of some members with the aristocracy and the influence of local magnates in elections; and to those members who are or have been servants of the Crown—the "westminster crowd". Knights of the shire are still "the bedrock of English political and local administrative life" (p. 85). Some burgesses have important mercantile ties. Of special interest is the number of professional lawyers in the Commons. Chapter iii, "The Problem of Parliamentary Experience", gives evidence of repeated election and the resulting "collective memory of the Commons", an anticipation of the "old parliament men" of Tudor days. Throughout, generalizations are supported by an impressive array of specific examples, figures and percentages.

"The Acts of the Parliament of 1422" (ch. vi) are obviously not those of a typical session. Although there was little important legislation, the author does summarize the evidence of the parliament roll as to private, group and Commons petitions, and even names members who must have been interested in this or that measure! More space is devoted to the important settlement of the regency, the personnel of the Council, and the administration of Henry V's will.

Although we are forewarned in the preface (p. vi) that because of the paucity of sources "the individual knights of the shire and burgesses themselves are somewhat unsubstantial figures," Part II supplies biographical notes, in alphabetical order, of all the knights and a number of the burgesses elected in 1422—148 in all! These sketches range in length from three lines to two or three pages for some important shire

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knights such as Sir William Sturmy and Thomas Chaucer. Part I is well documented with foot notes, Part II with references in parentheses in the text.

FAITH THOMPSON

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

William III and the Respectable Revolution. By LUCILE PINKHAM. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954.—viii, 272 pp. $4.50.

Students of the way things happened as well as of political theory and historical legend will be interested in Professor Pinkham's study. This is indeed a controversial but highly suggestive addition to the literature of 1688 about the often neglected rôle played by the Protestant deliverer. To Mrs. Pinkham the Dutch king is the nexus (p. 76) between English and continental crises. To him she attributes a single motive: to be king, and the responsibility for entangling his uncle and father-in-law James in the circumstances which brought about his fall. Only to a much lesser degree (in this version of the story) do the fatal weaknesses of James, the ambitions of the aristocracy out of office to regain power, and Protestant prejudices skillfully aroused work together to enable another silent William to achieve his ambitions.

Mrs. Pinkham has searched the *Rijks Archief*, The Hague, as well as the more familiar English collections. She is able to quote Dutchmen in support of her thesis. She is entirely concerned with William's character and his manipulation of his contemporaries for his own ends. She does not, for example, mention Somers, architect of the settlement. Indeed she regards the Revolution as failing to accomplish anything of lasting benefit (p. 237) and explains its immediate success by the fact that "men with varied grievances and personal grudges were able to bury their differences", both Whig and Tory being more anxious for office than for popular rights. William forced his allies of either party into a position where they dared not face failure and were obliged therefore to accept his terms. In this struggle the Dissenters held a balance of power. Neither Whig nor Tory wished for repeal of the Test for either the sects or the papists. Mrs. Pinkham, however, surprisingly enough believes in James's good intentions toward both. She cites the friendship of Penn (pp. 13–14). Surely no royal friendship has ever paid more handsomely in the matter of public relations. Yet no discernible party line can be found among the Quaker's intimates. Moreover James, unlike his brother, seems to have cherished vengeful feelings toward the sects and had indeed spoken publicly and bitterly against any pity for

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them. Mrs. Pinkham also emphasizes the good reception given "Indulgence" by the oppressed until their leaders convinced them that hope for the future lay with William.

The essay is extremely well written. Six brief but exciting and learned chapters take up the story of relations between William and James ("The Long Prologue") and the difficulty of keeping Tory support and of winning over a group willing to see a change of kings. "The Issues Defined" explains Anglican fears of dissenters almost more than Catholics and quite brilliantly discusses the situation created by the birth of a prince. "The Diplomatic Background" is described in terms of William using exaggerated accounts of Louis' ambitions for his own purposes. "The Protestant Wind" and the "March to London" detail the story of William's encounters on English soil with his supporters, and "The Interregnum" his insistence on the crown. In "Conclusion" Professor Pinkham warns against the worship of false gods, among which she puts the "political myth" of '88. As a solution to drastic problems reliance should not be placed "upon an inadequate and irrelevant example from the past"—that is upon the *Respectable Revolution*. There is much here to ponder and, whether or no agreement is arrived at, there is much that cannot henceforward be ignored in assessing the character of the Glorious Revolution and Dutch William's rôle in it.

Caroline Robbins

Bryn Mawr College

Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860: A Study in Political Conflict. By D. Mack Smith. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1954.—xi, 458 pp. $8.50.

If, as a historian, I were reviewing this book for historians I would give it some very high marks. I would especially welcome it as a historian interested in the process by which the Italians achieved political unity in their mid-century *risorgimento*. It is much more difficult to say for what reasons a political scientist should read it.

Certainly Cavour, as statesman, diplomat, political realist and at the same time mid-century "liberal" *par excellence*, is a subject about whom every student of politics needs to know all that he can learn, and this book holds a microscope over Cavour and his magnetic opponent Garibaldi in a year when Cavour's resourcefulness was extended to the limit.

It purports to be, and is, a study of the conflict and interplay of moderate liberalism and national radicalism in their bids for power and support as alternative methods of bringing the South of Italy—Sicily and Naples—

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into the Italian kingdom born in the North in the war of 1859. The moderates won, and Mr. Smith finds no reason to change the conclusion that they owed their victory to Cavour. But he enriches the picture of the culminating sweeps of the two movements in 1860, when Garibaldi's expedition suddenly made the South the center of conflict. The author does this by studying every current and wave of the tides of opinion that swirled around the principal contestants during that year regarding the ways and means by which Sicily and Naples should be united with Piedmont.

The book is an important contribution to its subject. Concentrating on one region for one year, Mr. Smith has deliberately used detail as a method. He seeks in it springs of thought and motive, patterns of interest that become clear and convincing only when every branch, leaf and seed pod of the design have been traced. The thoroughness of his research has permitted him to do this well. It has also brought unused information to light, and it has enabled him to correct serious misconceptions in the work of his predecessors. The picture is anything but static. Mr. Smith tells a story. It moves as deliberately as a Wagnerian opera. But it is packed with drama.

It has to be said again that the subject is opinion. This book is an essay in the history of ideas. I believe it fair to say also that Mr. Smith's primary interest is in motivation. He believes that this can be discovered in a thorough study of expressions of opinion, public and private.

The patterns of articulate political opinion that Mr. Smith has established are undoubtedly a valuable reflection of motivating forces generated by tradition, sentiment and economic interests. But we are still left in the dark about the effective potentials of those forces. We are still left with the guesses of contemporary observers regarding this vital matter. Mr. Smith evidently dislikes Cavour and likes Garibaldi. He deals gently with Garibaldi and the energetic idealists who surrounded him, and harshly with Cavour and his supporters. But, as he freely admits, Cavour guessed right and the radicals guessed wrong as to the effectiveness of the forces at their disposal. He is sure that if Cavour had been less narrow, more "Italian", better informed, and more generous, he could have produced a better-united Italy. But if Cavour had been all of these things, could he have afforded in the crisis of 1860 to be more conciliatory? Did Cavour overestimate the danger of foreign intervention, the political instability of the radicals, and their slippery control of the great force and inertia of regionalism in the South, which, as this book amply demonstrates, the nationalists were, by principle and ardent conviction, even less well equipped than Cavour to reconcile with their program for Italy? The answer to this question depends on the effective

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political weight of these factors; and the application of Mr. Smith's method, though it sharpens the question, does not provide the answer. I must add that I doubt if any historian can.

Kent Roberts Greenfield

Office of Military History
Department of the Army

Tito's Promised Land: Yugoslavia. By Alex N. Dragnich. New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1954.—xii, 337 pp. $5.75.

United States foreign policy-makers never admit that in supporting Marshal Tito in his struggle against the Soviet Union they practice a form of ideological coexistence. Now that a Soviet deputy premier has indicated that the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia have taken steps to resume normal relations, our Department of State faces two difficult questions: Can we continue to support the Titoist communist state now friendly with the Soviets? What manner of ally, and how effective, will Tito now prove to be at a time of crisis?

Tito, Professor Dragnich believes, will prove a poor ally indeed. Only the hope of freedom from communism will cause the Yugoslav army to fight. In that case Tito becomes a military liability, since he would resist entering any conflict (p. 305). Professor Dragnich bases his opinions not only on his analysis of the documents produced in a decade of Titoist communism but on his experiences in Yugoslavia as a United States foreign service officer.

He recognizes one of the significant facts of twentieth-century political life when he writes that the Serb military chief, General Mihailovich, "had no political ambitions and did not consider it within his sphere to plan the future of Yugoslavia" (p. 20). Unfortunately, Professor Dragnich fails to point out that the Yugoslav government-in-exile, like the leadership within the country itself, showed no political understanding and acumen, making it that much easier for Tito to fight a political war and pave his way to power.

Professor Dragnich is at his best when he delineates the process of decision-making in a communist state. His survey of the pervasive rôles played by the Yugoslav Communist party in the mechanisms of policy-making, public administration, law and justice, and the control of public opinion is particularly useful.

A considerable portion of *Tito's Promised Land* is concerned with the state of the Yugoslav economy. The author, who has keenly observed the Yugoslav scene, introduces many facts hitherto not known. While all the materials he presents are relevant and reliable, there is one important shortcoming that should be noted. With few exceptions his

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data are not quantitative and do not enable the reader to make an analysis of the economy as a whole. The facts are scattered and for the most part refer to individuals and individual agricultural enterprises.

While Professor Dragnich did not set out to write an economic study, he does pronounce a negative verdict on the nature and future of the Yugoslav economy. His conclusions may well turn out to be perfectly correct, but to evaluate the past performance and the potential development of as complex a phenomenon as the economy of a country one should have many more facts than he gives us.

Tito's Promised Land clearly depicts the life of a people under communism. That is its virtue. That is what gives point to the moral question Professor Dragnich raises: "How can we justify contributing to an indefinite enslavement of those people?" (p. 310). And that question relates closely to the national policy question of how valuable Tito or his army will be in case of Soviet aggression.

To answer one question is to answer the other. The effort to do so should cause a degree of rethinking on the nature of foreign policy. The facts are all here.

J. B. HOPTNER

NEW YORK CITY

The Soviet Regime: Communism in Practice. By W. W. KULSKI. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1954.—xiv, 807 pp. $8.00.

Professor Kulski, it will be generally conceded, has written one of the most ambitious studies of the Soviet régime to be published in many years. Some readers may dispute the author's claim that "the one unavoidable gap" in his book is the treatment given prisoners in correctional labor camps (p. 2) but few will deny that Professor Kulski has explored an extraordinary range of Soviet behavior. The book, it is freely acknowledged, is first of all a reference work on the Soviet Union today (p. 1); the author hopes, however, that his study will serve a more urgent need—to wean from communism its present and sometimes unwitting supporters both here and abroad. This Professor Kulski seeks to do by exposing in the U.S.S.R. the fundamental features of totalitarianism, the basic anatomy of which he considers "the same whether its name is Communism, Nazism or Fascism" (p. 7).

Professor Kulski's approach to his subject is a novel one: he explores Soviet institutions in terms of their effect on people. First, he considers the intellectuals, dwelling especially on the restrictions imposed upon them in the anti-"cosmopolitan" crusade following the Second World War; he touches also here on the effect of the resurgence of Great Russian

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chauvinism on the various nationalities of the U.S.S.R. In Part Two, he treats the citizen as such, irrespective of class, in his relations with the state: here Professor Kulski has occasion to discuss the rôle and organization of the party and, somewhat more exhaustively and successfully, the structure of justice in the Soviet Union. Part Three concerns the plight of the worker, as it may be inferred from Soviet materials published in the years immediately following the war. Part Four does the same with respect to the peasant. The final section is a postscript, reviewing developments since Stalin's death in March 1953.

This approach has a great deal to commend it. It makes for a lively and readable text on the whole, and the average reader will doubtless prefer it to the more pedestrian institutional approach normally used in studies of this sort.

A work of this scope will not, of course, satisfy all who consult it. Some readers will find the quotations from Soviet sources (which comprise between a third and a half of the total text) too ponderous. Others will object to the meager indexing; it is of little assistance to the student seeking information on Marxist theory in the Soviet Union, for instance, to learn from the index only that Marxism and Marxists (taken together) are discussed in forty-four different places in Professor Kulski's text. Still other readers will regret that the author did not use more charts and tables to free his narrative from massive statistical data.

A more general objection, and one less likely to be disputed among serious students of the Soviet Union, is the author's apparently intentional avoidance of related research in the field of Soviet studies. Professor Kulski states that his book is the "result of lonely research" (p. vii); it is evident on occasions too numerous to list here that this loneliness has led him into errors of both fact and judgment which were entirely avoidable. Research on the Soviet Union has become so highly specialized in recent years that no writer can expect to reach intelligent and valid conclusions on the multiple aspects of Soviet behavior explored here without consulting the product of this research. It is surprising that so conscientious a scholar as Professor Kulski should not have appreciated this need to consult and coördinate.

The most serious objection to *The Soviet Regime*, in this reviewer's judgment, lies not in the author's presentation or interpretation of his materials but in the narrow scope of the sources themselves. With few exceptions these were all published between 1946 and 1951. In consequence, because Professor Kulski relies so heavily upon his Soviet sources, there is reflected in this study only the outlook of the last years of Stalin's rule. The result is a disconcertingly static account of Soviet institutions and practices; even the past, where it is discussed at all,

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seems no more than the (then) Stalinist present extended backwards. Nothing of the dynamic character of Soviet development is captured in this account. When all is considered, a work which in 807 pages ignores the Revolution, the Civil War and the N.E.P. and makes only passing reference to such figures as Trotsky, Zinoviev and Bukharin (to mention only a few) leaves the reader poorly prepared to comprehend the workings of the Soviet system today.

Professor Kulski's book will not fail to attract attention among students of the Soviet Union—and deservedly. It is only to be regretted that his undoubted energy and painstaking scholarship should have been applied to a study which, unless it is often revised, must necessarily remain a view of the Soviet Union during a brief—and, it must be acknowledged, an exceedingly dreary—span of time.

CHARLES B. MCLANE

SWARTHMORE COLLEGE

Realities of American Foreign Policy. By GEORGE F. KENNAN. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1954.—120 pp. $2.75.

Three years ago George Kennan's Walgreen Lectures at the University of Chicago, published under the title *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950,* provided inspiration and controversy. His Stafford Little Lectures at Princeton last year on "Realities of American Foreign Policy" should enhance the inspiration and diminish the controversy. Mr. Kennan is not only one of our ablest career diplomats but also a writer of excellent prose. If even this second book, admirable as it is, fails to provide a completely satisfactory exposition of his analysis of problems and methods of United States foreign policy, one must bear in mind that it is composed of only four lectures and does not purport to be a full-length study. The sorry fact that our government, in an illusory political effort to create domestic capital by the pretense of novelty, has not continued to make use of his services is partly compensated for by Mr. Kennan's taking advantage of the interlude to study, to reflect and to write. It is notable that Kennan, in discussing Indo-China, warns against "back seat driving" and advises "There are times when, having elected a government, we will be best advised to let it govern and to let it speak for us as it will in the councils of the nations."

To the present reviewer the third and fourth lectures are superb, the first and second least satisfactory. Since the net result of reading this book is an enthusiastically favorable response, a few comments on the first two lectures may be disposed of first. In reviewing American history, here as in his first book, Mr. Kennan is not wholly convincing. He confesses to nostalgia for the good old days but in the last lecture

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freely admits that changed conditions alter the simple pattern which he finds so admirable in our national infancy. It is unfair to criticize particular passages because in the brief compass of an evening's lecture, he naturally cannot go into detail and one is not always sure to what historical period he refers. As he discusses what seem to him deviations from the wise policies of the founders, one feels, however, that he attributes an unreal uniqueness to American patterns. Our moralistic and utopian notes were not discords in a world harmony of realism. While we had our "Manifest Destiny", Britain had her "White Man's Burden" and France her *mission civilisatrice*. The sentimentality of Americans against which he inveighs was no stranger to nineteenth-century England. Despite the leading rôle of Woodrow Wilson in promulgating the ideal rôle of a League of Nations, Americans were not alone among his devoted disciples. Americans did devote perhaps inordinate efforts to the cause of disarmament but it was the Czar who led the way to this program at the Hague in 1899 and Europeans were at least as active as Americans in the League period. The Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921–22 was not motivated by pure sentimentalism but in large part by cold judgments of local politics, considerations not absent from the American scene since 1952. The picture presented of a secretary of state like Elihu Root wasting his time on illusory treaties of arbitration is not based on the reality of the effort actually devoted to what Kennan would agree were the practical politics of United States relations with Latin America, Japan and Europe.

In the discussion of United States relations with the non-Soviet world, the reviewer believes Mr. Kennan, like others concerned with the direction of United States foreign relations, fails to appreciate the rôle of multilateral dealings through the United Nations. What he has to say later in his fourth lecture particularly about our relations with the "in between" countries is admirable but belies his overly mechanistic interpretation of the United Nations process. In the earlier discussion there is an appearance of condescending superiority which is emphatically repudiated in the later lectures.

Mr. Kennan is at his best—and his best is very good indeed—in the third lecture on "The Problem of Soviet Power" and the fourth lecture in which he outlines the essentials of a productive American attitude. In a few paragraphs he annihilates the specious campaign chit-chat about a basic distinction between "liberation" and "containment". Only a stupid politician—alas, such still exist—could continue to mouth some of the popular clichés after reading George Kennan's calm and penetrating analysis. As he goes on to talk—as he did in his Chicago lectures—of the supreme importance of our own posture and character and the dev-

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astating impact on our world position of the beams in our own eye, Mr. Kennan sounds notes which should be echoed throughout the length and breadth of the land.

It would be a sorry error for many who—in this reviewer's opinion—misunderstood Mr. Kennan's first book, to pick out of his Stafford Little Lecture items about the place of law and organization and morals in international politics to the neglect of the sage and philosophic advice which he gives to us in our new world-rôle as the nation most capable of determining the world's future. There is no room in this review for quotations but there are abundant sentences in this book which might well be slogans for an America intent on wisely fulfilling a great potential destiny.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The United States in a Changing World: An Historical Analysis of American Foreign Policy. By JAMES P. WARBURG. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1954.—xv, 496 pp. $5.75.

James P. Warburg's perceptive analyses of international problems are familiar to students of our foreign policy. His views are often unorthodox and disputatious, but they are always well considered and the result of reliable research. This latest is especially ambitious. In it Warburg examines our place in the world since 1776, and concludes with an indictment of our present policy-makers for not having assumed more vigorous leadership of the revolutionary forces let loose by World War II. This conclusion blinks at the fact that our present policy, whatever its weaknesses, is a logical outgrowth of the historical background Warburg is at pains to supply. Warburg himself writes: "The key to our behavior as a nation among other nations in the latter part of our history lies in the nature of our domestic development" (p. viii).

Perforce, Warburg's survey of our past is cursory and on such a small scale that his generalizations are often misleading. For example, his apostrophe to the Declaration of Independence as the keynote of the new republic is an overstatement that gets him off on the wrong foot. The signers reluctantly accepted a break with England. They talked about "all men" but that was only the vocabulary of the day; they meant, of course, "all Englishmen". Furthermore, Warburg ought to remember that Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* is not only a call to political action, but is also a call to isolation from Europe—to an avoidance of "the miseries of Hanover".

This is not to suggest that the Founding Fathers counseled a policy of self-centeredness or avoidance of international commitments. It

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does suggest that our schizophrenic attitude toward Europe—alternating repulsion and attraction—has deep and tenacious roots. A survey that omits this fact distorts the "key" to which Warburg refers.

At least as important has been the perpetual American *Drang nach Osten* which has been the motive force behind what we have misnamed our Westward Movement. It is as old as the Republic itself. It underlay our concern with transcontinental railroad building. It was uppermost in the minds of nineteenth-century missionaries. In the long run it made Americans Orient-oriented and guaranteed that, regardless of our relationship to Europe, isolation would not be a part of our Pacific policy.

The diplomacy of the United States, furthermore, has always been excessively responsive to domestic politics. Our particular bête noire has been sectionalism. American nationalism has been self-consciously and artificially superimposed on a diverse society. This has been both cause and effect of our inability—until recently—to agree upon a sensible definition of "national interest". Today, when the "national interest" no longer is open to dispute but has become the maintenance of national life itself, the locus of disagreement has shifted to the *means* of its maintenance. Yet, no less than in the past, foreign policy formulation is a function of political considerations at home. Today when we talk hopefully of bipartisanship in external affairs we are in fact longing for an unattainable nonpartisanship.

There are other themes that are built inseparably into our history: our characteristic impatience with diplomats and their work; our elaborate moral specifications for international dealings; our stubborn-headed opposition to the physical aggression of the strong upon the weak.

All of these modes of thinking will no doubt persist, and they will continue to get in the way of the kind of changes Warburg hopes will come about— changes that may very well be desirable. His specific expectations for today and the future are high-minded but vague. Afraid of the consequences of our "neo-isolationism", he asks for "affirmative purposes" and "creative American leadership" working toward "universal disarmament". If our history is an accurate yardstick for prognostication, it is reasonable to suppose that we will meet fully our obligations to ourselves and to our neighbors. Warburg knows this, as he also surely knows that we must be prepared for frustrations outside of our capacity to diminish or control. Many of them will be Soviet-made or Red China-made but at least as baffling may well be those that come out of our own soil—the ones that are inescapably Made in America.

HENRY F. GRAFF

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Its Aftermath. Edited by HARRY ELMER BARNES. Caldwell, Idaho, The Caxton Printers, 1953.—xiii, 679 pp. $6.00.

This volume is dedicated to the memory of the late Charles A. Beard. The title, "perpetual war for perpetual peace", is a phrase that was used by Dr. Beard in a conversation with the editor in 1947 and is supposed to describe "the foreign policy of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, and of their ideological supporters." The volume, essentially an anthology of "revisionist" literature, comprises essays by William Henry Chamberlin, Percy L. Greaves, Jr., George A. Lundberg, George Morgenstern, William L. Neumann, Frederic R. Sanborn, and Charles Callan Tansill, with introductory and concluding chapters by Mr. Barnes. These writers object, or Mr. Barnes objects for them, to their being called isolationists. Whatever term is used, they all agree that the United States made a serious and disastrous blunder in going to war in 1941. Apparently, too, they all deplore American participation in world politics and collective security systems since 1945. The purpose of the book is to set forth these views from various angles, but especially to exhibit the chain of alleged errors and deceptions which led to Pearl Harbor and American involvement in World War II.

Much of the material here assembled has appeared before. Nearly all of it is controversial, but in varying degrees. Few students of the period would challenge the contention of Mr. Sanborn that the United States was not "neutral" in 1940–41. All-out defenders of Roosevelt or of General George C. Marshall will find it hard to refute the view of Mr. Morgenstern that there was amazing high-level negligence in Washington on the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack, or to combat the demonstration by Mr. Greaves that there were outrageous, and partly successful, efforts to evade responsibility and to cover up evidence in the long series of Pearl Harbor investigations.

So long as they stick to ascertainable facts, as Messrs. Morgenstern and Greaves do for the most part, the "revisionists" deserve, and I am sure will get, a fair hearing. When some others of this group permit their obvious prejudices to carry them far beyond the facts and make charges of villainy that are unproved and, to say the least, improbable, they have only themselves to blame if they are not taken seriously. A few quotations will illustrate what I mean.

We are told that after 1937 the American attitude to Japan "was sharpened and hardened by President Roosevelt's decision to turn to armament and war as the most successful manner of prolonging his

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political tenure" (p. 639); that Roosevelt promoted appeasement in the Munich crisis of 1938 because of a belief that if war came then, Hitler would be defeated before the United States could get into the scrap—a view, by the way, which Tansill and Barnes espouse but Sanborn rejects (pp. 171, 201–2, 633); that Roosevelt and Churchill met in Newfoundland waters in August 1941 "to devise some means for getting America into the war through the back door of the Pacific" (p. 642); that "Japan veritably crawled on its diplomatic belly from the end of August, 1941, until after the middle of November of that year in an attempt to reach some workable understanding with the United States" (p. 642). Other assertions as extravagant and as unproved as these could easily be cited. Mr. Barnes and some of his associates, in fact, not content with the thesis that Roosevelt "lied" the United States into the war, attempt to show that, presumably to promote his political fortunes, he lighted the fire of war in Europe and poured oil on that in Asia.

Underlying the "revisionist" thesis is the assumption that the United States had nothing to fear from a victory of the Axis Powers in 1940–41, and that if we had then stood aside and let nature take its course, we should be living in a safe and comfortable world today. This is an assumption that will be widely challenged. To thousands of intelligent Americans of that day, the vision of a world dominated by Hitler, Mussolini and Tojo was frightening. It is still so in retrospect. If in scotching that danger we brought upon ourselves a greater one, was the mistake made in entering the war or in conducting it with too naïve trust in our Soviet ally? Mr. Lundberg wisely remarks: "Any discussion of alternate policies is, of course, faced with the difficulty that while the results of the policy adopted are known, the effect of those that were not adopted can only be surmised" (p. 570). A sound principle, but one neglected throughout this volume.

It is to be doubted whether Mr. Barnes helps to get a fair hearing for his collaborators by serving advance notice that all who reject the "revisionist" version of history are *ipso facto* "court historians" who have sold their consciences to the government, or hangers-on of the "Ministry of Truth" (Barnesian for agency of propaganda and lying), or, at best, victims of an "emotional fixation on the mythology built up after 1937." Such attribution of dishonest motives or blighted intelligence to the opposition in a debate was once common in theological controversy. It seems strangely out of place in twentieth-century social science.

Mr. Barnes is convinced that there exists an "historical blackout", designed to choke off any revision of the official narrative of America's relation to World War II, and that historical scholarship in America is

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well on its way to the situation that obtained in George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-four*, or that obtains today in Soviet Russia. I believe that Mr. Barnes is unduly alarmed. I am confident that when a revisionist point of view is stated with such respect for evidence and logic as appears in a minority of these essays, it will have a suitable reception. In fact, I see in some parts of this book indications of the Hegelian dialectic at work: a new synthesis developing from the official thesis and the intemperate antithesis of earlier (and some current) revisionist writings.

JULIUS W. PRATT

UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO

Power and Policy: US Foreign Policy and Military Power in the Hydrogen Age. By THOMAS K. FINLETTER. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1954.—viii, 408 pp. $5.00.

No citizen has been more learnedly concerned with national military policy than has Thomas K. Finletter, our former Secretary of the Air Force. What he has to say, therefore, is worthy of the closest scrutiny. In *Power and Policy* he argues cogently—and, understandably, breathlessly—that Soviet atomic air power is nearing the capacity to level our cities and prevent our hitting back. "We should assume for the purposes of our national policies and planning", he writes, "that the Russians will reach this absolute point during the year 1956" (pp. 3–4). The consequences that may be expected from this eventuality constitute the book's import.

Mr. Finletter contends that we can look for a vastly more aggressive Russia which will be contained only by an air force capable of surviving a "sneak attack" and of "destroying the Russian state in the counter-attack." This is, however, no victory-through-air-power-alone tract. Mr. Finletter elaborates the importance of NATO, and he is at home with the problems of coalition politics. Furthermore, he discusses extensively those "gray areas" that are still neither ours nor the Communists'. He warns that in these regions lie "great possibilities of blundering into an atomic war" (p. 192). His worry throughout is that the military content necessary for the patient and potent foreign policy we must pursue is at present nonexistent. We must, he implores, make our politico-military strength so great that we can deter the Russians from aggression, just as by our atomic supremacy we saved Western Europe in the post-war period. It is Mr. Finletter's belief that between $18 and $20 billions will give us the minimal protection we shall require.

This line of thinking one does not summarily dismiss. But its assumptions should be thoroughly and critically analyzed. They would

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have to include the premise that for a sneak attack to succeed without devastating retaliation, the Soviets will smash not only United States cities but also simultaneously our air bases in Western Europe, North Africa, Greece, Turkey, the Philippines and Japan, and so make war on the whole world at once. They would also have to include the premise that our gradual build-up of thermonuclear strength will in fact frighten the Russians and not embolden them to strike us ahead of our schedule. Mr. Finletter's assumptions do not provide for the likelihood that Russia wants no more Koreas and will rely on psychological infiltration against which we have thus far devised little effective defense, and against which atomic air power can avail nothing.

Mr. Finletter gives little encouragement to preventive-war advocates. He would build up American atomic air power only in order to put us in a position to make possible a political solution of international problems. Consequently this book should be read especially by at least three "publics": that which subscribes to the let's-get-it-over-with-now fallacy, that which trusts in honeyed words, and that which continues to hope that our civilization will not end as an impulse on a Geiger counter.

HENRY F. GRAFF

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Justice William Johnson, the First Dissenter: The Career and Constitutional Philosophy of a Jeffersonian Judge. By DONALD G. MORGAN. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1954.—xvi, 326 pp. $6.50.

Son of a Charleston blacksmith, pupil of Witherspoon at Princeton, South Carolina legislator and judge, William Johnson in 1804 at the age of 32 was appointed by Jefferson to the Supreme Court, on which he served until his death in 1834. Chief Justice Marshall died almost a year later. As Holmes was to disappoint Theodore Roosevelt in the Standard Oil case, Johnson soon displeased Jefferson by deciding that the Embargo Law, which authorized collectors of the ports to detain vessels "whenever in their opinions" evasion was intended, did not permit detention under a general direction by the Executive that "every shipment" of certain articles "for a place where they cannot be wanted for consumption, should be detained" (pp. 57–66). But the independent disputatious spirit which embroiled Johnson with his party's leader soon became a thorn in the flesh of his Chief Justice. Tables compiled by the author (pp. 46, 176, 189, 306–7) graphically demonstrate how Johnson became the first Justice to write frequent dissents. It was Marshall's

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policy to write all the opinions himself in cases where he sat, and before 1823, with the exception of Johnson, no member of the Marshall Court "spoke out in separate opinions, whether concurring or dissenting, in more than eight cases" (p. 176). By 1809, Marshall had "abandoned his claim to be exclusive mouthpiece" (p. 180). But during the period of Johnson's tenure on the court Marshall wrote 458 majority opinions out of 977, and Johnson 34 out of 74 dissents (p. 189).

Johnson's insistence on stating his own views was encouraged by correspondence with Jefferson which commenced in 1822 when the ex-President praised Johnson's unpopular *Life of Nathanael Greene*, in which the judge analyzed party divisions and emphasized that states' rights were not a major ingredient in republicanism: "State rights, or United States' rights are nothing, except as they contribute to the safety and happiness of the people" (p. 151). Jefferson responded with the notable passage about the "cherishment of the people" as the object of his Republican party, in the letter of June 12, 1823. Jefferson also stated two canons of constitutional construction which made an impact on Johnson's later opinions (pp. 159–161). He likewise prodded the South Carolinian into the determination to record his individual views "on all subjects of general interest; particularly constitutional questions" which should come before the court (p. 184). Jefferson in the course of the correspondence had urged revival of the pre-Marshall practice of *seriatim* opinions where every member of the court states his individual views. This suggestion may have been made to Jefferson by Madison (pp. 168–172, 183).

Perhaps because of the influence of Jefferson, Johnson's nationalism tended to exalt Congress, as the representative assembly of the people, rather than to emphasize as Marshall and his followers did the importance of the judiciary (pp. 92, 125, 293).

Professor Morgan's book is well written and reveals diligent use of the meager materials available. Johnson's papers may have been destroyed during the Civil War; and his cantankerous personality, and the popularity of the Marshall cult, have tended to eclipse the fame of the South Carolina Justice until recent years, when dissent has become extremely fashionable in judicial circles. The author, as well as A. J. Levin and Oliver Schroeder, Jr., have heretofore published a number of law review articles on Johnson. The present book is mostly an analysis of judicial opinions, with little biographical flavor. A type of book now common is one depicting "The Constitutional World of Mr. Justice X"; and the present work is of that character. Such studies are valuable however, because of the political importance of the Supreme Court and

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the fact that its decisions result from the votes of human individuals who do not undergo transubstantiation when they are elevated to the bench. *Et [judicis] mentem mortalia tangunt.*

EDWARD DUMBAULD

UNIONTOWN, PA.

North Carolina: The History of a Southern State. By HUGH TALMAGE LEFLER and ALBERT RAY NEWSOME. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1954.—ix, 676 pp. $7.50.

The appearance of this work serves to emphasize the fact that there are few states that have satisfactory one-volume treatments of their history. The authors, collaborators in previous writings and colleagues for many years in the Department of History at the University of North Carolina, were eminently qualified for their task. To be sure, they had the good fortune to enjoy the fruits of a great tradition of historical research and writing in the state. It must be added, however, that they contributed substantially to these fruits. When Professor Newsome died in the summer of 1951 approximately one half of the manuscript had been written. Professor Lefler completed the work and saw it through the press.

This history is impressive for several reasons. One is its scope. Not only does it cover a period extending from exploration in the sixteenth century to politics in the middle of the twentieth century, but it takes into ample consideration virtually every aspect of life in the course of the state's development. Thus, colonial society, problems of transportation and communication in the eighteenth century, intellectual currents at various times, and interstate and federal relations are treated, as well as the usual political, economic and military developments. Another is its freshness. All through the book there is evidence of a thorough mastery of the sources and complete familiarity with more recent monographic and other writings about the state; and there is evidence of willingness to pass judgment and take a stand.

The first third of the book is devoted to the colonial period and deals with the several abortive attempts to settle the colony, including the still unsolved mystery of Roanoke Island, the separation from South Carolina, the emergence of a distinctive economic and social order, and the colony's leadership in the movement for independence. The second third, which carries the story from the administration of George Washington to the close of the Civil War, covers the period in which the authors seem to be most at home. They handle with great skill the many problems arising in the early federal period, the growth of plantation slavery and

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the movement for a diversified economy, the support of numerous plans for education, anti-slavery sentiment, and the heated controversy over secession. Outstanding chapters in this section are: "An Intellectual Awakening, 1835–1860", which chronicles the development of the state's remarkable tradition in the field of education; "Religion and Society in Antebellum Days", containing a good discussion of the structure of society; and "Internal Division and Wreckage, 1861–1865", an able analysis and graphic description of the collapse of support of the war and the latter's effect on the life of the state. The final portion deals with the well-known problems of Reconstruction, the coming of industry into the state, and the slow integration of the state into the life of the nation.

The effort to appeal to both the general reader and the college student has resulted in some compromises with regard to organization and arrangement. The numerous topical subdivisions within the chapters, ranging in length from four lines to several pages, tend to break the narrative unnecessarily. One is tempted to argue with several assertions made by the authors. Among them are, "Because the slaves were Negroes and because the Negroes were slaves, they worked slowly and could not easily be driven beyond their normal pace and quality of labor" (p. 400), and "The withdrawal of Federal troops from the South in 1877 . . . was an outstanding example of statesmanship" (p. 472). One could also argue with the authors' omission of Negroes from the lengthy list of scholars and writers (pp. 557–559), although one of them won the coveted Mayflower Cup for the best book published by a citizen of the state in 1943. There are helpful population, agricultural, and industrial maps throughout, and the appendices contain, among other things, a handy list of chief executives of the state, and a chronology of events in the state from 1524 to 1953.

JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN

HOWARD UNIVERSITY

The Negro and the Schools. By HARRY S. ASHMORE. Foreword by Owen J. Roberts. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1954.—xv, 228 pp. $2.75.

This is the first of four volumes reporting the findings of the forty-five scholars who participated in research studies sponsored by the Fund for the Advancement of Education undertaking to provide "a new and comprehensive look at the structure of bi-racial education in the United States" (p. v). The remaining three volumes will present in detail the basic data gathered; the present volume is a summary and interpretation of the findings.

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There are two aspects of the problem of the education of the Negro in the United States: the problem of securing for particular Negro children as good school education as that provided for white children residing in the same community; the problem of providing this education in the same school for white and Negro children together. The United States Supreme Court ruled on May 17, 1954 that the two problems are one. The Ashmore Project was carried to completion before that decision had been handed down. In it the two aspects of the problem receive distinct treatment. The factual data presented in Part II of *The Negro and the Schools* and summarized in chapters 6 and 11 of Part I have to do with the first of the two. The historical and descriptive treatment of Negro education—beginning with a Massachusetts Supreme Court decision in 1849 upholding segregation and ending with the United States Supreme Court decision declaring segregation in the public schools to be unconstitutional—concerns itself with the second problem.

The purpose of the Ford Foundation in sponsoring the study was practical. To no degree was there to be argument either for or against segregation; the concern was to be with facts: facts that would "bring into focus the dimensions and the nature of a complex educational problem" (p. vii). The report was to be addressed to the general public, the large group of men and women in the thousands of local communities who in the last analysis determine policies for particular schools. It was intended for this public in the hope that facts would aid in making wise decisions.

Mr. Ashmore has succeeded admirably in carrying through this policy. He has provided a readable account of the problem of Negro education in the United States and the factors involved in attempts to improve and equalize opportunity in education for Negro children. The historical-descriptive treatment sketches the origin of bi-racial education in the South during the Reconstruction Period, its spread to the non-South as migration of Negroes to particular areas outside the South reached large proportions, the glaring inequalities in opportunity for the Negro in the South that developed during the first quarter of the twentieth century, the accelerating trend in the second quarter of this century toward raising the level of Negro education to that provided for the white, and the progress being made in the non-South in eliminating segregated schools.

Certain facts stand out in the report: that social-economic forces are operating with increased momentum to eliminate the grosser types of injustice meeted out to Negro children; that three eighths of our Negro population now live in the non-South—the problem of Negro education is a national problem; that even in the South the Negro is migrating from the farm to the city—the problem of Negro education is increasingly

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being dumped in the lap of the city; that basically it is life out of school that segregates—the schools merely fit into the pattern of the society in which they exist; that school segregation is of two major types, legal and extra-legal, the latter being either voluntary or manipulated; that in the South inequality of educational opportunity (in the meaning that term carried before the Supreme Court of 1954 redefined it) is a twofold problem, Negro-white and rural-urban; that to equalize opportunity of the first type is only a small part of the total problem of equalization; that "integration" would not in the immediate future help in solving the economic problem; that "Even those who are dedicated to the proposition that the common good demands the end of segregation in education cannot be unaware that if the transition produces martyrs they will be the young children who must bear the brunt of spiritual conflict" (p. 135).

S. G. BRINKLEY

EMORY UNIVERSITY

India and Pakistan: A Continent Decides. By LORD BIRDWOOD. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1954.—315 pp. $4.50.

Lord Birdwood is a member of a famous family with a tradition of five generations of service in India. His father was Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in India. He himself held high positions in that Army. He admits to some nostaglia for "the settled happy times we ourselves had enjoyed between the wars." (It may be uncharitable to observe that for India these were hardly "settled happy times".) But he has tried sincerely to make an adjustment in his own mind to the new order of affairs in the Indian subcontinent.

In November 1944 Lord Birdwood left India after a service of a quarter of a century. Seven years later he returned, in order to seek answers to "a long list of questions". The present book, which is in a sense a sequel to an earlier volume, *A Continent Experiments* (London, 1946), records his observations, woven into a comprehensive and sympathetic treatment of the first years of independence.

The book begins with a brief survey of the events of 1946 and 1947. Lord Birdwood questions the wisdom of trying to complete "the greatest political and administrative operation in history"—the transfer of power from the British to the new states of India and Pakistan—in less than two and a half months. One part of this process, namely the division of the armed forces, he describes in intimate detail. With all due respect to the opinions of a man who spent many years in the East Punjab, one may well question his assertion that "had the Gurdaspur District not been awarded to India [by the Radcliffe Commission], India would certainly never have fought a war in Kashmir."

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Lord Birdwood was in India during the General Election of 1951–1952. His chapter, "India at the Polls", has therefore the flavor of a firsthand report. He points out that the elections should be regarded as "an educational process in the business of learning democracy." It is difficult to understand the basis of his conclusion that as a result of the elections "an effective opposition" to the Congress party emerged.

While he recognized the basis of the Muslim League's demand for a "Pakistan" in the western part of the subcontinent, "the further demand for an eastern State" he "found difficult to defend"; and he believes that "it would not be unnatural if one day the eastern limb of Pakistan decided to cut itself adrift from control from Karachi." He insists that "the link between the two Pakistans is essentially economic," not religious. In his opinion Islam is "no deterrent to many who think they can see in Communism a background to their own confusion of ideals."

Only four chapters and fifty pages are devoted to the external problems facing India and Pakistan, but these chapters are remarkably informative. The best sections deal with the position of the two countries in the Commonwealth, with the controversy between India and South Africa, and with India's policies in Nepal against the background of Indo-Chinese relations.

Originally Lord Birdwood intended to devote a single chapter to the Kashmir issue; but as a result of his observations in India, his visit to Kashmir, and a more careful study of the whole question, he concluded that "here was the key to agreement [or disagreement?] over the whole range of controversy between the two Dominions." So the single chapter expanded into eight chapters, comprising one fourth of the entire book. Lord Birdwood does not hesitate to state opinions and conclusions. He believes that Pakistan's case would have been stronger if from the beginning her spokesmen had admitted that the tribesmen who poured into Kashmir in late October 1947 had done so with "the knowledge and tacit consent" of the Pakistan government. He is convinced that the operation of sending Indian troops by air to Srinagar on October 27, 1947, was "entirely spontaneous". He gives a graphic account of the "controlled warfare" of 1948, which he calls "this most ambiguous of wars". Credit for the cease-fire in Kashmir, in his opinion, should go to "British initiative" rather than to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. While he gives considerable attention to the efforts of the United Nations to assist in the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, he confesses frankly that "the recitation of the story of political negotiation has proved a thankless task, approached in a sense of duty rather than pleasure." He suggests a number of "solutions" for the dispute, but he sadly admits that none of them is likely to be accepted.

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Although the book was written before the dismissal and arrest of Skeikh Abdullah in August 1953, Lord Birdwood does refer to some aspects of the personality and policies of "the Lion of Kashmir" which in all probability contributed to his downfall. A "Kashmir Epilogue", written after Abdullah's dismissal, discusses the immediate effects of this startling turn of events and voices some well-justified reservations regarding the future of Kashmir under the present Indian-oriented régime, headed by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed.

NORMAN D. PALMER

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Red Design for the American-Guatemalan Prelude. By DANIEL JAMES. New York, The John Day Company, 1954.—347 pp. $4.50.

The first time the Communist technique for the seizure of power became serious in America was in the recent case of Guatemala. There the Communists came to the verge of controlling the government, only to be dislodged by a successful armed revolt against the government of President Jacobo Arbenz.

After outlining the background against which this attempted seizure of power took place, Mr. James recounts the history of the 1944 revolution, which gave the Communists their chance. This revolution started out with objectives which are becoming familiar in Latin America. It sought to bring the Indian into the life of the nation and to develop the economy of the country. It sought to bring in the trade unionism, labor legislation, and social security which have become characteristic of almost all of Latin America. Finally, it sought to establish the bases for a modern democratic government.

This program was not Communist in orientation, but the Communists were able to take advantage of it. Mr. James describes the reasons for this. The young men who took over the government in 1944 were generally devoid of political experience. They had grown up under a dictatorial régime which had not given them much opportunity for learning the subtleties of modern ideological politics. Finally, they came to power in a period when the whole Western World was wooing the Communists and the Soviet Union. For most of the Guatemalan revolutionary politicians of the generation of 1944, this courtship never ended.

The author makes it clear that the first foothold which the Communists got was in the labor movement. The Communist-controlled Confederation of Workers of Latin America, with its headquarters in neighboring Mexico, was the only functioning continental labor organization at the

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time, and it got in on the ground floor in organizing the Guatemalan workers. The efforts of the American Federation of Labor a few years later to build up a strong non-Communist labor movement in Guatemala came too late.

During the administration of President Juan Jose Arevalo, the Communists built up their first cadres, and near the end of the administration came out into the open. Mr. James argues that Arevalo was very naïve in dealing with them, citing particularly his placing of Communists in the foreign service. However, it seems to this reviewer that Dr. Arevalo, who had had long contact in Argentina with both Socialists and Communists, played essentially a cat-and-mouse game with the Stalinists. His placing of Communists in the embassies and legations abroad could well be interpreted as a species of exile, an attempt to keep them out of the country. This reviewer has the impression that the Communists themselves regarded Arevalo's policy in this light. Furthermore, Arevalo's refusal to recognize the Communist party as a legal entity which could put candidates in the field is notable. So was his policy of closing down Communist institutions from time to time. In general, Arevalo used the Communists much more than they used him.

Mr. James's description of the Communists' use of the agrarian reform is particularly graphic and interesting. He argues that the Guatemalan Stalinists evolved a "Maoist" technique, a compound of agrarian reform and "anti-imperialist" nationalism, and that this is a significant new contribution to the armory of the Latin-American Communists. However, there is some doubt whether this appeal to the countryside is anything new in the history of the Communists of Latin America. In the 1920's and 1930's the Communist party of Mexico certainly tried its utmost to build up support among the peasantry, and succeeded to a limited degree in some regions. The Peruvian Communists have for long sought to win influence among the Indian peasants and it is not without significance that their principal support comes from the Indian departments of Cuzco and Puno.

On the other hand, the Communists of other Latin-American countries have not had the opportunities which those of Guatemala possessed. The type of revolution which the Guatemalans have been passing through in the last ten years has occurred before only in Mexico, and subsequently in the last two years in Bolivia. In Mexico, the revolution much antedated the appearance of the Communists, and its general lines had been well laid down by 1920. In the case of Bolivia, the Communists have met serious rivals in the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario*, the party which has had the reins of government since the revolution of 1952.

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The Communists have for long used the "anti-imperialist" anti-Yanqui line, toning it down only in the period of Russia's involvement in World War II. In the 1920's they were busy forming Anti-Imperialist Leagues throughout the hemisphere, most of whose efforts were directed against the United States and its influence in Latin America. That they have intensified this propaganda during the last nine years is rather the result of the cold war than of any fundamental shift of Communist policy in Guatemala or anywhere else.

The great value of Mr. James's book, therefore, is in its description of exactly how the Communists operated in Guatemala, rather than its theorizing on Communist strategy on a hemispheric basis. For the former it is invaluable. The author gives a detailed account of the way the Communists penetrated into some of the most important organs of the government, particularly during the administration of President Arbenz. It traces their exploitation of the issue of agrarian reform—and their "undeclared civil war" in connection with this. It highlights their emphasis on anti-Yanquism and their conversion of the Guatemalan government to a violently anti-United States policy. It underscores the recklessness with which the Communists sacrificed the 1944 revolution to their own ends.

The book is fascinatingly written and should have a wide audience.

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

Bolivia: A Land Divided. By HAROLD OSBORNE.—x, 144 pp. $2.50, 1954.

Colombia: A General Survey. By W. O. GALBRAITH.—vii, 140 pp. $2.50, 1953.

Ecuador: Country of Contrasts. LILO LINKE.—ix, 173 pp. $2.50, 1954.

Paraguay: A Riverside Nation. GEORGE PENDLE.—vi, 115 pp. $2.50, 1954.

These four volumes are published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London and New York.

Chatham House adds these four country-studies to those already published on Chile, Brazil and Uruguay. Others are in preparation for Argentina, the Central American Republics, Mexico and Venezuela. Their total value will be something more than the sum of the parts. The complete set will provide a convenient source of encyclopedic information, in a field which United States publicists and scholars, as well

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as the foundations, are ignoring increasingly for other areas of the world. Although there is no official editor of the series, Robin A. Humphreys has had a continuing responsibility for reading all the manuscripts.

The authors under review come prepared with extensive personal acquaintance in the area and with journalistic experience. Both Galbraith and Pendle are connected with the Latin American service of the BBC. Osborne has worked with the political intelligence department of the British Foreign Office, although his recent employment as a British civil servant has been essentially economic in character. Miss Linke is exceptional among the others in that she has become a citizen of Ecuador and is alone in being professionally trained in the behavioral sciences. She has been a social worker in Ecuador and is presently teaching in this field.

The books follow a similar pattern: roughly a quarter of each is given over to economic characteristics of the country and about one tenth to communications. The human picture—ethnic patterns, culture and health—occupies one seventh of the volumes on Bolivia and Colombia and not more than this space is given to the historical development of any but Paraguay. Government and politics have been neglected; hardly more than one tenth of the volumes on Paraguay and Colombia are given to this topic while the Bolivian political situation occupies only 3 per cent of the entire book. With the exception of the one on Colombia all bibliographies are selective and provide a guide to important country sources. Such occasional errors as "Hispanic American Studies" for "Hispanic American Report" are trivial. Helpful maps appear throughout.

Harold Osborne's *Bolivia* correctly emphasizes the geographical and historical influences on this underdeveloped country. Special attention is paid to the economic and financial problems with which a United Nations Mission of Technical Assistance was mainly concerned in 1951. The problems resulting from the economic, ethnic and educational distinctions among the Bolivian people are revealed and the author concludes that the present situation is dark and its immediate prospects obscure. While Osborne is concerned with objective characteristics of the people—including their birth rate, standard of living and education—he gives little attention to the important political or social symbols which have captured the imagination and therefore have motivated the current revolution in Bolivia.

W. O. Galbraith's *Colombia* gives a competent descriptive account of the geography, history and the people of the country. The brief statement of governmental, ecclesiastical and educational institutions, how-

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ever, is barely adequate for a book even of this small dimension. The underemphasis on the institutional rôle in contemporary Colombia is suggested by the fact that history and culture together are given more space than these institutions, while the social class structure is ignored altogether. The survey of the Colombian economy gives the book a momentary value as a source of recent statistics. The bibliography is disappointing—neither selective nor extensive.

Without doubt Lilo Linke's *Ecuador* is the best of these studies. It is the only one which gives a proper perspective to government and politics—one half the volume treats politics and economics equally, while one third is devoted to the people. Miss Linke is one author aware of the importance of social classes, and she has included a special chapter on this subject. The armed forces are considered in a separate chapter—one might wonder how this topic could be ignored so consistently in the other studies. Withal, the author has brought into balance the subjective with the objective characteristics of the people. The bibliography is conveniently arranged, and unusually complete.

George Pendle's *Paraguay* suggests that this country has had a past, however obscure its present and future may be. Approximately a quarter of the book is given over to history. The author has relegated helpful statistical tables to a ten-page appendix, and thereby has improved the readability of this volume over that of his study on Uruguay. Those who desire an adequate analysis of contemporary Paraguayan political institutions, or any understanding of the thinking and behavior of the people and institutions, however, must turn elsewhere. The extensive bibliography demonstrates the paucity of recent studies on Paraguay, and suggests thereby the particular value of this book.

Without detracting from their very obvious value, it must be candidly admitted that these studies have not taken advantage of available opportunities. Only two of the authors, Butland, whose volume on *Chile* was published in 1951, and Linke, are social scientists trained to interpret rather than record statistics. There is no conceptual framework which facilitates the correlation of the historical, economic, social and political material described in these volumes. The developing phenomenon of nationalism, so characteristic of these countries, has been ignored, and the nature of the social and political revolutions presently seething there is accordingly obscured. Much could be learned from the imaginative Doubleday paper-covered, 95-cent pamphlets in the social sciences.

MARTIN B. TRAVIS, JR.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

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American Business Corporations until 1860: With Special Reference to Massachusetts. By EDWIN MERRICK DODD. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954.—xix, 524 pp. $7.50.

Professor Dodd of the Harvard Law School has, posthumously, given us a painstaking and scholarly study of a difficult area of politico-economic relationships. His work, though that of a legal scholar and necessarily written to meet the requirements of legal history, offers important material for the student of American political evolution.

About a generation ago, it seemed deceptively easy to trace the development of early nineteenth-century business enterprise and its relation to the political state. Whether a fiction theory, a concession theory, natural law, or just man's propensity to associate himself freely without the state's yes-or-no into bodies corporate were each or all explanatory of our great phenomenon of corporate business enterprise seemed academic and unreal to American economic historians. They simply said that we had taken the idea of the Tudor-Stuart chartered corporation, created solely by the state's sovereignty, and cleverly adapted it to the needs of a democratic, business-oriented society. True, we had some difficulties arising out of dual sovereignty in our federal system, the privileges-and-immunities clause, the obligation-of-contracts clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment; but our great jurists had easily coped with these problems.

Many descriptions of the evolution of American business organization and the state's relationship thereto still echo this naïve and misleading story. This would perhaps not be of much moment, were it not for the fact that political theorists have thereby been warded off one of the most interesting paths in their domain by a tourists' sign reading "Nothing interesting for students of political science on this route, just a simple short-cut; other roads much more intriguing."

Dodd was a leader in exploring source material of the early nineteenth century and in tracing one area of the complexities in the evolving American art of business organization. Evans, DuBois, Cadman and others have significantly contributed to the much-needed retelling. When the whole story of this short period of about seventy-five years is told, it will be as truly interesting to students of man's relations with his fellows in arranging his economic (and cultural) pursuits as the great analyses by Maitland and von Gierke of earlier ages. Unfortunately but excusably, Dodd could not tell the full story in four hundred and fifty pages. He repeatedly states that the political theory and the business climate of the years he deals with must be left to others to delineate. They have not as yet done so in any thorough fashion.

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Dodd in this book confined himself almost wholly to the statutes and reported cases involving chartered corporations. He did a masterly job on his favorite "case study", Massachusetts; but death prevented, as Dean Griswold and the editors of Dodd's material explain, a similarly thorough review of other states. Occasionally he does refer to petitions filed with legislators, to governors' messages, and to periodical articles. Within this limitation, his organization of topics and of his data is a model of helpfulness to the reader who wants pre-1860 guidance on stockholders' liability, on constitutional questions affecting corporations, on statutes and cases relating to such particular categories of chartered corporations as banking, insurance, toll bridges, turnpikes, early gas and water utilities, early railroads, and on the taxation of corporations. He rightly concentrated on the highly significant fact that the leader-states long insisted on unlimited liability for corporate shareholders; nor did the existence or absence of limited liability seem to affect the decisions of business men on whether to form their enterprises as chartered corporations or private associations (pp. 398–402). This important subject rightly comprises about one fifth of the book. The crown-chartered corporation was, in contrast, most distinctive in English law precisely because it did provide limited liability. And it was most certainly not, in the reviewer's opinion, a conscious reversion to imitating this characteristic when our legislatures finally settled down to the grant of limited liability to all charter seekers with the exception of banks.

The book as a whole supports one central and very important thesis: that our legislatures and judges, having really "received" almost no doctrine on the nature and status of corporations and business associations other than partnerships from English common law, independently worked out their own original and ingenious solutions. In so doing, legislatures and courts were responding to rapidly changing business concepts and initiative.

Thus what the reader will miss most is analysis of the beliefs and motivations, and resulting creative actions, of the businessman-lawyer community. Hundreds of private joint stock associations were formed in this period lacking charters or any state sanction even in such a state-guarded pursuit as banking. They behaved just like corporations. Why was limited liability so little valued until quite late in this era? Why did business men not seek charters of incorporation for most ordinary business undertakings, that is, other than for activities where "a little slice of sovereignty" was needed, as in banking and insurance and canal or turnpike building? Was this simply because it was fairly expensive to acquire a charter, or was it fundamentally an expression of the belief,

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widely and sincerely held, that free association for group activity without the state's blessing or intervention was a fundamental right possessed by business men as clearly as by church parishioners (the powerful congregationalist principle, which certainly was "received doctrine" in all the states Dodd examined)? Was this natural-law belief in men's private right to organize freely into associations for any lawful business purpose the primary origin of the final emergence of the untrammeled general incorporation system—something entirely new in American social engineering? Was the democratic jealousy of special privilege, to which this result is attributed by most historians, only the secondary source? Dodd affirmatively answers this last question, though with little elaboration (p. 432). These basic questions could not be properly explored in less than a volume of similar scope and of equally painstaking scholarship, which yet remains to be written.

Shaw Livermore

New York City

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BOOK NOTES

The work of unmasking "democratic man", a figure populating most contemporary Western political theory, proceeds apace in *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Row, Peterson and Company, 1954; xiii, 242 pp. $4.75), by Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller. By the device of asking a national sample of the electorate some one hundred fifty questions, divided between two interviews, one before and one after the 1952 election, the authors of this penetrating book (and the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan) are able to probe into the motivating factors which guide electoral decisions. Among these factors are three which dominate the analysis: party identification, issue orientation, and candidate orientation, each of which contributes to, or impedes, a final partisan decision. By means of attitude scales and other quantitative techniques the authors can not only locate demographically the classes of people influenced by each of these factors, but also contribute to our understanding of cross pressures, electoral perceptions, sensitivity to party differences, alternative response patterns and other significant psycho-political phenomena. In addition, the participation decision is clarified by analysis of popular attitudes toward the effectiveness of the vote and toward different kinds of citizen duties. Or, taken as a report on a single important election, the book offers invaluable data to the political historian. In this connection, it may well be that much of the book's very great value will not be revealed until other similar studies permit comparisons between 1952 electoral responses and responses under different circumstances with different candidates and different issues. Every good book has the defects inherent in its virtues: here, if the terms are admissible, there may be paired hyperfactualization with hypoconceptualization. Other readers may feel as I did, that there are hidden in the findings principles of political behavior which might have been isolated and given names for the guidance and use of other scholars. The most fruitful theory is often precisely the kind which emerges when experienced scholars who have saturated themselves in a body of data come to generalize, albeit cautiously and tentatively, upon the relationships they have discovered. Furthermore, it seems to me that the work might have been even more useful if it had drawn attention in footnotes to the findings of other similar, although local, studies. But these criticisms may be matters of taste.

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The achievement in this work of a comprehensive, often profound, well-documented interpretation of a national election, together with the development of new concepts and new tools of analysis, serves as a milestone in the progress of political science.—ROBERT E. LANE, Yale University.

Yearbook of the United Nations, 1953 (New York, Columbia University Press in cooperation with the United Nations, 1954; x, 906 pp. $12.50) is the seventh of a series produced by the Department of Public Information. For the student of international affairs, or for any person who has an interest in the work of the United Nations, this book is invaluable as a source of reliable information. It covers the activities of all United Nations organs, and, in somewhat more condensed form, the activities of the specialized agencies as well. It includes well-prepared charts and maps which further aid the use of the volume in understanding the structure, functioning and work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. The general organization of the volume remains substantially the same as for the preceding years. The main-headings and subdivisions are logically selected, and serve to provide maximum guidance for the reader in the use of the volume. The factual accounts of United Nations activities give just about the right amount of detail and are written with commendable objectivity. For the student, an extremely valuable feature is the frequent citation of documents, as well as the inclusion of the texts of resolutions and draft conventions. Considering the total quantity of material from which the editors have had to choose, their selections appear generally to have been well made. Frequent cross-references to previous volumes in the series are of great assistance to the reader in tracking down texts which have appeared in earlier volumes. A more frequent use of this device might be advisable, as, for example, in such matters as the Rules of the General Assembly and the Provisional Rules of the Security Council.—LELAND M. GOODRICH, Columbia University.

The principal justification for rewriting history is to acquaint readers with new findings of fact and new historical interpretations and points of view. These objectives have been shared by all the contributors to the multi-volume *Oxford History of England*, still in course of publication, in which J. D. Mackie, professor of Scottish history in the University of Glasgow, has written *The Earlier Tudors, 1485–1558* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, New York, Oxford University Press, 1952; xxii, 699 pp. 25*s.*; $7.00), the most comprehensive and important historical work that

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he has produced. The narrative, inevitably of varying degrees of readability in a book of this scope, is based upon a breadth and depth of learning which is evidenced in the footnotes and the usefully organized bibliography. A noticeable feature of the work is the attention given to England's foreign relations. In the great religious controversies of the age he is dealing with, Professor Mackie leans to the Protestant side. He is not much given to speculating on what might have happened, and therefore the historical significance of the actual is not always clarified. Might not the subsequent course of English history have been greatly different from what it was if the marriage of Queen Mary and her Habsburg cousin Philip of Spain had not been childless? The author does not permit his imagination to play on such questions.—R. L. SCHUYLER, New York, N. Y.

Simply to chronicle the highly complicated sequence of events in the ethnic borderlands of Russia during the tumultuous years between 1917 and 1923 is a difficult problem by itself. Richard Pipes has not only accomplished this task in his book, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954; xvi, 355 pp. $6.50), but he has given this complex story meaning and perspective. His documented study of nationalism and communism in Russia shows clearly and lucidly how the deep-rooted social conflicts that erupted in 1917 in the Great Russian areas of the Tsarist empire spread to the Ukrainian, Caucasian and Asiatic periphery of the realm, becoming mingled there with insipient national movements. Mr. Pipes's keen political analysis of the diverse forces at work in these areas reveals how the Bolsheviks were able to capitalize here, as in Russia proper, on the chaos and social ferment and to emerge from the civil war as the dominant political power. The methods and the pace of the struggle, as well as the problems encountered by the Communists, differed in each region as a result of local historical differences inherited from the old régime. But the over-all pattern was similar in each of the three areas treated in the book. The Communists utilized their fundamental singleness of purpose and political flexibility against their opponents' disunity and ineptitude and succeeded in achieving their primary objective—supreme power. Ultimately, however, Mr. Pipes shows, the Bolsheviks were compelled to come to terms with the nationalist feelings that they had encouraged during the civil war in order to win allies for their struggle for power. When the Communists turned to reintegrating these borderlands into the new Russian state, the system that emerged represented a compromise between doctrine and political expediency. It was "an attempt to

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reconcile Bolshevik strivings for absolute unity and centralization of all power in the hands of the party, with the recognition of the empirical fact that nationalism did survive the collapse of the old order." The compromise was heavily weighted in the Bolsheviks' favor, however, for in return for granting the ethnic minorities extensive linguistic autonomy, the Communists imposed a unitary, centralized and totalitarian régime on them. As one student of Soviet history has remarked, the Communists permitted the minority groups to publish directives from Moscow in their own languages. Mr. Pipes's book, in short, is a balanced, mature political account of a vital phase of the Russian Revolution that has heretofore been insufficiently studied.—Sidney Heitman, New York, N. Y.

A recent analysis of "the reasons for the disappointment of the high hopes of the Liberation" is entitled *The Death of the Fourth Republic.* The title is hardly appropriate: the "Fourth Republic", in the sense intended, gave way to the Third before it was born. This judgment is confirmed by Henri Michel's and Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch's *Les Idées politiques et sociales de la Résistance* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1954; xi, 410 pp. 1,200 fr.), a collection of letters, speeches, manifestoes, draft constitutions, and articles from the clandestine press. They illuminate the passionate convictions of the heroes and martyrs of the Resistance and their determination to cement the victory of democracy over Nazism and over those Frenchmen who "preferred Hitler to Blum" by creating a new France, a truly democratic *République pure et dure* in which the elimination of plutocracy and irresponsible power would guarantee national unity, political stability, and social justice. If these hopes have come to naught and French politics (and economics) has reverted to type, this testifies not to the poverty of the aspirations of these men and women but to the strength of social inertia and of other facts and forces of internal and international political life which the Resistance fighters—but a small minority of the population—were powerless to banish or control. And yet, the projects for France's political and social future reprinted here in realism and sophistication lag far behind the generosity of the sentiments animating them and the accuracy of the analyses of the French national tragedy on which they are based. It is easier, given a high degree of patriotism and courage, to fight an invader and his home-grown puppets than it is to reshape political and social structures, and the men who successfully made the transition from the underground to the *Palais Bourbon* have not remained without scars. One is reminded of this in glancing at the conventional

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preface to the present volume by Georges Bidault, today a leading representative of the politics-as-usual school in the French Assembly and of the party that has done most (the Communist "separatists" excluded) to betray the ideals of the Resistance, written in his capacity of former President of the clandestine National Resistance Council. The compilers of this collection have each contributed a perceptive and informative essay on the political history and politico-constitutional thought, respectively, of the Resistance, to place the documents in their proper context and facilitate their understanding. For having gathered and put between (the inevitable paper) covers these widely scattered materials —their publication seems particularly appropriate at a time when the "*expérience Mendes-France*" has rekindled some small part of the fire of the Resistance spirit—they deserve the gratitude of all students of French history and politics.—FREDERIC S. BURIN, Columbia University.

Professor Val R. Lorwin's monograph, *The French Labor Movement* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954; xix, 346 pp. $6.00), is one of the rare examples of the species which make one rejoice rather than regret that monographs exist. The French labor movement is an intricate and important subject; to analyze it requires a sophisticated and discerning mind. Mr. Lorwin is remarkably well equipped for the task. Trained in history and labor economics, a veteran of many years' service as a labor specialist in Washington, a frequent visitor to France, he writes with real understanding and authority. In a sense, Mr. Lorwin has produced two books in one. The first half might stand by itself as a reassessment of French trade-union history over the past century. The second half, rooted deeply in the first, examines the character and the problems of French labor organization in our own day. So far as the historical section is concerned, the ground has been covered before; but Mr. Lorwin's interpretation is fresh and stimulating. For readers who would like greater detail and deeper analysis, the author promises to return to this historical record in future studies. For many students, however, the brevity and terseness of the present survey are likely to be virtues. The second half of the book offers much more that is new. Here is a topical analysis of the labor movement during the post-war years, ranging from the structure of the various unions to the relations between workers and employers at the plant level; from the rôle of the unions in politics to the incidence of the family allowance system; from the relative failure of collective bargaining to the refusal of the workers to pay adequate union dues. Practice rather than theory is stressed; Mr. Lorwin is interested in how the unions actually function, and why.

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On the whole, the picture of contemporary French labor is a dispiriting one. Labor's high hopes after the liberation have given way to apathy and frustration; labor's apparent gains in broader social benefits have amounted in fact to a redistribution of income within the working class. Furthermore, Mr. Lorwin reminds us that "the CGT (and Communist Party) following includes some of the best paid workers in France", and that "the industries with the highest [social security] benefits have had some of the worst industrial relations and strike records." Mr. Lorwin fully recognizes how much the Communists have contributed to this miasma; and he sees no simple way to bring the working class back into the national community. "It is easier", he observes, "to visualize continued stalemate or sudden catastrophe than the infinitely varied possibilities of social adjustment." He does suggest, however, that "the Communist hold on the workers remains conditional and vulnerable", and he hopes that changing attitudes on the part of employers, workers and politicians may somehow combine to produce both a new French unionism and a revitalized French democracy.—Gordon Wright, University of Oregon.

Despite the fact that 83 per cent of India's population is rural and the form of government with which the average inhabitant of South Asia comes most frequently in contact is district, municipal or village government, surprisingly little attention has been paid by students of political science to the development of local governmental institutions in this area. Thus Hugh Tinker's book—*The Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan and Burma* (London, The Athlone Press, 1954; xxiv, 376 pp. $7.00)—fills an important gap in the literature on political institutions in the Indian subcontinent and Burma. This carefully documented historical study, originally a doctoral dissertation presented at the London School of Oriental and African Studies, traces in detail the rise of local government in India and Burma under British rule. The book is divided into three parts. Beginning with a survey of indigenous systems of local government, the first part traces the expansion of local governmental institutions up to the famous Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1918. Part II examines these same institutions during the period of the 1920s and 1930s when the British-appointed members of urban and rural governing boards were reduced to one quarter of the total, and when popularly elected ministers took over the responsibility for local government. Part III deals with the specific problems of education, highways, health, water supplies and finance over the entire period. An index and an excellent partially annotated bibliography

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are appended. Although a number of South Asian political leaders (such men as Vallabhbhai Patel, K. N. Katju and Khwaja Nazimuddin) received their early political training in local governing bodies, these institutions were not generally successful. Public-spirited men were more frequently attracted to national politics and local boards were often "abandoned to the self-seeker and the jack-in-office" (p. 144). Local government legislation, says Tinker, almost never arose from a popular demand, and the doctrinaire and conservative schemes which frequently evolved did not make adequate provision for local conditions and prejudices. "Public indifference and sometimes hostility to the workings of local government", he adds (p. 335), "furnished conservative-minded British officials with a constant theme: there is no native demand for local self-government." Thus the failure was both British and Indian. With such a careful and exhaustive study it is difficult to find fault, except on minor matters. The frequent use of untranslated Hindustani words is acceptable in Britain but may cause annoyance to students unfamiliar with the jargon of "Old India Hands". The wealth of unrelieved detail, statistical tables and charts tends to make the work ponderous, and coupled with the outrageous price of $7.00 places unnecessary limitations on the potential readership. On another level, it would have been helpful to present-day students of colonial affairs to have a bold answer to the question: can local government develop satisfactorily as long as a colony's struggle for independence monopolizes the best indigenous leadership? A negative answer is implicit in Tinker's evidence. This book establishes a sturdy foundation for further study of local government in South Asia, and it is hoped that equally competent attention will soon be given to the subject for the post-independence period.—MARSHALL WINDMILLER, University of California.

Western students of government are at last becoming aware of the importance of giving more attention to the government and politics of India, the world's largest democracy. They are handicapped both by their own lack of knowledge and by the lack of books and other publications which are sufficiently informative and penetrating. Almost every Indian political scientist, it seems, has written a book or articles on the Constitution of India. Most of these books or articles, however, are largely in the form of an exegesis of the Constitution itself, with some historical and comparative information but with little attention to the actual operation of the system of government or to the mainsprings of political action. *Democratic Government in India* (Calcutta, The World Press Ltd., 1954; 404 pp. Rs. 10) by N. Srinivasan, Professor of Political

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Science at Andhra University, is one of the clearest and most satisfactory examples of the conventional treatment of "the new Constitution of India in its historical setting." It is a useful introduction to this important subject. Its distinctive features, aside from the unusual clarity of style, are a keen appreciation of the institutions of local self-government, a consideration of the precedents from other democratic constitutions which influenced the framers of the Indian Constitution, and a particularly good discussion of parliamentary procedure and of the system of federal finance, in the two longest chapters of the book. Professor Srinivasan is not too hopeful of the prospects for democratic government in India. He holds that Dr. Ambedkar's oft-quoted claim that "Democracy in India is only a top dressing in an Indian soil which is essentially undemocratic" is "distressingly true." He still finds, even in high places, "a profoundly undemocratic attitude" which "must change completely before India can be said to be psychologically ready for a democratic system of government."—NORMAN D. PALMER. University of Pennsylvania.

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